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FOREWORD 
In the course of the half century since 1945 the ideas and the practice of development have 
been a theme of academic and public debate.  In the succeeding waves of opinion building 
the term development was stylised by different catch-words : emancipation, 
nation-building, modernisation, industrialisation, democratisation, and lately globalisation.  
But in reaction against all forms of Westernisation, we are now witness of an unexpected 
resurgence of identity politics and of indigenisation.  These are in fact novel and 
fascinating forms of non-Western modernities.  On account of the scale of the tale to be 
told, the writing down of the postwar saga of development studies in a compact volume 
was a real challenge.  My view on this part of intellectual history is a tale of the interplay 
between the changes in the real world in relation with paradigm-shifts and with the 
flourishing of different canons.  The history of ideas illustrates with ample evidence that 
canons should better not be imagined and profiled as timeless universals.  Like all human 
artefacts, even the most promising and flourishing canons perish.  Like all products of the 
human mind, they are up to a certain degree context-dependent and thus coded by the 
values, the norms, the epistemic modes of thought and the historical consciousness 
prevalent in the society from which they spring.  Canons live a cycle of birth, growth and 
flourishing, followed by decline and re-interpretation.  In the course of time, even the most 
cherished interpretative schemes and canons are like rivers flowing into separate beds. 
Our essay exemplifies the historico-concrete context and the problem-centred nature of 
fifty years of development studies.  In the formative years of the 1940s and 1950s these 
studies were notoriously influenced by the ideological conflict and the geopolitical rivalry 
between the superpowers, as well as by the intense nationalism of the new nations in the 
wake of decolonisation.  The pioneers in the field were full of ideas and produced a flood 
of development projects : on Westernisation, Sovietisation and on a more self-reliant 
approach in the guise of Third Worldism.  Since the failure of the communist project of 
authoritarian planning and the problematic ambition of the Western market democracies to 
go global, new thematisations flourish.  These are pregnant of the neoliberal canon.  
Besides ideology, divergent paradigms of the social sciences and of economics were at all 
time important markers.  In the course of its career the theorising on development 
broadened by the inclusion of  formerly neglected factors in its horizon such as ethics, 
culture and religion.  Since the beginnings different actors have been spinning cloth in the 
field of thematisation on development : academics, leading staff members of the 
United Nations, donors of aid, the World Bank and the IMF, Churches, NGOs and other 
think-tanks of civil society. 
The historian of thought, like other historians cannot completely free himself from the 
impact of the present on his reading of the past.  Up to a certain degree an author’s Sitz im 
Leben influences his interpretation of the present.  My interest in the problems of 
‘Economic development and socio-cultural dynamics’ dates from 1952, when I followed a 
summer course on this subject at the University of Guadalajara (Mexico).  From 1954 to 
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1961 I lived in Rwanda, Burundi and Congo where I did field work in combination with a 
teaching job at the Lovanium University (Kinshasa).  In 1961 I became director of the 
‘Centre for Development Planning’ at the Catholic University Leuven.  There I conducted 
research and had a teaching assignment for mainly two courses : History of Economic 
Thought and Development Studies.  Besides my work in Leuven I had the occasion and the 
privilege to be a visiting professor in several African, Latin American and Asian 
universities.  The following text has been influenced by context in a double way : by the 
unfolding of developments in the world at large and by my own experience. 
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CHAPTER I : A BIRD’S EYE VIEW 
1. The genealogy of the discourse 
In the recent revival of interest for the history of economic and social theories, the 
perspectivation of postwar development studies has been relatively neglected.  And yet, the 
historical unfolding of development theorising is a fascinating story that merits more 
attention.  In the historiography of development theorising that follows, we concentrate our 
attention on the dialectic interplay between the thematisation on development and the 
geopolitical context ; all this in relation with the ideological overtones of the time and its 
leading or sanctified canons in economics, in sociology and in geopolitics  Our analysis 
reflects on the complex dynamics engendered by externally induced impulses toward the 
modernisation of non-Western societies and their reaction to it.  In the course of our story 
we will demonstrate how the thinking on development is coloured, in one way or another, 
by the power relations between the centre and the periphery as well as by the at that time 
intense rivalry between the superpowers.  More specifically, we will illustrate how the 
shifts in the thinking on development were related to ruptures in the historical awareness, 
concomitant with changes in the real world.  In our synthetic bird’s eye view, we intend to 
map out the postwar saga of development thought. 
In his celebrated study on scientific revolutions Thomas Kuhn illustrated some epochal 
paradigm-changes in the development of physics.  We agree that Kuhn’s approach fits 
rather good to the development pattern of mature (or so-called normal) sciences.  For the 
social sciences, where the systems of knowledge and the discursive practices are more 
dependent on historical contingencies as well as on the multiple, external influences of the 
real world and of Zeitgeist, the dynamic processes of change are more complex.  As I see 
it, the approach of Michel Foucault, the French historian of the human sciences, offers a 
richer source1.  His methodology opens the way to uncover not only the gradual evolutions 
but also the ruptures and the discontinuities in the knowledge systems and discursive 
practices of the social sciences ; it also explains the coexistence of rival schools of thought.  
In his extensive studies on the genesis of the social sciences, with his characteristic 
emphasis on la naissance du discours, he illustrates his famous genealogies of novel 
problematisations.  His well-documented studies on the archaeological roots of the nascent 
thematisations open new horizons which reach beyond the conventional histories of ideas.  
Foucault is not interested in a mere sequence of ideas and of epistemes.  He focuses on the 
contextual synergies leading to the mise en discours or on the historical contingencies in 
the novel problematisation of an issue.  He relishes to reveal the contingent forces that at a 
given moment offer possibilities for the appearance of innovative trends of thought and 
new styles of thematisation.  Foucault’s approach highlights the specific circumstances in 
which the basic categories and concepts emerge at a particular time in history.  He further 
demonstrates how the various disciplines of the social sciences shape and in fact discipline 
                                                          
1  M. Foucault, The Archeology of Knowledge, New York, 1972. 
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our thought and behaviour.  Their concepts of man and society, their professional and at 
times metaphorical vocabularies, their epistemic culture and their ideological overtones, 
influence the problematisation of upcoming issues as well as the policies to cope with 
them.   
In our essay we follow this line, and we illustrate the contingencies that affect the genesis 
of new interpretations and canons in the new field of study.  We highlight the rise and 
decline of the thematisations and the development strategies engendered by the leading 
modes of thought.  The complexity of the subject matter invites us to straddle the fields of 
economics, sociology and political science.  We constantly cross borders between theory 
and practice, between text and context ; all this in order to elucidate their dialectical 
interferences.  After a series of breakdowns in modernisation the at times naïve optimism 
of early developmentism changed into a more critical, postmodern mood.   In the view of 
the nationalist elites, development was a mere paraphrase for Westernisation.  And when in 
the 1980s the neoliberal wave and the globalisation of the Western culture industry spread 
to the remote corners of the globe, the most alert cultures reacted with an indigenous 
response of identity politics.  The recent trend of critical thought tends to make us more 
aware of modernity’s ambivalence.  We more than former generations are conscious of its 
shadow sides.  And indeed, the lofty ideals of emancipation, progress, freedom and also of 
authentic development, remain unfulfilled promises for too many people.   
With the unfolding of development studies, the perspectivation of the state’s role in the 
functioning of the society and of the economy made a U-turn.  In the early postwar period 
ideological and intellectual support for active, socio-political interventionism had pride of 
place.  Since the 1980s this canon and its electoral support has weakened considerably.  In 
our days, the neoliberal creed has eager adepts in the former Soviet empire and even in 
China.  The early postwar modernisation theorists were militants for a speedy 
transformation of Gemeinschaft into Gesellschaft.  Since the Iranian revolution, the 
emphasis shifted.  Today the geopolitical context and its problematisation are framed by 
the all-encompassing process of globalisation, not only of the economy but also of Western 
culture.  In reaction to this globalising trend, part of the ongoing thematisation refers 
increasingly to the politics of identity.  With the decline of the marxist alternatives and in 
the absence of credible challengers, an unintended danger may be that neoliberal thought 
becomes increasingly dogmatic.  Against this dogmatic globalisation we experience an 
assertive quest for ethnic and cultural identity.  In several parts of the world novel forms 
and expressions of modernity, or should we say postmodernity emerge.  These new forms, 
like Asiatic modernity, Islamic resurgence and the postcolonial indigenisation of Africa, 
are products of novel expressions of cultural assertivity.  The claims of Western rationality 
to universal legitimacy are gradually undermined by its incapacity to cope with other 
cultures and with their forms of social rationality. 
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2. The rise of developmentism 
The domain of development studies as a branch independent from sociology, economics 
and political science, is a theoretical product of the early postwar period.  The Second 
World War had transformed the geopolitical scene and the international power relations.  
During the war, the  European nations had dealt themselves a severe blow and the dwarfing 
of Europe resulted in a power vacuum on the world scene.  A new era started wherein two 
non-European colossi, inspired by conflicting ideologies, profiled themselves as 
superpowers.  Both the United States and the Soviet Union developed their respective 
spheres of influence according to the sixteenth century principle applied during the 
religious wars : cujus regio ejus religio.  In the second half of our century then, a power 
which conquered and occupied a territory or wielded hegemonic leadership in an area also 
imposed its own political and economic system. 
The development model presented by the United States to its allies was an amalgam of 
Rooseveltian idealism, Protestant messianism, socio-political liberalism and economic 
pragmatism. This was tempered by the righteous self-interest of a victorious hegemon.  
Classical marxism had no specific strategies for development as it proclaimed that 
Communism would spring from the exhausted well of mature capitalism.  In 1945, Stalin’s 
revisionism came to serve as an adequate model for some new nations. The Soviet Union 
itself had been a 'latecomer' to modernisation and industrialisation ; hence, Stalin’s model 
could pose as a success story of development.  Indeed, at the end of the 1940s the model 
could show fantastic results, achieved in the time-span of only one generation.  
Consequently, in the early postwar period the socio-political steering, the planning and the 
administrative ordering of the economic system of the Soviet Union impressed a great 
number of social(ist) minded intellectuals world-wide.  They perceived the Soviet model as 
a better embodiment of modernisation than capitalism.  After the death of Stalin, the 
epigones began reviling the red tsar and Maoïsm came to pose as a rival marxist model for 
the developing countries.  
In the Western part of the world, groups of reform-minded social scientists sensed the 
urgent needs of the time and initiated a series of thematisations on the problems of 
development.  In a minimum amount of time, these thematisations matured into a novel 
tradition of theory building, namely, development studies.  Intellectual history indicates 
that the growth of a theoretical tradition follows a sequence which consists of 
thematisation, followed by institutionalisation, and concludes with the phase of 
canonisation, that is, with the hardening of a central theme into a canon2.  Thematisation is 
a condensation of elite communication aroused by changes in the historical perspective or 
by a rupture in collective experience. In the social sciences new thematisations are elicited 
                                                          
2 For a more detailed analysis concerning the historical and paradigmatic context of thematisation and 
canon building, see L. Baeck, The Mediterranean Tradition in Economic Thought, London : Routledge, 
1994. 
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by, and become manifest in, the wake of a crisis mood generated by shocks in the historical 
consciousness.  New thematisations produce a quantum leap in elite communication by 
which the harbingers of novelty and change are identified and cast in a theoretical mould.  
According to an observable pattern of intellectual history, the issue-focusing of new 
thematisations is related to radical changes in the real world which may cause ripples, and 
eventually shocks, in historical awareness.  The geopolitical transformations that occurred 
in the wake of the Second World War, the conflicting ideologies of the two superpowers, 
and the ensuing wave of decolonisation set the stage for a novel focus of thematisations.  
In just a few years, these thematisations matured into the new tradition of development 
studies. 
In the ideological climate and the political mood of the early postwar period, the market 
mechanism stood at a low ebb in public professional opinion as it had so miserably failed 
during the Depression of the 1930s.  Government was called in to master the situation by a 
deliberate steering of social and economic development.  In the industrialised countries of 
the West, governments, in line with the organised interest-groups, pressed for active and 
interventionist policies to push economic growth and to spread social welfare.  The market 
economy was supplanted by a mixed economic system, in which the socio-political elite 
was supposed to correct and redress the shortcomings of the market mechanism.  The urge 
for an active engineering of the rise in living standards spread to the most remote corners 
of the globe.  The latecomers became test cases wherein nation-building, economic growth 
and modernisation were deemed to be achievable in the time span of one generation.  
Modernisation and development became the rallying cries of the decolonised peoples,  and 
their rising expectations for a higher standard of living received a favourable response 
from the power elite in the West.  In due course the new focus of thought, called 
developmentism, gained recognition.  The new creed spread to various constituencies and 
institutions : to the Social Democratic and Christian Democratic parties, the United 
Nations, the Churches and the non-governmental organisations (NGOs).  In some cases, 
the dialectics of developmentism caused a political stir and interfered in the course of 
world affairs. 
New problems challenge the legitimacy of conventional wisdom, and the ambition to 
modernise and develop a whole spate of backward nations had no precedent in history.  
Challenges of this dimension elicit novel thematisations and require new solutions.  The 
sociology of modernisation and development economics were the twin births which 
responded to the theoretical challenge of the time.  But the unfamiliarity of most social 
scientists with the concrete situation of the new nations led them to posit the historical 
trajectory of the West as a model.  For the sociologists this entailed a refurbishment of the 
classical modernisation theories, whereas the economists opted for the Keynesian growth 
models in a tropical dress. 
Since the time of the Enlightenment one of the basic tenets of Western philosophy on 
progress and its liberal theory is that man can alter the existing institutions, the ways of 
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thinking, the degrees of freedom, the organisational capacity and the basis of material 
production, by human effort alone.  In order to come to an autonomous self, individuals, 
peoples and nations have to be liberated from the burdening historical shackles, such as 
tradition, ethnic bonds, past beliefs and the heritage of meaning offered by religion.  The 
new term development expressed this idea unambiguously ; development means after all 
stepping out of the envelop, this is out of these historical shackles.  The modernisers of the 
early postwar years were looking for scientific evidence to demonstrate to the newcomers 
how the West had done it. 
The new nations, so it was thought, were spared the trouble of choosing their own path of 
development since the historical model already existed.  The basic pattern for these 
latecomers to development was assumed to be the same as that of the Western forerunners.  
The concerned economists, sociologists and political scientists epitomised this pattern in a 
set of central concepts : rapid industrialisation in the economic field, secularisation of 
ideologies and religions, modernisation of the behaviour patterns, urbanisation, and the 
adoption of cosmopolitan (i.e., Western) attitudes to facilitate integration into the world 
culture.  Western sociology and economics, themselves children of the Enlightenment and 
of its rationalistic premise, held that modernisation in the form of industrialisation, 
secularisation of values, and growing urbanisation of life styles would transform the 
traditional cultural mosaic of the heterogeneous societies of the Third World into 
integrated national communities.  Modernisation would change the primordial loyalties, the 
values, the ethnic and linguistic particularities, and other such 'anachronistic' features of 
the historical latecomers into the basic ingredients necessary for the creation of a civil 
society.  But this promising prophecy did not seduce everyone.  There were also the 
recalcitrant who rejected this path of development as Westernisation, or worse, as 
neocolonialism under a new guise.  In two large countries, China and India, a more 
nationalistic and ideologically self-reliant line was followed. 
In the mainstream version of modernisation, traditional societies and their religious and 
cultural roots received a negative valuation, whereas modernity was praised as a heavenly 
kingdom on earth.  According to the most narrow view, economic growth and societal 
modernisation posed only a series of technical problems.  For one school of thought a more 
ample supply of investment capital would automatically generate growth.  Others 
emphasised the crucial role of infrastructure, and still others proclaimed that with the 
development of education, the shortage in professional skills could be met. Following the 
brief heyday of confidence in this single-topic approach, there followed a broadening of 
the horizons.  It soon became clear that development is a complex project in which 
political, social, ethical and cultural factors play a major role.  Given this wide diversity of 
aspects, the single-topic approach of the early days was challenged by opposing views3. 
During the period from 1945 to approximately the mid-1960s, an abundance of 
development theories were produced.  In the 1960s, the first wave of theorising, 
                                                          
3  A. So, Social Change and Development, New York, 1990. 
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propagated by the modernisation and economic growth theories, was met by an intellectual 
counter-revolution instituted by the Latin American structuralists, that is, the dependencia 
thematisers, and by the neomarxist schools4.  While founded on conflicting ideological 
bases, these latter two schools nevertheless shared some basic similarities and 
shortcomings with their predecessors.  The modernisation theorists, who proclaimed the 
instrumental rationality of the West as a universal model, attempted to silence all other 
cultures and societies by labelling them as non-rational and particularistic latecomers.  The 
asymmetric power relations and the intellectual colonisation inherent to the modernisation 
discourse were cautiously wrapped in abstract jargon. On the other side, the dependencia 
and neomarxist schools were not able to overcome their dogmatic concentration on the 
structural links entailed in the growing integration of the periphery in the capitalist centre.  
Their myopia had, like the short-sightedness of their opponents, ideological roots.  The 
neomarxists had no eye for the mis-development of Central Europe, nor for the quagmire 
of the underdeveloped satellites which was caused by 'their' integration into the Soviet 
empire.  However, the two opposing sets of views had one common focus, namely, that 
external factors largely determine the context of development.  In the modernisation school 
the positive effect of Westernisation was emphasised to the detriment of tradition ; whereas 
the structuralists focused on the negative effects of the dependency relationship which, in 
their view, solely functioned to the advantage of the centre. 
In the new nations, the first generation after independence was generally guided by 
charismatic leaders.  These helmsmen were adept in the art of bolstering the imagery of the 
population in states with different ethnic groups, religions, cultures and languages, by 
masterfully designed campaigns for nation-building.  Their campaigns awakened 
slumbering energies and heightened the historical awareness of a growing number of 
people.  In this process, new elites took over the lead from the traditional authorities.  The 
power base of these charismatic populists rested on broader constituencies than political 
parties or national bureaucracies ; their constituency was the people.  During a highly 
publicised conference of African and Asian leaders in Bandung (1955), the best known 
leaders, like Sukarno, Nehru, Nasser and Nkrumah, proclaimed that together they formed a 
Third World.  They flamboyantly declared that the capitalism of the First World and the 
communism of the Second World therefore did not qualify as models.  To order their 
future they opted for a strategy of their own design.  The principles of political 
non-alignment and of national(ist) self-reliance formed the geopolitical guidelines of Third 
Worldism. 
The 1950s and 1960s were a high tide for development studies.  Different schools of 
thought flowered and produced a series of grand theories.  Most of these thematisations 
                                                          
4  In the 1950s and 1960s the staff of the Economic Commission for Latin America as well as the Brazilian 
intelligentsia have been actively and creatively engaged in the thematisation of development.  On 
several issues their heterodox approach clashed with the mainstream version.  D. Tussie, Latin America 
in the World Economy : New Perspectives, London, 1983 ; C. Kay, Latin American Theories of 
Development and Underdevelopment, London, 1989. 
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were elegant but highly abstract models of thought5.  The shortcomings of the early 
development theories resulted from their outspoken economic reductionism and their very 
schematic, ideal-type methodology.  Indeed, a great many of these thematisers were 
armchair theorists without any fieldwork experience. Consequently, their abstract and 
dogmatic stances ignored the great diversity in the historical, cultural, social and economic 
context of the developing countries.  Their approach failed to produce a grand narrative, 
enriched by historico-cultural orientations rooted in a moral base.  Some colonial 
administrators, missionaries and researchers, more attentive to indigenous history and 
culture, had greater success in formulating a more balanced view. 
3. The turn of the tide 
By the mid-seventies, the international context had changed dramatically.  The exuberant 
economic growth cycle of the core countries in the West had slowed down and a spiralling 
inflation plagued most of them.  In this context of stagflation a new model of growth was 
initiated, impulsed by multinational firms.  A cycle of external growth was launched with 
the relocation of manufacturing industries in the most promising lands of the periphery.  
The new strategy of the multinational firms entailed a departure from the classic 
international division of labour, that is, from a world consisting of nation states 
specialising in activities in which they had a comparative advantage.  The older type of 
economy, marked by the international exchange of raw materials (from the periphery) for 
manufactured goods (from the centre), was superseded by an interdependent, interacting, 
global network of manufacturing.  A whole spate of New Industrialising Countries (NICs) 
broke with the conventional division of labour between primary commodity producers and 
industrialised economies.  They opened their frontiers in order to integrate their sectors of 
manufacturing industries within the Western industrial system.  This integration was 
stimulated by the multinational corporations, who were spinning cloth for the functioning 
of global networks. In the widely different development situations and trajectories that 
followed, it became all the more clear that the earlier concept of the 'Third World' had been 
a 'universalist' label for many different histories and destinies.  The nationalist 
development strategy of Third Worldism proved to be unproductive.  The new tune of the 
time was that of globalisation.  In this global vision,  policies oriented toward national 
coherence and self-reliance on the basis of import substitution were losing their political 
constituencies. 
The decentralisation of industrial production and its spread on a global scale, opened new 
opportunities for those developing countries willing to play according to the rules of the 
game.  This unfolding of a transnational and decentralised market economy was 
ideologically nurtured, and politically legitimated, by the renaissance of liberalism and 
steered by its technical handmaidens, namely, neoclassical economics, monetarism, and the 
theory of public choice.  In the 1980s this amalgam matured into a new canon of 
development.  The Soviet empire was unable to resist this global pressure and engineered 
                                                          
5  G. Meier & D. Seers, Pioneers in Development, Oxford, 1984. 
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an eleventh hour restructuring.  This led to the collapse of the system.  In the new 
geopolitical context, the canon of market democracy embarked on a triumphal 
worldmarch.  The most enthusiastic thematisers launched a new rhetoric on the 'end of 
history'. The simple typologies, like First, Second and Third World, became inadequate.  In 
an increasingly integrated Western world, the domestic economies became parts of a 
complex network.  In this differentiated context the ideology of Third Worldism declined6.   
The new course, consisting of the deregulation of the financial markets and the departure 
from international Keynesianism, challenged the socio-political coalitions that supported 
the welfare state in the core countries and placed a bridle of drastic structural adjustment 
on the developing countries.  In the countries where easy credit-lines had caused a laxist 
public policy course, the enforced programs of structural adjustment brought a salutary 
redirection. At this juncture of theoretical counter-revolution, one of the most influential 
institutions, namely the World Bank, entered the arena of development thought and started 
a teach-in on ‘good governance’.  However, the neoconservative policy reorientation also 
had negative effects, one of these being that the lower income classes had to shoulder a 
relatively heavy burden.  The social hardships and a deep sense of frustration with the 
social injustice that became manifest in some countries caused an upsurge of moral 
indignation in the deep layers of society.  With the intention to reduce the social costs of 
structural adjustment the World Bank launched a new set of compensatory programs for 
poverty alleviation, the so-called safety nets7. 
The first culture bomb exploded in Iran, where the Shah had followed a megalomaniac 
course of Westernisation. The Shi’ite clergy and the traditional lay elite perceived  
Westernisation as a sort of disease, which was called Westoxication8.  In some of the 
leading countries of Latin America, a grassroots movement animated by Christian 
communities took a militant stand against social injustice and the excessive economisation 
of society.  The rebirth of religion as an agent of societal change stood in open 
contradiction to the mindset of secularisation that prevailed in Western social science.  
Looked at from the Islamic perspective, the mainstream studies on development are 
legitimating devices for the imposition of Western values in the guise of a scientific 
discipline 9.  Since this time, the voices of the non-Western 'Others' have been heard, 
loudly and clearly.  The culture-conscious elite groups of the developing world realised 
more than before that Western modernity is not the only historical road of development.  
This growing awareness engendered a wave of indigenisation of their social sciences.  
Theoretical indigenisation springs from a new consciousness by which native social 
                                                          
6  For a different ideological perspective on this paradigm shift, see J. Toye, Dilemmas of Development : 
Reflections on the Counter-revolution in Development Theory and Practice, Oxford, 1987 ; B. Nezeys, 
L’Autopsie du Tiers-Mondisme, Paris, 1988 ; P. Krugman, Towards a Counter-revolution in 
Development Theory, Washington, 1992 ; S. Brunei, Le Sud dans la nouvelle économie mondiale, Paris, 
1995. 
7 C. Graham, Safety Nets, Politics and the Poor, Washington, 1994. 
8  B. Hanson, 'The Westoxication of Iran', in International Journal of Middle East Studies, n° 1, 1983. 
9 Z. Sardar, “Beyond Development : An Islamic Perspective” in The European Journal of Development 
Research, December, 1996. 
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scientists are driven to construct distinctive conceptual frameworks that reflect their own 
worldviews, respond to their own historical and cultural experiences, and which are 
oriented toward their own societal goals.  The dynamics of indigenisation have manifestly 
influenced the development theorising of the last decade.  Since then, the elites of the non-
Western world have been engaged in the search for a new identity and difference.   
Thus, in response to the ongoing process of globalisation oriented toward a uniformisation 
and convergence of lifestyles, a counter-movement of identity-reassertion has set in.  This 
is based on primordial loyalties such as cultural roots, ethnicity and local community 
feeling.  The ensuing ethnocultural assertivity has become a world-wide process in the last 
two decades10.  However, for a clear understanding of the ethnocultural upsurge, it should 
be emphasised that its dynamics cannot be reduced to a form of cultural resistance against 
Westernisation alone.  With the collapse of the last colonial empire of this century, the 
Soviet Union, the by then brooding ethnocultural storm broke. The same type of tension, 
which results from diversity, is at work in the multi-ethnic and pluri-cultural states of Asia 
(Sri Lanka, Pakistan, India and Bangladesh) and Europe (Spain, Italy and Belgium).  It is 
worth noting that for the people of Timor, Indonesianisation may be more worrisome than 
Americanisation, as Japanisation may be for the Koreans, Indianisation for the 
Sri Lankans and Vietnamisation for the Cambodians11.  And even in the United States the 
melting pot has recently proven unable to contain the outburst of ethnicity and 
multiculturalism.  In ex-Yugoslavia, Somalia and Rwanda, the ensuing ethnic strife has led 
to genocide. 
4. The development of development studies 
Development theorising has always been influenced by the drift of events.  Moreover, it is 
always coloured and put into perspective by the ideological spectrum and theoretical 
orientations of the time.  Amongst the most important markers we can mention the 
following: unexpected changes in the geopolitical context; a new focus in the strategy 
deployed by the major actors on the world scene; paradigm shifts in the mother disciplines 
(economics, sociology and political science); and last but not least, a breakthrough of a 
novel historical awareness.  The canons of the different schools of thought were 
successively redefined, either to suit the changing needs of world governance or in 
response to the critiques of opposing views.  The agendas for thematisation originated not 
only in academic institutions but also, and increasingly, in political cabinets, in national 
and international agencies, in round tables of executives for global management, in Church 
organisations and in other non-governmental organisations. In some instances a new topic 
was added to the study agenda, at times in response to a resounding slogan launched by a 
muscular revolutionary movement. Moreover, apart from the mainstream agenda, a 
                                                          
10  Rudolf Stavenhagen was one of the first scholars to introduce ethnicity into development discourse. See 
his text 'Ethnodevelopment : A Neglected Dimension in Development Thinking', in R. Apthorpe and 
A. Krahl (eds), Development Studies : Critique and Renewal, London, 1986. 
11 A. Appadurai, 'Disjuncture and Difference in the Global Cultural Economy', in M. Featherstone (ed.), 
Global Culture : Nationalism, Globalisation and Modernity, London, 1990. 
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number of scholars independently followed their own way, a way undisturbed by the 
distortive effect of ideologies and short-term fashions.  However, the practical significance 
of these independents, or their impact on policy-making, has been limited as in many cases 
they were marginalised by the conventional wisdom of the mainstreamers.  In the critical 
mood of the 1980s, a number of analysts carried out a methodological evaluation of the 
different schools of thought and emphasised the circumstance-specific nature and the 
problem-centred focus of development studies12. Viewed from this angle, the area of study 
has been a follower rather than a leader. 
a. The early postwar fashion in development thinking and practice was characterised by 
an outspoken industry-centrism and urban bias.  Under the shock of the Cuban 
revolution and Mao Zedong's thesis that well-organised peasant movements are able to 
ignite a revolution, a shift of paradigm occurred. In its wake ; the basic needs approach 
and policies more attentive to land reform and rural development followed.  The 
spectacular oil-shocks organised by OPEC induced the Group of 77 to launch a Third 
World initiative with the motto a 'New International Economic Order'.  By the middle 
of the 1960s, the 'New Left' had espoused the cause of the liberation movements in the 
Third World and had spawned an abundance of marxist literature.  This was more 
reactive than innovative and it had almost no practical effect.  One of the most 
influential canon shifts consisted in the political questioning of interventionist 
macro-economics, in favour of ideological support for the market mechanism on a 
world scale.  Whereas the high tide of the nationalist models of development prevalent 
during the 1960s had been spinning cloth for the dependency and Marxian schools, 
both of which stood for delinking and self-reliance, the free market system of today 
works as a powerful force of integration on a global scale.  Not only the former 
Soviet Union, but also China, are in a process of 'relinking'. 
The collapse of Comecon and the revelation of the actual weaknesses of centralised 
planning and its ideology have discredited the socialist strategies of development.  
Liberalisation has unleashed tremendous forces in markets all over the world, more 
specifically in East Asia.  Faith in the grand transformative visions and in government 
directed development has waned.  The concern of policy makers and theoreticians has 
shifted to ways and means to improve the effectiveness of governments and of their 
political institutions. 
The neoliberal resurgence of the 1980s brought the debate on the role of the state back 
to the fore.  After more than a quarter century of active state intervention and of 
planning, neoliberalism rediscovered the ideas formulated in the late eighteenth 
century, of a liberal civil society as an antonomous reality that has its own laws and 
mechanisms  of disturbance.  But informed by the mood of the time it also introduced 
                                                          
12  P. Preston, New Trends in Development Theory, London, 1985 ; J. Harrod, 'Development Studies : From 
Change to Stabilisation', in R. Apthorpe and A. Krahl (eds), Development Studies : Critique and 
Renewal, London, 1986 ; J. Manor, Rethinking Third World Politics, London, 1991 ; J. Fontaine, 
Mécanismes et Politiques de Développement, Paris, 1994. 
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some ideological novelties.  Different trends of thought and practice contributed : the 
breakthrough of the Chicago and Public Choice schools, the triumph of the 
Ordo-liberalen in Germany and the rise of the New Right in several Western 
democracies.  By different ways and means these strands of neoliberalism seek a form 
of politics “beyond the state” by the introduction of techniques that can produce, for 
civil society and for the economy, a greater degree of autonomisation, 
responsibilisation and empowerment ; more particularly for people and agencies 
distant from the centre.  They advocate ways and means to achieve competitive, 
optimising market relations and behaviour that will lead not only to less governmental 
action, but also to a more rationalised form of government itself.  In this view the 
market can only function well under certain political, legal and institutional conditions 
that must be constructed by responsible government.  Some Chicago economic liberals 
went so far as to advocate an extension of economic rationality to all the institutions of 
society and to human behaviour in general.  The neoliberal U-turn of the centre came 
as a shock to the periphery.  The Bretton Woods institutions, World Bank and IMF, 
picked the message and started their famous programs of structural adjustment and of 
good governance. 
Here the thematisation shifted to the socio-political prerequisites for sustained 
development, to wit : political liberalisation, empowerment of the people, greater 
accountability of government by means of good governance13.  With the emphasis on 
administrative probity and efficiency ; on effective legal, judicial and regulatory 
mechanisms, especially property rights and contracts ; with the recommendation for 
informational openness and transparency including a free press, the Bank entered 
political waters.  This betokens a new turn in perspective and a considerable 
broadening of development ideology.  Here the emphasis is not on less but on better 
or on more efficient government.  With the insistence on reinvigoration of local 
government and the fostering of community participation, or in other words on the 
importance given to civil society and its NGOs, the reports open a novel agenda with 
populist overtones.  One of the new goals of development, as the World Bank now 
sees it, is ‘to empower ordinary people to take charge of their lives, to make 
communities more responsible for their development and to make governments listen 
to their people’.  The fostering of a more pluralistic institutional structure – including 
NGOs – is see to be a means toward the above mentioned ends.  With the 
recommendation of accountability, legitimacy, transparency, participation and 
empowerment of the people, the staff of the World Bank opened a new horizon. 
However, the Bank’s concept of good governance has been criticised as an epistemic 
transplant from the West on the political cultures of the developing nations.  
                                                          
13  World bank, Sub-Saharian Africa : form Crisis to Sustainable Growth, Washington, 1989 ; id. 
Governance and Development, Washington, 1992. The Bank’s new interest in the political of 
development showed again in its recent World Development report on The State in a Changing World, 
Washington, 1997. 
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According to these critics the Bank’s approach is in fact a revival of the modernisation 
(Westernisation) theory of the early postwar period.  Indeed, with its emphasis on the 
techniques of disciplining, monitoring and watching, the Bank’s new procedures reach 
much deeper into the socio-political functioning of the assisted countries and 
ambitions to mould them more than before.  The canon of good governance is part of 
the neocolonial resurgence in the wake of globalisation14. 
The miracles of East Asia gave rise to a new wave of thematisation on the respective 
merits of the free play of the markets versus state intervention.  In the course of these 
intellectual controversies over the most promising policy, the political scientists came 
up with a new conceptual construct, namely ‘the developmental state’.  But the Asian 
crisis of 1997 initiated a new theme, namely crony capitalism or the mismatch 
between the state bureaucracy and the private sector in Asia15.  In Sub-Saharan Africa 
the economic decline, more particularly since the 1980s, elicited a flood of studies on 
the negative role of the state.  In these analyses the African postcolonial state was 
bestowed with different ‘disquality’ labels : predatory state, prebendal state, 
patrimonial state, clientilistic clique state, etc.  In the early 1990s the impulse of 
Afrostroïka initiated new themes like democratisation, good governance and civil 
society.  The thematisation on ‘good governance’ and the newly formulated canon of 
market democracy are markers of the post-Cold-War trend.  This new agenda has been 
eagerly espoused by the Western donors of aid, by multilateral creditors, more 
particularly the World Bank and by the NGOs 16.   
Looking back over the last fifty years of development studies, we can see that 
successively new dimensions were added to the narrow starting blocks of the early 
models, to wit, the religious, ethical and cultural dimensions17.  With a growing 
awareness of ecological problems, the notion of 'sustainable' development adds a new 
dimension as well. Thus the subject matter, as well as the structuring of perception 
that inspires development studies, are themselves in permanent development. 
b. Initially, thematisation was restricted to Third World-oriented development theories.  
The early postwar period had created a particular historical juncture (geopolitical 
bipolarity, ideological conflict, and the disintegrating impact of World War II on the 
colonial system) which induced the constitution of an autonomous field of 
development studies.  A group of academic theorists and technical experts of various 
                                                          
14  D. Williams, “Governance and the Discipline of Development”, in The European Journal of 
Development, n° 2, 1996. 
15  R. Mcleod & R. Garnaut, East Asia in Crisis, London, 1998 ; J.L. Domenach, L’Asie en Danger, Paris, 
1998. 
16 A. Leftwich, Democracy and Development : Theory and Practice, Cambridge, 1996. 
17  T. Verhelst, No Life without Roots : Culture and Development, London, 1990 ; J. Friedman, Cultural 
Identity and Global Process, London, 1994 ; G. Rist (ed.), La Culture Otage du Développement, Paris, 
1994 ; J. Nederveen Pieterse, 'The Cultural Turn in Development : Questions of Power', in The 
European Journal of Development Research, n° 1, 1995 ; M. Wieviorka, Une société fragmentée ? 
Paris, 1996 ; V. Tucker, 'A Cultural Perspective on Development', in The European Journal in 
Development Research, n° 2, 1996. 
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national and international agencies were convinced that a concerted effort of enquiry 
and policy formulation, embodied in a specialised discipline, was indispensable in 
light of the urgency of the development problems.  Now that there is no longer a 
'Second World', and the neoliberal paradigm has replaced the interventionist mood of 
the early postwar period, the need for an autonomous discipline is questioned. From 
the standpoint of methodology, as well as of theoretical orientation, development 
studies have tended to be reintegrated into the mother disciplines, namely, economics 
and sociology.  With the revival of neoclassical economics and of political 
conservatism, and the consequent reassertion of their universalist claims, the 
thematisation on 'the special case' has lost its appeal.   
As a result of the geopolitical changes (the end of bipolarity, the global spread of the 
market economy and the growing diversity between the Third World countries), 
development theorising risks losing its original anchorage in the domain of developing 
countries.  Indeed, some of today's development theorists are attempting to embrace 
the scale of the globe. Novel problematisations, such as the problems of transition in 
the former Communist bloc, the migration of economic opportunity to the growth 
poles of Asia and, last but not least, the growth pains of the Western core countries, 
enrich the subject matter with new avenues of enquiry that tend toward a promising 
study of world society or of globalisation.  The now fashionable term globalisation 
stands for the worldwide networking of industrial production firms, of financial 
intermediaries and markets, and last but not in the least of the Western media and 
culture industries.  Its driving force is the neoliberal ideology that since the 1980s 
seems to have conquered the world.  Neoliberalism stands for cheap or minimal 
government and government geared to securing the conditions for optimum economic 
performance.  In this entrepreneurial strategy, the market is the central institution.  
Today, the new rhetoric of globalisation poses as a substitute for development.  
However, in my view development studies, or the analysis of special and regional 
cases, will continue to be valuable. In order to meet the challenge, this approach ought 
to be infused with a new spirit. The new accents in institutional economics and the 
studies of comparative economic systems may be helpful companions on the road to 
the renewal of development theorising. 
c. With the exception of a few historians, the development theorists of the early period 
were not interested in the stories of the two non-Western latecomers, Russia and 
Japan18.  From the second half of the 1980s, when the failure of the Soviet Union and 
of Central Europe became manifest, the state-planned, socialist development strategy 
could hardly be of interest, except as a negative model.  Conversely, the development 
of Japan offers a more interesting story.  Due to the industrial success of Japan, the 
                                                          
18  The three most noteworthy economic historians with an interest in development were natives from 
Eastern Europe, A. Gerschenkron, S. Kuznets and K. Polanyi.  Only Gerschenkron drew interesting 
conclusions from the development story of his native country. See A. Gerschenkron, Economic 
Backwardness in Historical Perspective, Cambridge, 1962. 
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Western managers and scholars realised that not only the developing countries, but 
also the core economies of the West, can learn from the Japanese case.  In the 1980s 
the 'learn from Japan' idea became a fashion.  Before the financial crisis that struck the 
region, the strategy of the so-called dragons or tigers of East Asia, was profiled as the 
most promising recipe of development.   
Economic development, and more particularly industrial development, is in essence a 
process of flexible restructuring and upgrading of activities toward higher added value.  
The general model of transformation consists of a sectoral restructuring : from the 
primary sector (primarily agriculture) toward manufacturing, and in a later phase 
toward a service economy.  Once the latecomers enter the industrialisation phase, the 
optimal strategy consists in a permanent restructuring of the industrial sector itself : 
from low-productivity, labour-intensive, low-technology and light industries, toward 
high-productivity, high-technology and knowledge-based industries.  In short, 
successful industrial restructuring consists of flexible upgrading : from 
low-value-added to high-value added activities.  Japan was the first latecomer who 
most successfully did the job19.  The restructuring and upgrading can be accelerated by 
adequate policy guidelines or, conversely, may go astray due to faulty ones.  Policy 
makers necessarily have to make choices between the following options : state versus 
market, inward- versus outward-oriented strategies, and investment-led versus 
export-led growth.  The early postwar climate of opinion favoured state-propelled, 
inward-oriented, and investment-led strategies. The neoliberal creed, emerging in the 
early 1980s, favours the market mechanism coupled with outward-oriented and 
export-led growth. From the mid-1980s, a significant migration of economic 
accumulation has taken place.  The economic and cultural successes of East Asia have 
challenged the West’s monopoly in modernity.  A non-Western modernity, namely, 
Asiatic modernity, imposed itself as a promising alternative.  The recent Asian crisis 
impulsed by financial speculation tarnished the model, but the fundamentals are still 
there.  We are living at a new historical juncture : the ideological bipolarity has 
vanished and new 'cultural divides' are emerging. 
d. Now that we have witnessed the geopolitical changes and ideological transition of the 
1990s, we are in a better position to evaluate the development thinking and practice of 
the last half century.  In the 1950s, the modernisation school enthusiastically 
subscribed to Weber’s thesis on the uniqueness of Western rationality. As such, and 
with Weber, they minimised the import of the social, cultural and economic dynamics 
in the non-Western civilisations.  The modernisers claimed that Western rationality 
was a universal model.  This affirmation marginalised all other cultures and identities 
as non-rational, particularistic and backward 'others'.  In order to secure the power 
relations hidden within the modernist discourse, modernisation theorists invested a 
great deal of energy in encouraging the postcolonial and per definition underdeveloped 
                                                          
19 T. Morris-Suzuki, A History of Japanese Economic Thought, London, 1989. 
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'others' to internalise these projections.  By the end of the seventies, though, the 
geopolitical situation and the value-judgements concerning that situation signalled a 
change.  In the earlier models, modernisation was conceived of as a deliberate 
displacement of an indigenous system by the import of a Western one.  In some cases 
Westernisation was implemented at great social and cultural costs.  By the end of the 
1970s the structures of perception started to change.  The West’s loss of prestige due 
to both the Vietnam debacle, the 'showdown' in Iran and the spectacular breakthrough 
of Japan, was followed by an assertive drive toward new thematisations. Development 
came to be perceived  from a broader perspective, and scholars from non-Western 
cultures joined in the chorus.  Since then a growing number of social scientists have 
directed greater attention to both the cultural, ethical and religious values affecting 
development, and to methodological issues 20. 
The geopolitical upheavals of the 1990s wrought a change in the distribution of power in 
the world and accentuated the already ongoing structural shifts of impact from 
governments to markets which gave an impetus to globalisation.  The rise of East Asia and 
the growing significance of its economies in world markets, in the international 
organisations and world politics has diminished the relative economic importance of the 
transatlantic links.  This spells the demise of the familiar Atlantic dominance.  In the future 
the Atlantic-centred worldview will be challenged by a new geopolitical set-up.  The giants 
China and India are in a dynamic process of economic emergence.  And in Latin America a 
colos like Brazil is growing more economic muscle. 
We live in the midst of an epochal tide.  In today’s world, the objectives of development 
and the means to achieve them are increasingly redefined and co-determined by actors and 
groups from cultures outside the Western world.  The revival of the Islamic culture, the 
grassroots movement of the Christian communities in Latin America, the resurgence of the 
cultural conflict between anti-Western Slavophiles (narodniki) and westernisers 
(zapadniki) in Russia, the messianic movements in Africa, as well as the flamboyant theses 
on Asiatic modernity loudly proclaimed in Japan, Singapore and Malaysia, are all clear 
indications of the growing disenchantment with the secularising and materialistic 
ideologies of development.  A renewed sense of basic loyalties is nurturing an 
intensification of cultural and ethnic demands.  The cosmopolitan imagery of late-modern 
globalisation and secularisation appears to be incapable of satisfying such needs though, 
and as such new developments are in the offing21.  
5. Postmodern identity politics 
                                                          
20 In his survey of postwar development studies Ingham states that the thematisations of the first 
generation focused on “material” problems and mechanisms, while the newer ones are more 
“people-centered” ; see B. Ingham, “The meaning of Development : Interactions between New and Old 
Ideas”, World Development, 11, 1993. 
21  J. Delcourt, “Vers une culture mondialisée ?”, Sous la Loupe, n° 12, 1996 ; A.J. Arnaud, Entre 
Modernité et Mondialisation, Paris,1998. 
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Two decades ago when the term 'postmodernism' emerged, it was initially associated with 
developments in the arts.  Gradually the term spread to other cultural spheres, with 
spin-offs in ideology, philosophy, sociology, economics and political science.  Modernism 
had postulated that science and reason could solve all our problems.  It suggested that 
reason, scientific knowledge and technology were able to insure harmony amongst the 
diversity of mankind.  According to the paradigm of modernity, the social, political and 
economic spheres of life could be almost completely rationalised and managed.  As a 
consequence, our lives were being engineered, planned, steered and administered by 
'globalising systems'.  Postmodernism is a cultural rejection of this paradigm. 
The postmodernist mindset is propagated by an eclectic group of philosophers and 
essayists.  The most influential authors are Umberto Eco, David Harvey, Thomas Kuhn, 
Larry Laudan, Jean-François Lyotard, Edgar Morin, Richard Rorty, Stephen Toulmin and 
Wolfgang Welsch22.  Lyotard became one of the best known proponents with his stance 
that late modernity engenders a generalised distrust in the grand narratives of reason and 
progress ; but this is only the negative side of it.  Keywords in the postmodern agenda are 
identity, difference, basic loyalties and multiplicity of perspectives. Postmodernism 
conveys a deep aversion to any global project or cosmopolitan claim on the sole basis of 
technology, science and reason. Critics of postmodernism paint them as cultural relativists.  
Basically, though, the postmodernists are in search of new sources and bearers of meaning.  
The original movement was amplified by new adepts from the Left.  These converts voiced 
a radical critique, or deconstruction as they call it, of the celebrated grand narratives of the 
Enlightenment, including marxism.  As opposed to these grand explanatory theories, the 
'postmodern' social scientists explore and explain the dynamics of development in terms of 
history, institutions and culture. 
In the pluri-cultural nation states of the world, the tide of intense nation-building has past 
its peak.  It is increasingly challenged by ethno-cultural assertivity.  In countries where the 
marxist ideology prevailed, the theory of class-conflict succumbed to the onslaught of 
cultural politics.  The rediscovered impact of the cultural and religious spheres stands in 
sharp contradiction to the convergence thesis.  The convergers and their globalisation 
rhetoric proclaim the complete assimilation of the sphere of values to the requirements of 
the market. The postmodern stance, on the other hand, elicited a deconstruction of this 
Western version of economic determinism, as well as of the class-ideology of marxism.  
Development thinking is now undergoing a renewal that is leading to enlarged horizons.  
The area of study is invited to respond to the paradoxical coexistence of two contradictory 
trends, those of globalisation and heterogeneity.  Postmodernism recognises and respects 
the authenticity and particularity represented by the non-Western 'others'.  As such, the 
                                                          
22 Here follows a short selection from a voluminous literature : J. Lyotard,. La condition postmoderne, 
Paris, 1979 ; G. Vattimo, La fine della modernità, Milan, 1985 ; G. Leng and K. Shell, Crisis of 
Modernity, Boulder, 1986 ; D. Harvey, The Condition of Postmodernity, Oxford, 1989 ; E. Morin, 
Introduction à la pensée complexe, Paris, 1990 ;  S. Toulmin, Cosmopolis : The Hidden Agenda of 
Modernity, New York, 1990.  A comprehensive reader with an enlightening introduction is edited by 
W. Welsch, Wege aus der Moderne, Weinheim, 1987. 
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proposed cultural decolonisation should have an impact on the methodology of 
development studies. 
In order to recognise that we are drifting into a new era, one need not become a disciple of 
the postmodernist springtime.  The peoples of the earth were not waiting for the inspiration 
of postmodernism to get on the move.  In all times, human beings are value-bestowing 
agents of history.  The assertivity of religions and cultures is driven by their own strength 
and by their inherent dialectics of flourishing.  In a great part of the developing world their 
value appeal has grown stronger. 
In a great number of developing countries churches and religious movements entered the 
field of development work by means of an impressive network of NGOs.  This 
NGO-isation brings them to a new associational style characteristic of grass-roots 
movements.  In the Christian as well as in the lands of Islam, the movements inspired by 
religion are fighting against the baleful effects of modernisation and its promise of human 
emancipation and liberation that did not live up to this promise.  According to G. Kepel, 
who studied the Islamic resurgence this betokens a revenge of God23.  The dynamism of 
culture and religion unexpectedly broke open 'the iron cage' of modernity and activated 
indigenisation.  Historical forces that had been marginalised or kept within bounds by the 
flatting mill of modernity are coming to the fore 24. 
In the 1940s and 1950s the geopolitical constellation and the ambition of the superpowers 
to undermine the European colonial system, favoured the nascent political nationalism of 
the local elites in the colonies.  In the geocultural situation of the 1990s a different form of 
nationalism, namely cultural nationalism manifests itself as a new force against 
Westernisation25.  In the lands of Islam and in the transition countries where the 
communist ideology lost its spell, the revival of religion and ethnic assertivity are powerful 
allies of cultural nationalism.   
                                                          
23  G. Kepel, La revanche de Dieu, Paris, 1991. 
24 For more details, see L. Baeck  Postwar Development : Theories and Practice, Unesco - ISSC, Paris, 
1993 ; V. Tucker, “Cultural Perspectives on Development” in The European Journal of Development 
Research, December, 1996 ; M. Castells, The Power of Identity, Oxford, 1997 ; M. Roque, Identidade y 
Conflicto de Valores, Barcelona, 1997. 
25  K. Yoshino, Cultural Nationalism, London, 1992 ; S. Rubert de Ventos, Nacionalismos : el laberinto de 
la identitad. Madrid, 1994. 
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6. There is no end to history 
In the 1990s the ideological triumph of the Western market democracies became a 
dominant theme.  In the new geopolitical context the abuse of power and economic 
mismanagement of the postcolonial states in Africa came to be seen in a new light.  The 
Western constituencies who are influential in the aid-business (American and European 
civil society and its NGOs) attributed the generalised decline to the misgovernment of 
these authoritarian regimes.  To turn the tide of the prebendal clientilism and the predatory 
practices of their rulers, they called for democratisation and economic reform.  This change 
of the political paradigm caused a flood of studies on the role of the state and on political 
pluralism as a prerequisite of sustained growth. 
Against the black picture of the African quagmire stood the East Asian tigers.  These were 
hailed as the most successful champions in development.  The dynamic restructuring and 
upgrading of their industries toward higher added-value activities was proclaimed to be a 
model for the rest of the developing world.  But in the summer of 1997 it seemed that the 
Asian tigers had been doped by speculative bulbs.  And the swing of their dynamism was 
interrupted.  The Asian shocks spread by contagion to two other colossi : in the summer of 
1998 to Russia and in January 1999 to Brazil.  The accelerated sequence of financial crises 
initiated a new cycle of thematisation on the volatility of the globalised but unregulated 
financial markets and on the more or less inept management of these crises by the IMF.  
The development strategy promoted by the Bretton Woods institutions, also known under 
the label of Washington Consensus, was questioned.  The financial crises of the Asian 
tigers, of the transition economies (Russia in particular) and of Latin America initiated a 
new view on the impact of international capital flows and their volatility.  An influential 
stream of expert opinion now calls for rules leading to more prudential banking practices 
and for reform of the international financial architecture and of the IMF.  Since the 
dialectics of development produces a dynamics in theorising that never stops, there is no 
end to history, nor to intellectual history.  Both enjoy eternal youth.  
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CHAPTER II : THE FIRST GENERATION OF MODEL BUILDERS 
1. Vocabulary and meaning 
The history of ideas informs us that each period has its dominant thematisations and 
vocabulary.  According to the mood of the time, certain words happen to be given a seal of 
collective approval, whereby they become 'code terms'.  These key terms select and 
underline what are experienced as unquestionable realities and objectives.  In the postwar 
period this happened to the term 'development', as at that time development had become an 
imperative for our age.  New historical power constellations and changes in geopolitical 
relationships, especially when they are accompanied by a novel sense of consciousness, 
elicit a new vocabulary26. Until the Renaissance, the most widely held view was that 
human history illustrated a repetitious cycle of growth, maturity, and decline.  The 
post-Renaissance scholars, and even more so the philosophers of the Enlightenment, 
postulated the idea of a continuous progress.  This is a process of accumulation and growth 
in the non-material domain of ideas and scientific discoveries, with a concomitant rise of 
welfare in the material sphere.  The idea of progress moved onto the centre stage of 
European thought and gradually permeated the Western collective consciousness.  Progress 
was perceived as, and declared to be, intrinsically felicitous.  In the nineteenth century, 
Darwinism introduced the concept of evolution.  This new term conveyed a novel 
meaning, namely, the idea that the new forms (biological species as well as societies) are 
accompanied and influenced by a struggle between internal and external forces.  In the 
ensuing contest the fittest survive and dominate the losers, who become dependents.  
Social Darwinism offered the by then industrially advanced and politically expansive West 
an open invitation to colonisation. 
The activist mood of the early postwar period had little patience for historical processes of 
such slow maturation as evolution, and so launched a new term, namely, development. 
This term conveyed the idea of an historical rupture, to be followed by a deliberate and 
steered process of renewal.  In the respective views of the Soviet Union and the United 
States, development was understood to be either an avowed effort to replicate the models 
of the West (Westernisation) or as enforced Sovietisation.  The term development came en 
vogue in the wake of the decolonisation process that marked the forties and fifties.  Taken 
in the literal sense, de-velopment means to be taken or coming out of the envelop.  In the 
early postwar period, the historical and cultural traditions of the so-called 'backward' 
countries were perceived to be the envelop. And just these historico-cultural envelops were 
thought to be handicaps for the new nations on their road to modernisation and progress.  
In some native languages of Africa, for example, the term development means the same as, 
or is an etymological equivalent of, enlightenment.  In Africa, then, the root of the term 
development is also associated with 'a breaking away from historical tradition'. 
                                                          
26 E. Agazzi, 'Philosophical Anthropology and the Objectives of Development', in Goals of Development, 
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In an interesting study, the British sociologist J. Peel offers an exegesis of the Yoruba 
concept of development, or of the semantics of olaju as it was linguistically expressed in 
this cultural area27.  Olaju literally meant 'eye-opening', which creates a condition of 
greater efficiency and prosperity.  Basically, the term intends what the West refers to as 
'enlightenment', that is, the insight required to achieve power over the material and social 
environments.  Amongst the Yoruba, this enlightenment was jealously monopolised by the 
elders of the society and by the powerful.  With the arrival of the outer religions, Islam and 
especially Christianity, enlightenment underwent a transformation.  It was profiled as a 
treasure to be shared.  Under the influence of the missionary religions and the education 
they provided, enlightenment changed its power basis from the traditional elders to those 
with a modern education.  The younger generations had an option between entering the 
colonial administration or embarking on trade activities.  The personal independence and 
financial success of traders were regarded as the happy results of enlightenment supported 
by education.  
When the nationalist movements of the educated urban elites gained ascendancy and 
ultimately took over power, it became clear that an advanced level of education was the 
most essential element of enlightenment. Priority was given to general education up to the 
university level, since the holders of skills resulting from professional and technical 
schooling did less well in the competition for greater shares of the total social product.  A 
person with a general education, followed by a white collar occupation, climbed higher in 
the social hierarchy.  The new opportunities offered to the educated urban elite, and its 
spectacular rise as a result of decolonisation, anchored a skewed view of olaju in the social 
consciousness of the Yoruba people. From the outset enlightenment had a promethean 
connotation, and as such trade activities, rural development, handicraft work, etc. were 
ranked lower than the administrative and political achievements of the conquering urban 
bourgeoisie.  As a consequence of this skewed perception, the social demand for advanced 
general education went into overdrive.  The ensuing hypertrophy in the educational effort 
of the country evolved into the well-known 'diploma inflation'.  The Yoruba case study 
thus provides an insight into the dialectical link between the anchorage of the olaju concept 
in the collective mind and the strategy options of the policy makers. 
The tendency of the pioneers in economic theory to think in terms of steered economic 
growth was strengthened by the fact that interventionism had become the focus of 
theoretical interest in the West.  Since most of the backward areas were agrarian 
economies, they had an underdeveloped resource base with only a few infant industries.  
Given this, it was soon acknowledged that the application of the then fashionable 
neo-Keynesian growth models would be insufficient to meet the objectives of 
development.  Consequently, the spectrum of issues referred to in the theoretical discourses 
broadened.  Besides the determinants of economic growth and its required capital 
accumulation, other matters, such as the activation of industrialisation, the choice of 
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techniques in planning the industrial base, the transformation of the occupational structure, 
the mobilisation of the under-employed manpower and the role of international trade, 
loomed large in the early development debate. 
The liberal international order established by the United States cherished the idea of the 
incorporation of the new states into the Western industrial orbit, which was stimulated by 
an open door policy.  Early development theory and policy, though, chose to ride on the 
crest of the rising nationalism in the developing countries.  The dismal economic 
performance of the Western countries and the related depression in the economies of the 
commodity producing countries in the 1930s, continued to influence the climate of opinion 
as late as the 1950s.  Many economists were convinced that developing countries might 
have a better chance with a strategy of more balanced national growth.  This would limit 
their dependence on the cyclical fluctuation of trade with the developed countries.  More 
balanced growth would also create an opportunity to establish a national industry, and 
provide the modern lever to catch up with the advanced countries.  The then prevailing 
international trade pessimism, nurtured by some influential economists and policy makers, 
recommended industrialisation as the favourite vehicle of growth.  In their view, not only 
the vicious circle of backwardness and poverty had to be broken.  To make this program 
solid, employment creation by public investment planning, oriented toward rapid 
industrialisation, was also regarded as a priority.  The early developers envisaged a 
complete overhaul of the backward nations.  As a first step in this process they provided 
blueprints for economic growth. 
The first generation of development theorists started with the zeal of a new sect.  In a flood 
of publications, modernisation theory and its hard core development economics profiled 
itself as a new ideology of salvation.  Looking at the economic backwardness of the new 
nations, the developers proclaimed that urgent policy measures were necessary.  And the 
men in power were persuaded that they could succeed in the time of one generation28.  For 
development economics, 1945-65 was a high tide.  An impressive list of influential authors 
turned to the subject.  Among the first to construct general models of growth 
were P. Rosenstein-Rodan, R. Nurkse, H. Singer, C. Clark, S. Kuznets, A. Lewis, 
A. Hirschman, R. Prebisch, F. Perroux and many others29.  Their models were rooted in 
different paradigmatic traditions and ideological preferences.  These ranged from the 
classical school with a preference for the market mechanism, to the opposite school which 
defended state planning, and the middle roaders who practised Keynesian inspired growth 
models. 
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2. The founding father of development economics 
Rosenstein-Rodan, an economist originally from Central Europe, may be considered to be 
the founding father of the first generation of development economics.  In 1943 he 
published his path-breaking study on the new theme30.  As a complement to the dictum of 
the scholastic schoolmen of the Middle Ages, Natura non facit saltum, Rosenstein-Rodan 
founded development theory on the principle Voluntas facit saltum.  He asserted that in 
human affairs a deliberate effort of will can produce a jump forward.  Inspired by this 
philosophy he rejected the piecemeal and gradual approach of the neoclassical school.  On 
the premise that the underdeveloped areas of Eastern Europe were locked in an arrested 
state of industrial growth, the breakthrough toward sustained industrialisation required an 
organised attack on a broad front. 
His first concern was the excess agrarian population of the region, which resulted in a 
considerable degree of 'disguised' unemployment of its manpower.  To take advantage of 
the economies of scale, he advised a planned program of industrialisation based on the 
simultaneous creation of several complementary industries.  For the most backward 
regions, Rosenstein-Rodan initiated the idea of the big push.  On this view, a major block 
of government sponsored social overhead and infrastructure must be built as a catalyst for 
the consumer goods factories, as private market initiatives would not be able to start these 
public utilities in time.  To be effective, these infrastructural and public utilities, mainly 
transport facilities and energy installations, require a minimum quantum.  They could serve 
a number of factories as they would cost far too much for only one or a small group of 
firms. 
Coherent industrialisation programs require a big push, as in practice, the take-off in a 
program of comprehensive and complementary investment presents more indivisibilities 
than the smooth production functions of equilibrium theory postulate.  In order to succeed, 
the minimum threshold of capital investment had to be of significant enough size.  As 
such, foreign aid may be a useful complement to national savings. 
3. Development through balanced economic growth 
R. Nurkse is the second prominent author of early development economics.  He favours 
balanced growth31.  This choice rests on the technical requirement for a nationalist 
development strategy.  In order to meet the rise in demand in a closed economy, an 
equivalent expansion in productive capacity is necessary.  If the requirement is not met, the 
shortfall in national production has to be imported.  In the growth process, however, the 
volume of demand for all goods and services does not grow at the same rate.  In the course 
of welfare evolution demand for the basic necessities such as food, clothing, housing, etc., 
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will witness a relative decrease in favour of a more intensive demand for sophisticated 
goods and services.  With the rise in average welfare the demand for industrial products 
accelerates.  This implies a transformation toward the faster growth of sectors and 
industries where the income elasticity of demand is high, and a slower rate of growth for 
the sectors which witness a low income elasticity of demand. 
However, the dynamism of this complex transformation process cannot be left solely to the 
price mechanism of the market economy, particularly in underdeveloped economies. In 
these conditions, markets are imperfect as a consequence of basic rigidities in the 
production structure.  In addition to this 'elasticity pessimism', Nurkse argues that market 
prices do not convey all the relevant information which would permit private investors to 
make adequate investment decisions.  Markets, especially in underdeveloped economies, 
are saddled with monopolies or oligopolies.  Their prices then are not representative of real 
costs. Thus, the ineffectiveness of the market mechanism has to be assisted by investment 
planning. 
The smallness of the market for industrial goods was another argument.  At the time that 
Nurkse wrote his treatise, a country of ten million inhabitants like Belgium generated a 
greater demand for industrial products than India, a country with six hundred million 
people.  Even small countries with a high average income consume more industrial 
products than large, but poor countries. Due to the low average income in  developing 
countries, demand for and supply of manufacturing products are limited.  The market is so 
narrow that the vicious circle can only be broken if demand and supply are pushed up over 
a broad range of sectors at the same time. 
In the light of the metaphor 'the requirement for balanced growth rests on the need of a 
balanced diet', Nurkse investigated the complex interactions between the inter-sectoral 
terms of trade and of price structures.  One should beware of specialisation in some 
branches of industry, or of the over-concentration of resources in only a few sectors.  This 
distortion would inevitably cause a deterioration in the terms of trade or in the price 
evolution between the products of the favoured sector and the lagging sectors.  To cite an 
example : the neglect of agriculture would overlook the initially high income elasticity of 
the demand for food in the developing countries.  A sluggish agricultural production then 
would result in a disproportionate price increase of foodstuffs.  Price inflation for food 
would reverberate through the economy at large. Price rises in food would distort the 
cost-structure of the industrial and urban sectors as they would be continually subject to 
wage-pressure. Finally, the social and economic inequality between the rural and urban 
populations, and between the agricultural and industrial sectors, would be detrimental to 
social cohesion and to nation-building.  As such, the strategy of balanced growth was also 
favourable to Nurkse for its social and political impact. 
Allowing that the arguments in favour of balanced growth and of the big push called for 
inward-looking industrial strategies, they gave a firm boost to the nationalist aspirations of 
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the new states. The balanced growth theory gave rise to a plea for investment in the 
productive capacities of the 'own country' to match the domestic demand.  The engine of 
international trade was discredited and import substitution appeared to be a sound solution.  
In the words of Nurkse, balanced growth is a means of getting out of the rut, a means of 
stepping up the rate of growth when the external forces of advance through trade expansion 
and foreign capital are sluggish or inoperative. 
4. Imbalance as a strategy 
The long delay in development in the new states rendered the quest for a deliberate and 
guided industrialisation strategy the leading issue in the subject. Apart from the 'big push', 
several other metaphors were coined by various theorists, such as 'take-off', 'great spurt' 
and 'minimum critical effort'.  Regardless of the metaphor used, specialist opinion diverged 
widely as to the ways and means to achieve it. 
W. Rostow's term 'take-off' became the most popular metaphor32.  The subtitle of his book 
was 'An Anti-Communist Manifesto', and its tale had a rather optimistic ring.  In the 
construction of the functional prerequisites for take-off, he fell back on the then 
conventional growth creed : a sufficient level of savings would provide the required capital 
inputs for investment.  All would go well afterwards, provided that entrepreneurial-minded 
capitalists assembled the train of industries in the right order.   
Rostow was wary of state guided development and preached the safe old religion of the 
Protestant work ethic.  According to this philosophy, hard work and a sagacious sense of 
enterprise precede the consumption spree characteristic of the elite groups of the 
developing countries.  While take-off requires a deliberate effort, the ideological imbalance 
of state enterprise should be avoided.  His book advised a full swing back to laissez-faire 
economics and to reliance on the market mechanism.  Rostow became an adviser in the 
White House during the Vietnam War. This war became a quagmire. Vietnam illustrated 
the abortive effects of ideological messianism in a country dedicated to nationalist 
self-reliance.  Anti-communism was clearly not enough to be successful in foreign policy. 
Economists like Hirschman and Perroux questioned the balanced growth phalanx in a less 
ideological way33. Like Rostow, they concentrated on the problems of development 
resulting from the institutional matrix.  In their view, the major obstacles to growth are not 
primarily capital shortage, low thresholds of demand and supply, or the lack of 
complementarity.  The real obstacle is the absence of an entrepreneurial class which dares 
to take the risk of unbalanced growth.  Hirschman rejected the simultaneous push 
approach.  He proclaimed that the crux of the matter consisted in the generation of an 
eclectic 'sequence' of separate break-throughs.  As such, capitalist entrepreneurs and state 
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planners alike should concentrate their efforts on the creation of growth poles, productively 
knit together by backward and forward linkages. 
Development does not depend as much upon finding balanced combinations for given 
resources and factors of production, as on the mobilisation of resources and abilities that 
are 'hidden, scattered or badly utilised'.  The organisation of 'creative tensions' on the basis 
of backward linkages is the primary method for this kind of mobilisation.  Backward 
linkages relate manufacturing industries to their base of primary commodity production.  
They steer investment flows and manpower from the finished consumer goods sector back 
toward their input, that is, toward the semi-processed or raw materials base; and to the 
machine and tools industries that help to manufacture them.  Forward linkages are 
investment flows in the other direction, toward the finished products.  They are more 
difficult to realise and present tougher technological bottlenecks. 
In contrast to the relatively balanced path followed by the advanced countries in the 
nineteenth century, for the latecomers to industrialisation Hirschman advises a strategy of 
backward linkages enforced by import substitution.  In his attack on what he called the 
'myth of integrated investment planning on all fronts', he finally reaches the same 
nationalist conclusion as the phalanx for balance : import substitution is the central goal of 
industrialisation.  The difference between the two approaches lays in the pressure 
mechanism and the pacing devices used to attain this goal. 
Against the weight of the historical argument which put its trust in the engine of 
international trade, Hirschman proclaimed that 'latecomers have to follow other paths than 
prime movers'.  The problem with import substitution is not that it cannot achieve what it 
stands for.  The problem is that after a while it runs out of steam insofar as it is pushed to 
uneconomic lengths.  The frustration which evolved in the aftermath of exuberant import 
substitution proved Hirschman's prediction correct.  Once the easy steps in the light 
industry sector were accomplished, import substitution broke down in the capital goods 
sector or in more complicated machinery manufacturing. The lack of technical know-how 
and excessive state interference sunk the boat. 
The difficulties involved in the transition from the easy to the technologically more 
complex stages initiated a turn in the climate of opinion toward the import of technology 
operated by transnational firms. In the political fight between the nationalist line, which 
was supported by the populist regimes in power, and the groups which favoured 
incorporation into the transnational industrial complex, several Latin American nations 
became victims of authoritarian regimes. 
5. Development through occupational transformation 
In an impressive series of historical and statistical studies, S. Kuznets (and others such as 
C. Clark and J. Fourastié) investigated the development scenarios of the nineteenth century 
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prime movers34.  Kuznets found that their success was the result of the following 
transformations and their supporting forces : 
a. Relatively sustained increases in factor productivity, especially of labour 
productivity. 
b. Accelerating rates of structural transformation in the occupational structure of the 
economy as it moved from agriculture to manufacturing, followed by the expansion 
of the service sector.  The gradual shift away from agricultural to non-agricultural 
activities was accompanied by significant changes in the scale or average size of 
the production units.  Small family businesses gave way to large national and 
transnational corporations. 
c. In the initial phase of industrial take-off, wages were kept down.  The ensuing 
industrial surplus-value speeded up capital accumulation by the entrepreneurial 
classes.  The consequence was that the income gap between the social classes grew 
wider than before.  Unequal income distribution appeared to be the price of rapid 
capital accumulation.  As the industrialisation process matured and labour 
organised itself, higher wages followed and the income gap decreased. 
d. Substantial changes in the social and institutional matrices, such as the organisation 
of interest representation and bargaining coalitions for capital and labour.  The rate 
of increase in productivity by labour accounted for approximately 50 to 75 per cent 
in income growth. 
e. The propensity of the prime movers to reach out to the rest of the world for markets 
and raw materials. Given their dominant economic position, the international 
division of labour between the forerunners and latecomers played in favour of the 
former. 
f. The limited spread of this model to only twelve countries in the world. 
In the historical investigations of Kuznets, the transition from a land-based, rural agrarian 
society to a highly skilled, urban-oriented industrial and service economy, moves centre 
stage as a lever of development.  The success in the transformation of the prime movers' 
economy, however, rested on the fact that the preceding rise in agricultural productivity 
created surplus capital and liberated labour as a support for the industrial take-off.  A 
second point to be noted is the fact that this structural transformation did not evolve 
without social and political conflicts between agrarian landlords and captains of industry, 
or between capital and labour.  Indeed, in the United States a civil war broke out as a result 
of the opposing development strategies of the agrarian aristocracy of the South and the 
industrial establishment of the North. 
Kuznets' publications impressed policy makers and theorists.  They helped create a climate 
of opinion in which industrialisation, supported by a transfer of labour from agricultural to 
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manufacturing activities, became the chapter and verse of their blueprints. 
6. Development with an unlimited supply of labour 
A. Lewis profiled himself as a leading voice in this chorus 35.  His model was largely 
inspired by the classical synthesis on development, formulated in the middle of the 
nineteenth century by John Stuart Mill.  In the primeval years of development economics, 
the Lewis thesis on the unlimited supply of labour almost evolved into a canon.  Lewis’ 
growth model is based on the theory of a dualism between the traditional and the modern 
economic sectors.  In contrast with Boeke’s static conception of dualism, Lewis postulates 
a dynamic interaction between the two sectors: 
a. The traditional, rural subsistence sector, characterised by very low or even zero 
productivity of its surplus labour in low-cost manpower, can be tapped. 
b. The dynamism of the urban industrial sector, with a higher productivity of labour, 
is able to absorb manpower from the rural sector.  The surplus value thus created 
acts as an inducement for further investment. 
Aside from the differences in employment opportunity and labour productivity, the two 
sectors are also marked off by different sets of organisational behaviour.  The traditional 
sector functions according to rules of shared distribution, whereas the urban capitalist 
sector functions according to competitive rules and on the principle of profit maximisation.  
Lewis focuses his attention on the process of labour transfer from agrarian activities to 
urban industrial employment.  In his analytical construct, however, Lewis departs from 
historical experience.  In his theoretical model, the rural sector is able to deliver an 
unlimited supply of labour at a low cost, and the absorption capacity for employment in the 
urban capitalist sector apparently poses no problem.  This was not the case in nineteenth 
century Europe of course.  While Marx observed the proletarianisation of the urban 
masses, novelists like Charles Dickens and others gave vivid descriptions of the urban 
unemployment and squalor. 
Capital accumulation in the modern sector determines the speed of labour absorption.  In 
Lewis' model, capital accumulation and the capacity of the modern sector to invest proceed 
on the creation of profits based on the appropriation of surplus value.  Since the absorbed 
rural labour works at low wages, they create considerable surplus value.  Capitalists 
reinvest all their profits and the level of wages is assumed to stay constantly low.  The 
pressure of the reserve army of rural labour maintains the urban wages at a margin just 
slightly above the productivity value of the subsistence level of labour in the rural sector.  
To induce labourers to migrate to the urban centres, Lewis assumes that a margin of 30 
percent will attract a sufficient volume of rural manpower. 
At the beginning of the transfer process, the supply curve of labour will slope gently 
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upwards ; with the acceleration of the rural exodus, the supply curve will eventually slope 
steeply upwards.  The crucial variable in the accumulation of urban industrial capital is the 
appropriation of surplus labour value. The success of this capitalist appropriation of 
surplus value rests on the assumption of real wage constancy in the urban sector.  In order 
to succeed, this has to continue for a considerable period of time.  Once the elastic supply 
curve of labour ends and real urban wages begin to increase markedly, the rules of the 
functional distribution between the capitalist's profit and the wage fund of labourers begins 
to change.  At this turning point a second phase begins wherein capital accumulation 
derives not only from surplus value appropriation, but from the savings of wage earners 
and the profits of entrepreneurs as well. 
In most new countries, the evolution of the real situation departed markedly from Lewis' 
theoretical construct.  The premise concerning an unlimited supply of rural labour appears 
to be largely correct.  Indeed, research findings illustrate the acceleration of the rural 
exodus phenomenon.  However, the assumption concerning the unproblematic absorption 
of labour in the urban industrial centres, and the capital accumulation thesis based on 
surplus value reinvestment, did not materialise in the way Lewis had postulated. On the 
contrary, rural exodus and population growth engulfed the urban centres with masses of 
'unabsorbed' surplus labour.  This resulted in large urban unemployment. 
Even in the situation of labour redundancy, urban wages increased for those employed. 
Labour aristocracies were formed and created another kind of dualism.  This consisted of 
urban wage earners with a considerably higher income on the one side, and of people in the 
so-called 'informal' sector, characterised by lower income and disguised unemployment, on 
the other side.  Another miscalculation was that the industrialisation of the new countries 
did not proceed on labour absorbing devices to the degree Lewis had assumed.  A lot of 
new industries also incorporated capital intensive and labour saving technologies.  In such 
cases, a smaller volume of manpower is absorbed. However, this hard core of the labour 
class pressed for, and in several cases obtained, higher wages. 
In many of the new countries the assumptions of the Lewis model, as well as those of his 
many disciples, like Fei and Ranis, who formalised the model to a still higher degree of 
abstraction, did not materialise.  Labour aristocracies imitated the urban elites engaged in 
government administrations.  They competed for the spoils of modernisation and 
industrialisation under the form of higher wages.  In many new nations the populist 
regimes and the national bourgeoisie could not resist this mounting pressure for 
distribution.  In the course of time more authoritarian regimes, largely led by military 
juntas, took over power. In order not to jeopardise the process of capital accumulation 
required for the expansion of industry, they initiated social repression. 
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Thirty years after the publication of his transfer model, Lewis commented upon his work in 
his acceptance speech for the Nobel Prize. With an exceptional display of intellectual 
sincerity, Lewis confessed that ‘development economics, which relies more on history, 
statistics and anthropology, may be a little more realistic than pure or theoretical models'36.  
Born in Jamaica, a region that was a living laboratory in development problems, the author 
should have known better from the beginning.  However, most early economic growth 
models were constructed primarily on the basis of theoretical premises rather than on 
empirically tested processes and facts of the real world in development. 
7. Development in relation to the international structure 
At the end of the 1940s, a group of Latin American economists working on the 
Commission Economica para America Latina (CEPAL), or the Economic Commission of 
Latin America (ECLA), formulated an original analysis of development posited in an 
international context37.  From their vantage point, the external structural nexus was not 
only one factor amongst others, but was a basic determinant. This was the cardinal point in 
their theories and blueprints.  The postwar thought on development by Latin American 
scholars bears a striking resemblance to the analysis formulated in the 1930s by the 
Peruvian nationalist Haya de la Torre.  The basic emphasis of ECLA is on the asymmetry 
in the relations between the 'centre' and the 'periphery'.  For instance, the gains of trade are 
unequally divided as the terms of trade usually move against the primary countries. This 
structural nexus, though, was overlooked by mainstream theory. As a think tank of a 
semi-industrialised region, ECLA adopted a critical and militant stance and posed as 
spokesperson for the Third World in general. 
Their most authoritative leader was undoubtedly R. Prebisch, first chief of ECLA, and later 
Secretary General of the United Nations Conference for Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD).  However, we should point out that the ideas brought to the fore by Prebisch 
are not the result of one man's work.  They were passionately defended by a whole group 
of economists in Latin America. In time, they became common property in other 
developing countries as well. The fact that Prebisch occupied a key position in ECLA, and 
later in UNCTAD, helped spread these ideas world-wide though. 
The theories of Prebisch and his colleagues were strongly influenced by the historical 
evolution of economic development in Latin America, with the focus on three main phases: 
- el desarollo hacia afuera: the dominance of commodity exports to industrial 
centres; 
- el desarollo hacia adentro: the interiorisation of development by means of import 
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substitution industrialisation ; and 
- desarollo hacia la integración: the period of supra-national integration by means of 
enlargement of the markets and of co-ordinated industrialisation on the continental 
level. 
The group surrounding Prebisch elaborated theories on the role of international trade in 
relation to development, monetary policy, currency control, tariff protection, supra-
national economic integration, etc. For lack of space we will focus our attention on the 
central thesis only.   
The neoclassical theory of international specialisation rests on the assumption of 
comparative advantage, which produces the following positive results: 
a. An optimal distribution of world income and a maximisation of income for all the 
trade-partners involved. 
b. There are indirect dynamic effects of international trade as well, such as the 
learning effect and absorption of technology.  
c. Last but not least, there are beneficial effects such as international competition in 
traded goods which keeps costs and prices in bound. 
In contrast to the neoclassical view, Prebisch argues that international specialisation has 
been to the advantage of the industrialised countries only. Prebisch's criticism does not 
really attack the theoretical value of the celebrated Heckscher-Ohlin comparative 
advantage theorem, but rather its lack of conceptual realism.  Indeed, the hypothesis 
relating to the perfect mobility of the factors of production, and in particular to the 
beneficial effects of free competition, is contradicted by the facts.  If reality were to follow 
this theory, the comparative advantages would develop in favour of the countries 
producing raw materials. The facts have shown that technical progress and increases in 
productivity were much greater in manufacturing than in agriculture and mining though. If, 
as the theory suggests, the prices of industrial products had shown a more marked fall than 
those of raw materials as a result of the differential evolution of productivity, then the 
terms of trade would have developed in favour of the producers of raw materials.  
According to Prebisch, certain social and functional characteristics of the industrialised 
countries and of the oligopolistic markets for raw materials largely account for the fact that 
international specialisation was to the advantage of the industrialised countries. Among the 
internal factors he mentions, in particular : 
- the low income elasticity of demand in the industrialised countries for products 
from countries producing raw materials ; 
- the raw materials-saving innovations, such as synthetics. 
Moreover, the quasi-monopolistic structures of the markets for internationally traded goods 
are to the advantage of the centre of the system. In the centre, a great number of powerful 
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and oligopolistic firms determine market prices.  Competitive capitalism is only the case 
for small family firms and independent shopkeepers.  The oligopolistic form of the market 
disturbs the mechanism, which in itself should lead to a fall in prices as a result of an 
increase in productivity. The evidence points in the opposite direction though. Productivity 
increases steadily, but prices do not fall proportionately. This can be explained, in part, by 
the institutional structure of the centre that regulates the power relations between capital 
and labour in the mature economies.  In the industrial countries, the institutional pressure 
of the trade unions transforms the increase in productivity into income gains for its clients, 
under the form of a rise in wages. It is interesting to see what happens in a recession period 
when industrial activity slows down. During a recession both employers and employees are 
able to protect their profit-margin and their wage-level  from falling.  This is in 
contradiction with the theories on competition.  Instead of a fall in prices for industrial 
products, a fall in prices of the raw materials is the outcome. The reason is structural again.  
On account of the almost perfectly elastic labour supply, and as a consequence of the 
weakness of trade-unions in the developing countries, an increase in productivity in those 
countries is transformed into a fall in price of the product. 
The dissipation of export earnings is further explained by structural conditions in the world 
market.  The producers of primary commodities engage in fierce price competition with 
suppliers of similar export products from other developing countries.  In the price 
competition between primary producers, their wage earners receive the full shock by a 
drop in income.  According to Prebisch, international specialisation has the following 
results for the periphery : 
a. A constant deterioration in the terms of trade, which presupposes larger and larger 
volumes of export to obtain an equal amount of export proceeds in monetary terms.  
This may be called 'immiserising growth' as opposed to welfare benefits. 
b. In Latin America the income elasticities for finished industrial products are 
increasing with the result that the demand for these imports rises.  In the advanced 
countries, conversely, income elasticities for tropical food products are decreasing 
in relative terms.  Their demand for commodity imports is, at best, constant in 
volume.  The differential evolution of the income elasticities in the centre and in 
the periphery induces chronic balance of payment problems for the periphery.  
Indeed, the periphery's import trend of finished products moves at a structurally 
higher level than the centre's import trend of raw materials.  As a result, the Latin 
American financial proceeds of commodity export are structurally insufficient to 
pay for the import of finished goods. 
The policy guide-line that Prebisch has drawn from his analysis is that of an inward-
looking development (desarollo hacia adentro) as an absolute priority.  Industrialisation 
has to be oriented toward the substitution of imports, supported by the imposition of 
selected tariffs on industrial products from abroad.  As it would lead us too far afield to 
analyse all the results of this markedly nationalistic industrialisation policy, it is sufficient 
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to make the following remarks. In the early and easier phases of this process there was a 
marked success.  Most countries in Latin America witnessed a spurt in industrialisation.  
This had social consequences as well.  Behind the protective tariffs, the populist regimes 
and their nationalist bourgeoisie gained some leeway to offer wage rises to industrial 
labourers and to their administrative and political clients. For the social groups which were 
increasingly integrated into this populist system of industrialisation, all went well from 
1950 to 1965.  However, the rising costs generated inflation, with the result that part of the 
income increase melted away. 
The protective effect of tariffs insulated the national industry from outside competition.  
Encouraged by these initial political and economic successes, local industrialists and 
politicians alike pushed the industrialisation motor into overdrive. In line with their 
political creed, the populist regimes hoped to avoid a repetition of the class struggle that 
was characteristic of European industrialisation.  In this they went too far.  They granted 
social benefits beyond the productive capacity of the economy.  The policy of subsidisation 
engendered more unproductive or uncompetitive factories than a sound economy can bear.  
After fifteen years of industrial euphoria, a political and economic crisis was in the offing.  
The development of 'final phase consumer industries' had, in many cases, stimulated an 
uneconomic industrialisation. As such, it transferred the problems from the field of exports 
to the field of domestic industry.  Deliberate manipulation of currency by inflationary 
subsidising of industry had produced structural imbalances. The market dimensions were 
too narrow to enable a generalised build-up of the final phase industries to succeed. 
In opposition to ECLA, prestigious economists and members of the reputed Brazilian 
Institute Getulio Vargas criticised the development models formulated by Prebisch and his 
disciples38.  At their instigation, an important and interesting rear-guard battle was fought 
by the supporters of inflationary development against the monetarists, who were in favour 
of a more orthodox monetary policy. It produced the famous controversy between the 
monetarists and the structuralists39.  The monetarists were supporters of the orthodox view.  
They advocated a policy of strict price stability, a balance of payments in equilibrium, and 
prices of goods more in accord with the competitive prices of the international market.  In 
the view of monetarists there should be no contradiction between sound or stable money, 
equilibrium in the balance of payments, and economic growth. Simultaneous monetary 
equilibria, even in a situation of vigorous growth, depend on sound policy making.  
Permanent inflation weakens the purchasing power of the currency and discourages savers 
who see their savings account melting away.  It also encourages unproductive and 
speculative investment.  Finally, it induces the flight of capital from the periphery to the 
                                                          
38 E. Gudin, Inflacaô e exportacaô, café, crédito, desenvolvimento, Rio de Janeiro, 1959 ; K. Kafka, 'The 
Theoretical Interpretation of Latin American Economic Development', in Economic Development for 
Latin America, New York, 1961 ; R. Campos, Economia, Planejamento e Nacionalismo,  Rio de 
Janeiro, 1963;. 
39 The debate dominated the economic forum in Latin America from 1955-65. See A.O. Hirschman, Latin 
American Issues : Essays and Comments, New York, 1961; W. Baer & I. Kerstenetsky (eds), Inflation 
and Growth in Latin America, Homewood, 1964. 
  
 
35
centre.  According to the monetarists, this would be one of the most paradoxical 
consequences of the nationalist-oriented development policies.  A sound policy can redress 
these evils.  An adequate fiscal policy and competitive industrialisation are able to check 
the overheating of the monetary system.  In sum, long-run economic growth is better 
guaranteed by an orthodox policy. 
According to the structuralists, conversely, inflation is an unavoidable accompaniment of 
growth in a situation of structural rigidities in the economy.  As such it is not a pure 
monetary phenomenon. It belongs to the structural data of the developing countries, where 
the rapid urbanisation of the population and the elastic patterns of consumption engender 
inadequacies between national supply and demand.  In this structural nexus the monetary 
authorities are unable to keep the rise of prices under control.  In the structuralist view, 
inflation is not only inevitable in periods of rapid expansion ; it can also have a tonic effect 
on economic growth.  In the developing countries, with relatively low average income and 
with a low savings ratio, tax authorities and savings banks are ineffective mobilisers of 
funds for capital formation. In these conditions, inflation can be effective as it functions as 
a transfer vehicle of funds in the direction of investment.  Rising prices stimulate industrial 
investors. 
In Latin America, ECLA always had more than an intellectual relevance.  Prebisch was a 
charismatic intellectual leader and his staff consisted of young enthusiasts who spread the 
creed.  They organised seminars and workshops for opinion makers and professors of 
economics.  As a part of the United Nations Organisation, ECLA also had an influence on 
government officials in top level functions, especially in the economic segment of the 
bureaucracy in the whole region.  They were in need of macro-economic blueprints 
oriented toward the concrete problems of the economies of the periphery, but distinct from 
the profit-seeking ideology of the business class and of laissez-faire economics.  The 
doctrines of ECLA provided a more or less coherent scheme for industrialisation and for 
social reform that guaranteed a reasonable stream of profits and capital formation.  Their 
blueprints for agrarian reform, however, met with more than polite opposition from the 
oligarchy that ruled over the latifundia of the region.  The analyses and the policy 
programs, formulated with intellectual rigour and probity, were not always joyful music to 
the ears of the industrial establishment and of the populist regimes.  Although ECLA 
legitimatised state guidance in investment, it also advised higher taxes and less 
conspicuous consumption by capitalists.  The subsidies for industrial expansion had to be 
financed.  It was an ideology and a program designed for 'enlightened' state managers who 
place themselves above the bickering between interest groups and lobbies.  The 
theoretically supported plea for an alternative accumulation strategy, with advice to 
industrialists and populists to avoid class struggle, offered, with the hindsight of the 
military regimes that followed, an original and reformist blueprint for development. 
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CHAPTER III : MODERNISATION AS WESTERNISATION 
1. The heydays of Parsonian sociology 
The rising expectations of the new states in Asia, Africa and Latin America overwhelmed 
the social scientists with the immensity of the changes taking place.  Since most of them 
were unfamiliar with the concrete situation in so many different contexts of development, 
they fell back on the theories of Spencer, Durkheim, and especially those of Weber.  In 
effect, they updated the process of the socio-cultural dynamics of nineteenth century 
Europe.  As noted earlier, the Weberian discourse on the ambivalence of development and 
on disenchantment was considered to be a romantic after-thought of a tired European 
culture.  The Americanisation of the Weberian heritage was the work of an influential 
Harvard sociologist, Talcott Parsons.  On the basis of his rather abstract 
'functionalist-structuralist' dichotomies, which were formulated in pompous language, his 
disciples founded the modernisation school.  The most noted modernisers were D. Apter, 
L. Binder, D. Lerner, M. Levy, R. Braibanti, N. Smelser, S. Eisenstadt, A. Inkeless and 
G. Almond40.   
From the foregoing analysis, it is clear that both the theory and practical models of 
development are, to a very high degree, dependent on the ideological inspiration and the 
life situation of the thematiser.  Without consultation with the subjects for whom their 
models were intended, the designers of modernisation regarded 'their' constructs applicable 
world-wide.  The indigenous views of the societies and cultures of Africa, Asia and 
Latin America were either ignored or dismissed as particularist stammerings.  Central to 
early modernisation theory was the 'ideal type' dichotomy that conceives of societies either 
as modern or traditional.  Most Third World societies were assumed to conform to the 
'traditional' type, which is marked by the following general characteristics: a low degree of 
specialisation; a high level of self-sufficiency; cultural norms of tradition; particularism in 
human relations; relatively little emphasis on the money economy and the market; 
nepotism; and a one way flow of goods and services from rural to urban areas.   In contrast, 
the 'ideal' type of  modern society was assumed to exhibit the pattern variables and the 
developmental objectives of the first and most successful nation in the world, namely, the 
United States. 
In a concerted effort, modernisation theorists devoted much of their energy to the 
elaboration of numerous conceptual schemes. Most of these theorists had no time to gather 
data on the concrete context of the socio-cultural dynamics and of the economic 
transformation by way of field work. As such, the theories served as stylised surrogates for 
the lack in concrete data.  Development was conceived to be an homogeneous and 
universal transition from tradition to modernity.  In this trajectory, the following pattern 
variables were determinant : from primitive, subsistence economies to 
                                                          
40 For a comprehensive and critical overview, see W. Moore and R. Cook, Readings on Social Change, 
Englewood, 1967 ; A. So, Social Change and Development, London, 1990. 
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technology-intensive and industrialised economies ; from passive to participant political 
cultures ; from closed, ascriptive status systems to open, achievement-oriented systems ; 
from extended to nuclear kinship structures ; and from religious superstructures to secular 
ideologies.  In the following scheme, we reproduce a fairly representative sample of the 
traditional-modern dichotomy that was used by the research team of the influential Ford 
Foundation : 
Traditional Society 
a. Predominance of ascriptive, particularistic, diffuse patterns. 
b. Stable local groups and limited spatial mobility. 
c. Relatively simple and stable 'occupational' differentiation. 
d. A 'deferential' stratification system of diffuse impact. 
Modern Industrial Society 
a. Predominance of universalistic, specific and achievement norms. 
b. High degree of social mobility. 
c. Well-developed occupational system, insulated from other social structures. 
d. 'Egalitarian' class system based on generalised patterns of occupational 
achievement. 
e. Prevalence of 'associations', i.e., functionally specific, non-ascriptive structures. 
The societies of Asia, Africa and Latin America were perceived as being backwards.  The 
conceptual schemes depicted the religious and cultural traditions as 'obstacles' to 
modernisation.  To counter the weight of tradition, the secularisation of the superstructure 
and the urbanisation of lifestyles were perceived to be primary objectives.  In a study 
written by an influential theorist, B. Hoselitz, we read the following biased typology of 
Asian society : 
Let us consider the 'oriental' type of society as showing the characteristics of the 
kind of underdeveloped economy in which we are interested.... Usually it exhibits 
fairly pronounced and rigid structural relations and is dominated by an elite which 
enjoys a monopoly of wealth, political power, and education which are the main 
status-conferring social elements.  With reference to economic values the members 
of this elite, acting in performance of their social role, are predominantly 
self-oriented.  In contrast, members of the political, and to some extent even the 
economic, elite in advanced countries exhibit predominantly collectivity-oriented 
attitudes with reference to economic goods41.  
                                                          
41 B. Hoselitz, The Sociological Aspects of Economic Growth, Chicago, 1960. 
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This statement is but one example of a rather audacious inversion of value orientations.  
The elites of the capitalist West (especially in the United States), who are presented as 
self-interested maximisers in most economy textbooks, appear here as altruists.  We can 
only surmise what the reactions of the progressive Asiatic leaders like Nehru, Sukarno and 
Mao would have been. 
2. The approach of social psychology 
A good portion of the modernisation treatises directed their attention to the macro-level of 
society, treating it in terms of the nation state.  The modernisation school, however, also 
had an influential socio-psychology department, in which D. Lerner, A. Inkeless and 
D. McClelland were the intellectual trend-setters.  The psychologists of the movement 
were quick to point out the serious flaws in the traditional-modern schemes of their 
sociologist colleagues.  According to them these schemes only provided a classificatory 
way of telling, in complicated terms, that the West was modern and all the rest traditional.  
As such, they set out to explain why some societies modernised faster than others42. 
The traditional-modern dichotomy started from the premise that all non-Western societies 
are alike. By extending the same typology to a great number of very diverse cultures, they 
ignored the myriad of historical differences in the Third World.  Pigmy tribes, Tokugawa 
Japanese, Trobrianders, the indios of Peru, the Hindu villagers, the fellahin of the Islamic 
world, the Kikuyu and others, are all treated in the same manner.  This ethnocentric 
glorification of the American dream by modernisation theorists was not the result of 
painstaking field research. Rather, it was cultural imperialism disguised by scientific 
bombast. 
In spite of the wide variety of development situations in the Third World, the early model 
builders (economists, sociologists and political scientists) chose to formulate broad 
theoretical constructs, the coherency of which was more attributable to the underlying 
paradigm than to the empirical date before them.  In line with its basic ideology, the 
modernisation paradigm emphasised stability at the expense of change and social justice.  
Its models were ideologically determined modes of analysis.  As opposed to providing 
clearer insights, they distorted our understanding of the complexity that characterises the 
dynamics of development. 
The modernity paradigm came into overt crisis when it became apparent that the 
reproduction of Western capitalism in the Third World generated unexpected problems, 
conflicts, failures and breakdowns.  While the most militant modernisation theorists 
soldiered on bravely, some heretics distanced themselves from this naive dogmatism and 
turned their energy toward a critical analysis of the breakdown in the process of 
development.  It should be noted here that the modernisation school was not a monolithic 
                                                          
42 D. McClelland, Achieving Society, Princeton, 1961 ; A. Inkeless, 'Making Man Modern', in A. Etzioni 
(ed.) Social Change, New York, 1964 ;  D. Lerner, The Passing of Traditional Society, New York, 1965. 
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block.  A large group of anthropologists, historians and comparative sociologists professed 
more realistic and nuanced views, as for instance Clifford Geertz, Sylvia Thrupp and 
P. Worsley.  The mainstream version was not only criticised by leftist writers though. It 
was also questioned, and in many cases corrected, by field workers who had their 
permanent base in situ, that is, in the field where the problems arise. 
  
 
40
CHAPTER IV : EMPIRICAL ANALYSES INSPIRED BY FIELD 
WORK 
1. An overview of method and findings 
By the end of the 1940s, the new ideas on social and economic welfare had reached the 
colonies.  Even before the outbreak of the Second World War their administrations had felt 
the winds of change.  With a remarkable sense of prophecy, the British Colonial 
Development and Welfare Act of 1939 stated that 'development and welfare will be the cry 
of the generation that follows the present one'.  After the Second World War, the ferment 
of these ideas led to a change in the philosophy of colonial trusteeship.  In the wake of this 
reorientation several research institutes were set up in Africa and Asia.  In these 
think-tanks, anthropologists, sociologists and economists focused their analyses on the 
social and cultural prerequisites of development and on the consequences of enforced 
acculturation43. 
Empirical studies were produced by field workers who shied away from the grand theories 
which were of no great practical help.  The field researchers largely concentrated on 
topical area studies, but some of them explored problems of a more general nature.  In 
Indonesia, scholars like J. Boeke, B. Schrieke, J. Van Leur and W. Wertheim conducted 
research in which the cultural, political, social and economic aspects of development were 
integrated in an interdisciplinary approach.  Inspired by the socio-historical methods of the 
German Historical School, they revealed the ambivalence of enforced acculturation and 
they illustrated the inherent dualism of the colonial societies.  W. Sombart's notion of 
Zwiespalt or dualism was adopted by most of them44. 
In Boeke's theory on the village economy of the Eastern traditional societies, the social and 
cultural variables that regulate the subsistence sector took pride of place.  In his view, 
colonialism creates a dualism since it superimposes an external social system on the local 
one.  Boeke asserts that social dualism is the clashing of a dominant social system with an 
indigenous social system of another style.  Most frequently the dominant system is high 
capitalism.  But it may be socialism or communism just as well, or a blending of them.  
The Indonesian village community (desa) functions on pre-capitalistic principles and 
continues to live largely unaffected by the superimposed Western system.  People in 
traditional eastern societies do not behave like the homo economicus of Western theory as 
their material needs are very limited.  On the contrary, their social needs, culturally 
determined by a person's social embeddedness, are of greater importance than those 
postulated by an individualistic theory of utility.  In the community-oriented traditional 
desa, pure economic calculus leading to accumulation is curbed by a mechanism of 
redistribution, that is, of sharing with others.  Moreover, the limited material wants creates 
                                                          
43 H. Arndt, Economic Development : The History of an Idea, Chicago, 1987. 
44  The most prominent was J. Boeke, Economics and Economic Policy as Exemplified by Indonesia, 
New York, 1953. 
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a natural ceiling to the motivation for overwork or drudgery beyond the subsistence level.  
This culturally determined structure of motivation results in a backward sloping supply 
curve of labour. For Boeke, this was one of the essential differences between Western and 
Eastern economies.  Boeke's treatise, though, was an idealised perception of the communal 
ties in the desa. As such, its basic tenet concerning the all but absolute inelasticity of its 
productive and accumulative capacity overstated the static nature of the rural economies. 
The Dutch scholar was a social reformer, sympathetic to native society and its values.  He 
became disillusioned with colonial policy not only due to its political dominance, but 
especially because it generated capitalist production and individualist ideas. Through its 
institutionalised policy and enforcement of capitalist production, the pursuit of individual 
material gain was fostered in a culture where community values prevailed.  Boeke's static 
view and his idealised theory were unpalatable to colonial administrators and orthodox 
economists alike.  They turned a deaf ear, claiming instead that the concepts of pure 
economics must be taken as having universal validity.  Orthodox economists felt that 
historical and cultural relativism would discredit their science. As most of them were 
unfamiliar with any culture other than their own, they myopically viewed the idea absurd.   
In Africa, a number of British, French and Belgian researchers embarked on field work in 
multidisciplinary teams.  They added new study topics such as the analysis of migrant 
labour, the effects of detribalisation in the emergent urban centres, the messianic 
movements, the transformation of the subsistence economy, the land tenure systems in clan 
societies and its evolution, and the consequences of rural exodus on the division of labour 
between man and wife.  The list of anthropologists and sociologists is an impressive one, 
and we mention only the most influential : G. Balandier, L. Mair, R. Firth, J. Maquet, 
P. Mercier, A. Southall, M. Glucksmann, J. Vansina and D. Paulme45.  Economists like 
P. Deane, P. Leurquin and myself were interested in national accounting in countries with 
a large subsistence sector, but also in more dynamic processes such as the functioning and 
transformation of subsistence economies; the impact of markets; the generalisation of 
money; and the change of production and consumption patterns46. 
The sociologists and economists who worked in the field arrived at the insight that the 
economy is 'embedded' in a social and cultural web.  In these societies, the economy 
functions as a by-product of kinship, social, and political relations and obligations. The 
socio-cultural matrix arranges production, distribution and allocation of resources and 
status symbols in various ways, that differ from one concrete historical situation to another.  
                                                          
45  The French sociologist G. Balandier was one of the first to draw attention to the destructuration of the 
traditional social fabric, first by colonisation and afterwards by Westernisation.  The people of the 
Lower Congo reacted to this cultural imperialism in a series of messianic movements, the most famous 
being Kimbanguism.  These collective grassroots protests were the predecessors of the movements for 
(political) independence. See G. Balandier, La sociologie actuelle de l’Afrique, Noire, Paris, 1955. 
46  L. Baeck, Economische Ontwikkeling en Sociale Structuur in Belgisch-Kongo (Economic Development 
and Social Structure in the Belgian Congo), Louvain, 1959.  The study written by P. Leurquin, Le 
niveau de vie des populations rurales du Ruanda-Urandi, Louvain, 1960, is to my knowledge one of the 
best. 
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Reciprocity or obligatory gift-giving between kin and guests and communal redistribution 
are important determinants in the social and economic behaviour patterns of traditional 
society.   In Africa and in other parts of the world, rights in women are considered the 
highest form of social wealth.  The same is true for sacred cows and other cattle that are 
accumulated for reasons other than the material yield of the herds.  Conversely, a very 
important production factor such as land was almost never perceived as an object of private 
appropriation.  Clans and tribes regarded it as sacred.  It could be temporarily used by 
members of the clan, but it could not be alienated or sold.  Indeed, the most intricate 
conflicts between colonial administrations and local inhabitants resulted from 
misunderstandings concerning traditional land tenure systems.  As the subsistence 
economies were based on shifting cultivation, clan rights over land extended far beyond 
the inhabitable area at any one particular moment of time. 
However, contact with the market economy of the West generated complex situations of 
change and transition.  This is borne out by the research findings, of which a schematic 
overview follows.  The introduction of cash crops like tea, coffee, cocoa and cotton, or of 
vegetable and food production near urban centres and rural markets, transformed the 
material and functional context of the subsistence economies.  Millions of small plot 
farmers engaged in these forms of production in order to gain the purchasing power earned 
by these products.  Gradually, production and cash exchange penetrated the rural economy, 
and the propagation of new consumption goods followed.  The gradual monetarisation of 
the barter economy, the availability of industrial consumption goods, production 
instruments and other inputs that were labelled 'inducement goods', confronted the peasants 
and their families with a new gamut of artefacts and status symbols.  New employment 
opportunities, such as salaried work, provided yet another impetus to the monetarisation of 
transactions.  They familiarised ever more people with the functioning of markets, as well 
as with the occasionally erratic price formation in a market economy.  This change in the 
functioning of the rural and semi-urban economies in our age was induced by the desire for 
consumption goods.  This is called the 'demonstration effect'.  The purchasing power 
earned by cash crop production or by salaried work was promptly consumed.  In most 
cases, this either left a rather low level or a total absence of savings for investment. 
The research findings of social scientists in Africa and Asia confirmed the weight of the 
social and cultural factors in the traditional economies.  This weight was illustrated by 
studies on the economics of gift-giving (l’économie du don), the importance of ceremonial 
exchange, the functioning of clan solidarity, the technical limits imposed on growth in 
subsistence economies, and on the relatively low threshold of motivation to create an 
elastic supply of labour and goods in closed societies.  On the basis of more detailed 
studies, however, it was demonstrated that a different situation evolved as soon as these 
closed economies were opened up by commercial exchange.  Monetary exchange  set the 
dynamics of rising expectations in motion.  On their return to the village after long 
absences in town, migrant labourers arrived with cash earnings and with new consumption 
goods.  The original limited wants gave way to a more elastic consumption pattern, in 
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which social mimetics functioned as a stimulus to social and economic change.  In my own 
research on the dynamics of rural and urban societies in Central Africa, I discovered that 
the exposure of traditional enclaves to commercial exchange and to new opportunities for 
non-agricultural work and income generated rather elastic consumption patterns.  
Reference behaviour, inspired by the imitation of the trend-setters in this transition period,  
worked as a powerful motor of change in consumption.  Cultural and social factors, such as 
ceremonial exchange, gifts to senior relatives, land tenure systems, bride-price, etc., 
continued to be important but they underwent a notable change due to their gradual 
monetarisation. 
Most findings made it clear that, due to the varying circumstances and socio-historical 
contexts, this change did not move along a unidirectional path of acculturation and gain in 
material welfare.  Some tribes moved along faster than others.  There were regions that 
readily opened up to innovation, whereas other areas went into decline.  In some cases 
tradition received a new vitalism in modern clothes, even while the rising new social 
classes were ebbing away from the traditional mould.  Social scientists illustrated the ways 
in which slumbering tribal and customary conflicts were now manifested in the very 
different responses to acculturation and development.  Some tribes, like those of the Lower 
Congo, could not bear the pressure that accompanied their incorporation into the colonial 
jacket, and so took refuge in the past.  The forces that ripped their societies apart created a 
context in which the messianic movements took the lead.  These movements were studied 
in detail by G. Balandier and other social scientists.  Missionaries and colonial 
administrators were unnerved by the mass following of these exuberant solidarity makers, 
as the aroused masses sporadically erupted in xenophobic uprisings and revolts.  
Anthropologists, on the contrary, perceived these eschatological dreams, adroitly canalised 
by charismatic leaders, as the cultural protest of a wounded and alienated society.  Those 
who joined the messianic movements were people traumatised by the rupture in the 
traditional bonds, as a consequence of inadequate methods of enforced modernisation.  
From the vantage point of researchers the messianic movements were looked upon as the 
cultural forerunners of political freedom fighters.  The frequent reference to biblical 
passages, such as the David and Goliath legend, gave a clear indication that colonised 
peoples, when charismatically aroused, have a firm belief in their moral superiority 
(David) over a temporarily dominant (Goliath) but alien culture.  In the already politically 
independent societies such as Brazil, the messianic movements were said to function as 
carriers of grassroots protest, voiced by rural people against their marginalisation by urban 
elite groups.  The cargo cults of Melanesia, however, were rooted in a more material base.  
They revealed how the frustrated consumption aspirations of poor natives, confronted with 
the opulence of a dominant culture, can generate a myth of 'paradise lost'.  The indigenous 
people understood this loss to be a result of foreign spoliation47. 
The growth in the number and size of towns has been, and continues to be, one of the most 
                                                          
47 A detailed analysis of the cargo cult is given in P. Worsley, The Trumpet Shall Sound, London, 1957. 
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important social and economic phenomenon characteristic of the transformation processes 
of the new countries.  After World War II, the pace of urbanisation went into high gear.  In 
the colonies the novelty of its dynamics attracted the attention of researchers.  In my own 
field work, conducted in Central Africa, I studied the social and economic aspects of rapid 
urban growth in Bujumbura (Burundi) and in Kinshasa (Congo), and its consequences on 
the rural countryside. 
Up to the 1940s, most colonial towns had lived the tidy and somnolent existence 
characteristic of administrative centres surrounded by commercial activities and by an 
embryonic industry.  After the war, the more active development policies of colonial 
governments was going to change this.  From 1945-55 most towns of black Africa tripled, 
and some quintupled, the number of their African populations.  During this process of 
growth, which accelerated after 1955, the numerical ratio between the European and 
African populations dropped from 1:20 to 1:30.  In some cases, the Africanisation of the 
urban centres developed even more quickly.  Initially, the urbanisation of these new 
countries was the result of migrant, male labourers who moved to the cities, but returned to 
their village after a couple of years absence.  Later, a more voluminous rural exodus began, 
in which women and children joined the migrant workers.  The result of these dynamics 
was apparent in the formation of 'demographic pyramids' in, for instance, the capital 
Kinshasa, in a representative small town like Bujumbura, and in a rural region like 
Thysville surrounding the urban centres.  These three areas illustrated this state of 
demographic transition at the moment of my enquiries in 195548. 
In Kinshasa, adult males were predominant until the 1980s, while in the smaller 
representative towns the demographic equilibrium between the sexes was established 
earlier.  Conversely, in a representative rural district around town, the absence of male 
adults and the predominance of women is clearly demonstrated by the unbalanced 
pyramid.  This demographic imbalance, especially in a large radius of rural areas around 
the urban centres, had its effects on agriculture.  The young adult males moved 
(temporarily) to town and left the spouse in the village to work to on the land.  More than 
in the past, agriculture became an activity for women. By the end of the 1950s, rural 
exodus gave a still stronger impetus to the already overgrown urban centres. Shanty towns 
mushroomed and became crowded monster cities.  The attraction of the urban centres to 
rural people can be explained by a number of factors : the aspiration for better paid salaried 
employment, the availability of better educational and medical facilities, the possibility of 
work in the informal sector, as well as a sense of adventure and excitement.  Moreover, the 
intense urbanisation process was moved by a powerful psychological lever, namely, the 
idea that all important things happened in town.  Townspeople, even those living an 
immiserising existence in the shanty towns, felt superior.  They considered the rural 
'leftovers' as 'backward' people. 
                                                          
48  L. Baeck, 'Léopoldville, phénomène urbain africain', in Zaïre, n° 6, 1956 ; L. Baeck, 'Une société rurale 
en transition : étude socio-économique de la région de Thysville', in  Zaïre, n° 2, 1957. 
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Sociologists were particularly interested in two novel aspects of this rapid urbanisation : 
the effect on social behaviour in a situation of detribalisation and the progressive 
ruralisation of towns.  The sociologists reread their classics on anomie, or on the erosion of 
social and ethnic bonds, which they referred to as the 'social nakedness' of the detribalised 
urban people.  In most new urban centres, however, a creative response curbed the plight 
of immiserising growth by the ruralisation of large urban sectors.  In these areas, the 
marginalised immigrants organised a way of existence which was a mixture of half urban 
and half rural life, the so-called informal sector.  New social ties and means of material 
existence evolved.  Even in the most miserable parts of the shanty towns, which increased 
due to a steadily increasing rural exodus, the initial catastrophic prophecies were averted 
by social inventiveness. 
2. The institutionalist approach of Myrdal 
One of the most influential critics of the modernisation rhetoric was Gunnar Myrdal, a 
Swedish social scientist who had done research on the 'Negro Problem' in the 
United States. In a series of studies, of which Asian Drama became the most celebrated, he 
castigated the cultural imperialist premise of modernisation theory.  With his more open 
stance, which takes the cultural and social aspirations of the people and of the elites of the 
'soft' states into account, Myrdal profiled himself as the mentor of the institutionalist 
school of development. In his publications he hammered out a more sensible approach.  He 
worked on the assumption that the local configuration of social reality and cultural values, 
as well as the various indigenous concepts of development, were more determinant than 
external forces.  On account of this, the economically peripheral societies were culturally 
not as 'soft' as the phalanx of modernisers presumed.  Age-old cultures and world visions 
have a resilience and a capacity for adaptation that the Social Darwinists of America and 
the modernisation theorists had insufficiently realised. Srinivas, an Indian sociologist, 
illustrated Myrdal's premise with his study on Sanskritisation.  The introduction of modern 
education, radio and TV spreads the Sanskrit tradition to wider and lower casts, with the 
result that the diffusion of the Brahmin knowledge and norms tended to bring the different 
casts nearer.  Not secularisation, but Sanskritisation is here the determinant of 
democratisation. 
The naive cultural imperialism of the early modernisation model had overlooked the 
authentic potential and capacity of their subjects to resist.  The emergence of conflicts 
between social classes, the struggle for power between elites, the alternative models of 
capital accumulation and growth, the radical resistance against Westernisation by 
messianic movements, the assertive ideology of self-reliance, etc., strongly evidenced that 
the central tenet of modernisation theory was wrong.  Its basic assumption that rapid 
economic growth, democracy and acculturation follow automatically and are accepted with 
enthusiasm by all 'newcomers' in history, was clearly unrealistic.  The unexpected 
resistance, conflicts and problems indicated that the exclusive attention of the 
modernisation phalanx to objectives or ends, and the neglect of ways and means to achieve 
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them in so many different societies and cultures, was a misconception. 
The severe criticism directed at the schematic stereotypes of the early modernisation 
theorists was not lost.  Moreover, the younger modernist theorists were influenced by the 
cultural revolution in Iran, of which the Shi’ite clergy had been the locomotive.  The 
revisionists of the modernisation school realised that the secularisation thesis did not 
necessarily materialise in all cultures.  As such, they attended to reality and brought the 
forgotten dimensions, such as tradition, history, culture and religion, back into their 
studies.  This significant paradigm shift, in the direction of indigenisation and 
postmodernism, was a remarkable illustration of the development in development 
theorising49. 
3. An early neoliberal voice 
To conclude our survey of field research, we will briefly consider the studies of 
Peter Bauer on the rubber plantations in Malaysia and on cash crop farming in West 
Africa50.  Bauer, a neoliberal, contested the positive role of state interventionism that was 
fashionable at that time.  He unambiguously stated that orthodox theory, based on the 
rational calculus of the homo economicus, was sufficient to explain economic behaviour in 
developing countries.  He bravely challenged the relevance of theories that stressed the 
socially and culturally embedded nature of economics.  In his study on West African 
farming, he demonstrated that the 'trader’s frontier' provided the initial stimulus to the 
expansion of cash crop production.  Small traders provided and extended markets, 
transformed producers into consumers, and created new wants, thereby opening new 
opportunities to responsive producers and consumers.  Although neglected by later 
development theorists, small farmers and traders were a seed-bed of entrepreneurial spirit 
and surplus creation.  Against Boeke’s static dualism and the opinion of the more 
authoritarian colonial administrators, Bauer profiled the small farmers as shrewd 
profit-seekers and effective innovators who often out-performed the productivity levels of 
large estates.  According to Bauer, their ultimate failure to ensure development was not due 
to traditional socio-cultural values.  Rather, this resulted from the West African 
Stabilisation Boards which had been set up by the colonial administration to dampen the 
price fluctuations of crops resulting from business cycles in world demand.  According to 
Bauer, these Boards became instruments of heavy, persistent and discriminatory taxation.  
The new governments in need of income deliberately reinforced their taxation practice, so 
that the Boards functioned as a transfer mechanism of resources from the rural economy to 
the burgeoning state apparatus and to the privileged urban population.  This had a strong 
demotivating effect on the farmers and on the agricultural development of the new nations. 
                                                          
49 D. Apter, one of the well-known Parsonians, converted to revisionism and took a lead in the new 
direction. See D. Apter, Rethinking Development : Modernisation, Dependency and Postmodern 
Politics, Newbury Park, 1987. 
50 P. Bauer, West-African Trade, Cambridge, 1954. 
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In his study of the rubber plantations in Malaysia, Bauer described how Western 
enterprises organised and financed large-scale recruitment and migration of unlettered 
workers, mainly from China and India. According to Bauer, these activities of Western 
enterprises had 'unintended and unexpected' consequences. The imported Chinese saved 
their salaries and entered into trade activities as soon as possible ; the Indian immigrants 
did the same but with lesser results; and the native Malay people lagged far behind.  
However, Bauer did not probe deeply enough to account for the different responses of the 
Chinese, Indian and Malay peoples. The varying responses may be explained by important 
differences in the socio-cultural contexts of people confronted with the same challenges of 
adaptation. The Chinese, originally imported as coolies, were cut off from their own social 
and cultural environment. Being immigrants, the majority of them had nothing to lose and 
thus were eager for a better way of life. With a sense of purpose they left behind the 
shackles of tradition. Conversely, the local Malay workers were embedded in their social 
and cultural environment, and as a consequence they responded more slowly to the new 
economic opportunities. Cultural differences, not only ethnic, are important after all. In 
sum, in his zeal to demonstrate the pull of market opportunities, Bauer ignored the 
socio-cultural matrix that influenced the different responses.   
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CHAPTER V : POLITICAL THEORY IN SUPPORT OF THE 
MILITARY 
By the mid-sixties, the international scene had been transformed : Japan and the European 
countries had caught up with the American forerunner.  Communist Vietnam had proven to 
be a tough military and ideological challenge.  In America, the country of the liberal 
utopian dream, a series of events had traumatised public opinion and the social scientists.  
Successive political murders (for example, the Kennedy’s and Martin Luther King) and the 
cultural rebellion of the students, had demonstrated that the country of the liberal 'utopia' 
had its own problems and breakdowns in modernisation.  For modernisation theory, this 
was a time of revision toward a more conservative paradigm of order and stability. 
The early modernisation schemes were also criticised by the political scientists who 
considered themselves to be more realistic. A reassessment not only of theory but also of 
the accompanying policy guidelines set in, oriented toward the political implementation of 
order and stability.  With the gradual erosion of the democratic ideal, regime stabilisation 
(even with the helping hand of authoritarian or military regimes) was deemed preferable to 
the diffusion and reproduction of liberal, but unattainable, goals51. 
In this model-shift of theorists and policy makers, the American political scientists took 
over the lead from the sociologists, who were discredited on account of their naivety. From 
the outset, the political scientists stated that the classical notion of consensus, as a 
prerequisite for democracy, should be reassessed within the particular context of the new 
states.  They held that the ethos of the bureaucracy and the training conducive to it were of 
considerable importance, especially in these heterogeneous societies where the mass values 
are different from those of the ruling elite.  As such, during this transformation the civil 
society and the peoples of the new states were eclipsed.  Instead, the bureaucracies and the 
political regimes became the sole foci of attention. Western political science felt it must 
accommodate itself to the idea that in the early phases of political development, 
bureaucracies do not have to play the neutral agent responsive to the aspiration of the 
masses.  In this line of thought, the role of the military bureaucracy also needed to be re-
evaluated. 
Civil rulers may not be strong enough to perform adequately in the midst of political 
disorder ; that is, they may not be as effective as a military bureaucracy in achieving order 
and stability.  These arguments were already published in an American study as early as 
1961 by R. Braibanti, in his treatise 'Political Science and Underdeveloped Countries'52.  In 
this nascent militarisation of thought in American political science, the empirical 
arguments for stability and for the economic interests of the hegemonic power took 
                                                          
51  D. O’Brien, 'Modernisation, Order and the Erosian of a Democratic Ideal',  in D. Lehmann, 
Development Theory, London, 1979. 
52  This study on the political role of the military was published in his reader. See R. Braibanti, Tradition, 
Values and Socio-Economic Development, Durham, 1961. 
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precedence over the cherished liberal ideals.  The military was idealised as being a more 
efficient, rational and reliable planner than the civil leaders who were formed in the literary 
and ideological tradition. 
In another passage of the same study, Braibanti proclaims that:  
Of all sectors of the public bureaucracy the military, by virtue of its mission, can be 
expected to discard more quickly both the intuitive disposition of the masses and 
related literary generalist tradition of the civil bureaucracy.  Although it is 
preoccupied with the requirements of order and stability, its concern for precision in 
situation analysis disposes it favourably toward empiricism. 
The pragmatic re-evaluation of cold-blooded expediency, the depreciation of people's 
aspirations, as well as the departure from the social and cultural imagery of the civil elite 
projects, is clear enough.  And, in a lyrical climax Braibanti concludes that the military 
officer embodies ideals and manifests a zeal, sense of sacrifice, and devotion to duty 
greater than any other element in society.  Finally, in a footnote to his study he adds that 
‘the officer corps in Southeast Asia are the only hope for maintaining stability in the face 
of communist threat.  They should therefore be encouraged and supported by the United 
States’. 
In the conservative revisionism of American political science, the institutional instability of 
the new states was not perceived to be the result of the social and economic alienation of 
large numbers of the population.  The instability and disorder were regarded as the 
consequence of a too-intensive mobilisation toward the socio-political awareness of the 
masses.  In such a situation, characterised by unripe masses and soft civil leaders, the 
military was hailed as the wise harbinger of law and order and as the saviour of the nation.  
That the restlessness of the masses was also an expression of protest against the social, 
regional and welfare inequality of the development strategies did not come to the attention 
of these legitimisers of the military. 
Halfway through the sixties, then, the normative prescription that the institutional 
structures of the new states should be imposed on the masses from above became a major 
tenet of American political science.  Although they were all fiercely anti-Communist, these 
law- and order-warriors did not disguise their admiration for the Soviet leaders who 
managed to contain the discontentment of the deprived masses, as well as the tensions 
arising from the ethnic and cultural diversity following the Second World War.  From their 
vantage point, the ideal of democracy based on popular representation, and of social 
representation by trade unions and peasant movements, were regarded as dangerous.  
Capital accumulation should preferably proceed at the expense of the rural masses and 
through the stabilisation of urban wages at a relatively low level.  In most new states the 
accumulation of capital, bought by a too heavy social sacrifice, created disorder.  The 
civilian rulers appeared to be incapable of engineering the forced savings required to fuel 
the take-off.  As the populists proved unable to meet the challenge, the military stepped in 
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and took over the harsh task of social repression.  In Brazil, this linha dura engendered an 
economic miracle but it was of short duration. 
At the end of the 1960s, the transnationalisation of industry came into full swing and 
reached the developing countries.  The nationalist civilian leaders, who considered import 
substitution industrialisation as an economic expression of self-reliance, were considered 
to be unsuccessful nationalists from a past age.  For 'empirical' reasons the military junta's, 
amongst whom most of the top level officers had received an American training, seemed to 
be more compliant to the globalisation of Western industry. 
A number of political scientists, of whom the most influential are S. Huntington, 
J. La Palambora, F. Riggs, L. Pye and M. Janowitz, agreed that the simultaneous 
realisation of capital accumulation, social reform and democracy was almost impossible.  
The social reform ideal of the early Alliance for Progress initiatives was considered 
unattainable by some, and outright dangerous by others.  These reforms would jeopardise 
capital accumulation and invite a class struggle between the masses and their industrial and 
rural oligarchies.  Agrarian reform and trade union activities were not only frowned upon; 
they were repressed by the hard line regimes. 
Rapid capital accumulation and incorporation into the transnational industrial system, 
under orderly conditions created by authoritarian elites, received an encouraging nod from 
American theorists and policy makers alike.  Samuel Huntington stated that the social 
forces in the new states must confront each other 'nakedly'53.  In such situations, praetorian 
rulers are to be preferred to other elites.  In his study on the military Janowitz markedly 
dwells on the superior quality of military organisation54.  Ultimately, the erosion of 
hegemony and the relative decline in economic power in comparison with Europe and 
Japan, induced the United States to a dangerous inclination, namely, the militarisation of 
thought and of foreign policy. 
Janowitz depicts the officer class and its common values in most laudable terms. He asserts 
that more than civilians, they are 'committed to modernisation, moved by a sense of 
Puritanism and an ethos of public service'.  However, not all of his colleagues agreed.  
Some preferred civilian leaders supported by a strong party, insofar as they were also able 
to 'dominate the social forces and dynamics'.  In the aftermath of the breakdown of several 
populist regimes in Latin America, Asia and Africa, the American political scientists 
seemed to be very impressed by the Leninist principle of centralism.  There was only one 
difference: they supported praetorian elites from the conservative right wing to keep the 
progressive social forces at bay. 
Many of the political scientists were engaged in technical assistance missions and in 
foreign policy task forces.  In the defence of American interests abroad, they proved to be 
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as ruthless as the most daring policy makers in the State Department and the Pentagon.  
Latin American novels such as Señor Presidente by Asturias, and some of Graham Greens' 
best-sellers, provide colourful versions of these questionable enterprises.  With the aureole 
of the Camelot legend, they profiled themselves as the chivalrous knights of the Grail 
fighting against the so-called forces of evil, especially when American hegemony was 
contested by nationalist or reformist leaders.   
The hard liners dropped 'political culture' as the main determinant, giving precedence to 
the cohesive force of praetorian regimes.  The radical structuralists and marxists directed 
their attention to the origin, as well as to the function and role, of the dominant classes in 
the peripheral societies and in their states.  The subordinate place of the Lower Developing 
Countries (LDCs) in the international division of labour, the alternative cycles of capital 
formation and industrialisation, placed the state central stage as the initiator and arbitrator 
in development.  The centrality of the state in a situation of peripheral development 
rendered the struggle for dominance of state power the supreme test. 
The implications, for development, of the class relations of the postcolonial societies and 
peripheral countries requires analysis. Indeed, in most LDCs, the state appropriates a very 
large part of the economic surplus and deploys it in bureaucratically directed activity in the 
name of promoting development.  In the early postwar phase, the vanguard movements of 
the national freedom struggles in Africa and Asia, as well as the reformist and populist 
regimes in Latin America, inherited the mantle of democratic legitimacy.   
When the spell of their charisma faded, or when their failures became manifest, the 
military took over and bestowed upon itself a new mantle of legitimacy, that of national 
security and stability.  Due to the conflicts created by the implementation of reformist 
development strategies, the opinion that internal enemies are more dangerous than external 
ones gained ever wider audiences.  The legitimisers of the authoritarian regimes were avid 
readers of Karl Popper’s  The Open Society and its Enemies.  The authoritarian regimes 
posed as forces of pacification in the conflicts between the national oligarchies, the local 
reformists and the foreign influences and interests.  The opinion that only a military 
bureaucracy could do the job well became dominant amongst conservative political 
revisionists in the West and in the new states.  On the presumption of their efficacy and of 
their relative freedom of manoeuvre against social protest, a new era of postwar 
development began. 
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CHAPTER VI : DEPENDENCY THEORIES AND NEOMARXISM 
1. The early dependency school 
The contribution to development theory and practice by marxists and dependency theorists 
differs from the economic growth and modernisation schools not only in terms of policy 
implications; their ideological inspiration and world views are also anchored in opposite 
poles.  Common to both marxist and dependency theorists is their critical approach and a 
deep sense of frustration with the world they live in.  Their thematisations are 
differentiated products of the same crisis syndrome. As most of the authors adhere to the 
radical socialist or marxist creed, critical analysis is applied only to the dark side of 
capitalist development.  In the voluminous literature, the concrete processes of 
development in places like the Soviet Union, Cuba, China and the Comecon area are 
markedly absent.  A more representative description of these two groups would be that of a 
radical critique of the historical trajectory of the capitalist accumulation cycle, looked upon 
from the periphery of the world, with a conscious neglect of Soviet imperialism. 
The dependency theories originated in Latin America in the mid sixties, when some radical 
structuralists, most of them former disciples of ECLA, felt a growing frustration with its 
reformist policies.  Brazil was the source of inspiration for dependency theories in the first 
instance.  Here, the failure of import substitution industrialisation and of social reform by 
populismo was followed by a military regime, which opted for the insertion of the country 
into the transnational industrial circuit.  From the time of Haya de la Torre, a Peruvian 
pre-dependencia theorist of the thirties, Latin American intellectuals have been alert 
students of the structural and international constraints of development.  In Brazil, a group 
of social-democratic sociologists and economists rekindled interest in radical 
structuralism55.  Prolific writers like Celso Furtado and Fernando Cardoso took the lead in 
this trend in Brazil.  Oswaldo Sunkel originated this line of thinking in Chile.  F. Cardoso 
was undoubtedly one of the most productive and imaginative authors on dependency.  
From 1960-65, at his research centre in Saõ Paulo, he began concrete field research on the 
empresario industrial, that is, on the captains of Brazilian industry.  This formed the 
empirical base of his theories on the special historical context of economic elite formation 
in a dependent economy.  From 1966-69, his fully developed version of dependency 
blossomed.  In this historical and comparative study of the whole region, he was assisted 
by the Chilean historian E. Faletto56. 
The authors adopted the ECLA-doctrine that the insertion of their economies in the 
international division of labour resulted in negative side-effects, such as dependency on the 
external terms of trade.  The novelty of their approach lay in the fact that they analysed the 
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socio-political by-products of this economic process.  In such a situation, the populist 
regimes witness the growing opposition between the oligarchs who support the export base 
in agricultural and mining products, and the industrial entrepreneurs who embark on 
import substitution.  The surplus created in such a mixed economy is partly drained to the 
metropolitan centres, and part of it is appropriated by the state in order to subsidise import 
substitution and social reforms.  Two different types of bourgeoisie then, the traditional 
and the modernising, are constantly in conflict and competition over the levers of 
socio-political powers.  
The nationalist state, governed by a populist regime, may be able to arbitrate the conflict, 
as long as it does not disturb the uneasy coexistence of the two major interest groups; that 
is, the traditional power base and the national bourgeoisie in complicity with the organised 
urban workers.  The insertion of a third partner in the political power play, namely, the 
rural workers on the latifundia, challenges the power base of the traditional oligarchs and 
destabilises populismo.  As long as the populist state bureaucracy restricts its social 
reforms to higher urban wages and to other benefits under syndicalist pressure canalised by 
disciplined trade unions, the traditional elite may grumble but they will not enter into 
outright opposition.  When the populist state embarks on reforma agraria and on 
syndicalisation of the rural wage earners, however, the owners of the latifundia cross the 
Rubicon.  They will call in the military to stop these 'socialist' initiatives.  In a well 
documented study, Cardoso and his Chilean colleague Faletto formulated what constitutes, 
in my view, the most original and empirically supported analysis of dependency.  Later 
writers were much more mechanical and dogmatic in their treatment of this complex 
phenomenon. 
Cardoso and Faletto did not fall into the trap of the ideological or meta-theoretical 
commitment that rendered much of the marxist development analysis so sterile.  In contrast 
to the marxist theories on imperialism, Cardoso and Faletto recognised a certain margin of 
autonomy of action for the local bourgeoisie.  And they perceived the state as arbitrator 
between the conflicting parties.  In Brazilian tradition, the military has historically been 
perceived as the poder moderador, or the arbitrator of social and national conflicts.  In this 
huge and heterogeneous state, the historical role of the military consisted in keeping the 
nation together. 
In Cardoso's analysis the dependent bourgeoisie, as well as their economies and states, are 
not the imperialist puppets of marxist theory.  The following citation illustrates his subtle 
stand on the cross-fertilisation between external and internal determinants :  
The concept of dependence tries to give a meaning to a series of events and 
situations that occur together, and to make empirical situations understandable in 
terms of the way external and internal components are linked.  In this approach the 
external is also expressed as a particular type of relation between social groups and 
classes within underdeveloped nations.  For this reason it is worth focusing the 
analysis of dependence on its internal manifestations.  
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Proceeding on the basis of this methodology, Cardoso and Faletto provided one of the first 
socio-political analyses of class formation, as well as of the delicate balance or imbalance 
in the evolving class alliance during the ultimate phase of populism.  This alliance between 
the middle sector and the industrial and urban wage earners on one side, and the 
oligarchies of the agro-mining export base and transnational industry on the other side, 
degenerated into a class struggle.  The ideology and the interests that had linked these 
competitive components in a temporary alliance was endangered when populism  
radicalised.  This crisis occurred when populism set out to emancipate, socially and 
politically, the mass of rural workers from the latifundia. 
Moreover, by the time the dependencia theorists had formulated their theses, the industrial 
steam of import substitution had already exhausted itself.  The fight of late populism 
against the opening of the economy to transnational business proved to be a lost battle.  
The state bureaucracy and its planners, who, on the basis of ECLA-doctrine, had evolved 
into a technocratic intelligentsia above class interests, were aware of the nationalist 
impasse and sided with the military.  Their conversion to multinational development 
convinced the national bourgeoisie and prepared its association with the authoritarian state.  
In this conservative counterrevolution the urban and rural syndicalist movements were 
abolished.  The technocrats, the national industrialists, and the incorporated transnational 
sector formed a new alliance. 
A few years later Cardoso reformulated his theory to take account of the new situation.  He 
referred to the new context as associated dependent development57.  In this revised version 
he acknowledged the positive aspects of the smooth absorption of technologies offered by 
the multinational firms, who in the authoritarian state of Brazil could count on stability.  
However, he remained a severe critic of the system’s social repression and of its 
undemocratic rule.  As the authoritarian alliance spread to other countries of the continent, 
it triggered an acute controversy.  Various dependency theories evolved in which different 
aspects of this complex process were analysed.  The most noted authors are O. Sunkel, C. 
Furtado, H. Jaguaribe, A. Ferera and A. Pinto58.  In an ironical metaphor, the Chilean 
publicist A. Pinto refers to dependency as 'a case of frustrated development' (un caso de 
desarollo frustrado). 
In our survey we cannot dwell on the interesting thematisations and the petulant debates of 
these Latin American intellectuals.  In contrast to the theorists of the modernisation school, 
the prime movers of dependency were dedicated nationalists and social democrats, 
personally involved in the struggle for a more socially balanced development policy.  They 
were insiders who had an eye for the social plight of the forgotten and marginalised 
classes, that is, for the los olvidados.  Finally, they were reformists who shied away from 
the marxist understanding of exploitation and its revolutionary strategy.   
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2. The Neomarxist Theories 
Indeed, the marxist writers tended to take a more mechanical stance.  They proclaimed that 
the capitalist way of development, accompanied by transnational influences, resulted in 
exploitation and in complete subordination of the satellites to the metropoles.  Marx 
himself, though, had recognised the positive role of capitalism in the development of 
productive capacity.  Real socialism could only thrive when capitalism had exhausted all 
its benefits, including the benefits resulting from the multinational firms.  Had he lived, he 
would have called his disciples of the postwar period radical 'bastards'.  The major 
distinction between the Neomarxists and orthodox Communists was that the former 
refused centralised planning and an undemocratic society.  In their view, a nationalist 
revolution supported by the proletariat and a radical delinking from international 
exploitation would open a new era.  The most representative group of authors in the 
marxist dependency camp were R. Marini, T. Dos Santos, A. Frank, O. Braun and 
A. Quizano59. 
At the time when the dependency theorists published their first treatises, a North American 
economist of the New Left, Andre Gunder Frank, was working in the field.  He absorbed 
the radical dependency thesis, disseminating it in the English speaking world  under the 
new name of 'the development of the underdevelopment school'.  On the basis of a 
proclaimed transfer of financial surplus from the periphery to the centre, development 
thought of the North American New Left became 'dependent' on theory formation in the 
periphery.  Rebellious youth, frustrated by the quagmire in Vietnam and by the 
militarisation of thinking in the leading academic and policy making circles of the US, 
were in need of a critical stance on Third World politics and economics.  Frank's 
reformulation of the dependency thesis, in cross-fertilisation with treatises on imperialism, 
launched the idea that the domination of the metropolis resulted in a process of 'increasing 
underdevelopment' in the subordinated periphery.  Given the social sterility and economic 
satellite status of the bourgeoisie (Lumpenbourgeoisie) in the periphery, it was perceived 
as the greedy assistant of the metropolis in the exploitation of the masses. 
However, the pioneer of marxist thought on development was not Frank, but P. Baran with 
his study The Political Economy of Growth, published in 1957.  Baran's work reintroduced 
the theoretical line of thought on imperialism and monopoly capitalism initiated at the 
beginning of the twentieth century by Lenin, R. Hilferding and Rosa Luxemburg.  Stalin 
had sterilised all intellectual debate in his empire, but after his death marxists sailed out of 
the backwaters onto the open sea of First World versus Third World dynamics.  This was 
not an easy task as several of Marx's premises led them astray.  Although Marx condemned 
the dark side of capitalism, his economic appreciation of the creative bourgeoisie had been 
rather positive.  The capitalist way of production had broken with the feudal system and 
had generated a new class, the proletariat.  It was this new force in history that was to pave 
the way toward a social revolution. 
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Marx regarded capitalism and its creation of surplus value as a necessary step in the 
historical chain of capital accumulation and of proletariat class formation. Through internal 
contradictions, capitalist accumulation itself was to generate the revolution.  In the view of 
Lenin and Hilferding, capitalism had been able to survive only by imperialist exploitation.  
By the exploitation of the external proletariat, and by international reorganisation under the 
form of monopoly creation and social reform at home, capitalism had improved its 
functioning and prolonged its survival. 
On account of the appropriation of surplus value in the empire, the metropoles had more 
leeway for social reform at home.  In the centre of capitalism, the nascent Welfare State 
had cooled off the revolutionary consciousness of the proletariat.  In the new states, 
however, the exploitation resulted in an arrested or lopsided development.  The villain of 
the piece was the drain of surplus value from the periphery to the centre.  In the postwar 
marxist revival, the looting of the colonies was condemned ad nauseam in an almost 
unlimited supply of dogmatic studies with only slender empirical support.  Baran himself 
concentrated on the case of India ; Samir Amin focused on Africa60.  A phalanx of analysts 
took the misdevelopment of Latin America to test.  The seventeenth century thesis of the 
Spanish arbitristas (pamphleteers), that Spain had exhausted itself by over-extensive 
political colonisation, was completely ignored61. 
In an outburst of partisan historicism, the analyses alternated between the scholastic 
stances of the competing marxist and neomarxist sects.  They invariably ended by 
proclaiming that in the peripheral countries, capitalist exploitation either rendered 
development impossible or that it evolved in total misdevelopment.  The exploited 
societies had but few alternatives : they could cut the ties of exploitation by a proletarian 
revolution, or remain submissive to exploitation. 
Many of the studies on imperialism, unequal exchange, metropolis-satellite relations, and 
on the manipulative conspiracies between the bourgeoisie of the centre and periphery, were 
abstract and dogmatic discussions.  They referred more to marxist ideology and doctrine 
than to the concrete subject of development. The entry of new authors, such as E. Arghiri  
and P. Rey, on capitalism in the Third World, and the re-interpretation of Marx by 
L. Althusser and N. Poulantzas, produced a high tide of polemics between marxists62.  Due 
to the never ending quarrels about 'the Asian production cycle' and about 'what Marx 
would say about external exploitation by capitalists if he lived now', the practical problems 
of the Third World were neglected.  The discussion on the nature and the impact of the 
relation between the metropolis and satellite filled thousands of pages.  The vivid polemic 
between the priority of the production aspect, or 'productionism', and the importance of 
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exchange relations, or 'circulationism', kept the marxist authors busy. 
After a brief spell of success, the marxist Third World school reached an impasse due to an 
internal division resulting from the sterile in-fighting of factions.  In the seventies and 
eighties, a group of semi-industrialised countries achieved high growth rates after their 
insertion in the transnational industrial circuit.  Their authoritarian regimes were 
enthusiastic about the growth in the productive capacity of their economies.  The social 
imbalances were regarded as unavoidable accompaniments to this stage of growth.  The 
so-called economic miracle of Brazil was proof that the system of 'associated dependency' 
was capable of generating exuberant economic growth.  The marxist crisis syndrome thus 
lost its appeal. 
In the seventies, neomarxist theorising on development provoked a split between the 
approach that privileged exchange relations between the centre and periphery, and the 
approach that emphasised the ordering of the production structure on a world scale.  
According to the latter view, in a world economy where capital has become international, 
the production structure of the periphery can only be a subordinate component whose 
functioning and situation is determined by, and derives from, the new international division 
of labour.  This 'world system view' argues that the new division of labour is completely 
determined by the logic of capital, that is, that capital flows where it obtains the highest 
return. 
The 'world system' approach, first formulated by Immanuel Wallerstein63, constructed a 
more complete model of dependency than the sociological constructs of the early 
dependencia theoreticians and the 'unequal exchange' school of Samir Amin. But it 
reduced the peripheral states and their governments to entirely subordinate agencies which 
respond almost automatically to the requirements of, and to the changes in, the logic of the 
international economy. Reacting against this reductionism, Latin American development 
theorising of the seventies reintroduced the state as a 'third partner' in the development 
context.  This position holds that the state is to act as a catalyst between the multinational 
firms and the local (industrial) bourgeoisie64.   
By way of conclusion, let us mention two remarkable facts : 
a. The marxist Third World debate, with its focus on the effects of monopoly 
capitalism and imperialist exploitation, was an intellectual construct of Western 
marxists, with the exception of S. Amin. The marxist intellectuals of Eastern 
Europe and of the Soviet Union showed no interest.  The Western marxists, though, 
were silent about the exploitation of the Asiatic federated republics by the core 
republics in the Soviet Union.  While the Azeris, Armenians and others could 
illustrate a strong case of exploitation by the Russian centre, this was never 
mentioned. 
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b. All of the African countries that de-linked from the West after communist 
revolutions experienced the scenario outlined by marxist writers for cases of 
capitalist insertion, namely, the development of underdevelopment.  In countries 
like Ethiopia, a series of famines underlined the dismal results of the 
metropolis-satellite relation, in this case with the Soviet Union as partner.  In 
Afghanistan, the chaos was even worse. 
Since the marxist theorists were insulated from the arcanes of power, and as only a few 
intellectuals read their indigest prose, their influence was marginal both in the West and in 
the periphery.  The most spectacular revolution of delinking from capitalism by the end of 
the seventies occurred in Iran.  This was not the work of the marxists though.  It was a 
revolution in the name of God, something unheard of since the Enlightenment.  This was a 
clear sign that the moral base was a new force in development.  The disenchantment with 
modernisation, impulsed by capitalism, socialism and secularism, generated a revival of 
the pre-Enlightenment forces in history.  The most powerful monarch of the Middle East 
was toppled from his throne by an exiled cleric ; but he was a charismatic ayatollah 
supported by the common people.  A few years later, the Brazilian military regime 
resigned under popular pressure and others followed.  By the mid-eighties the authoritarian 
states had past their peak.  A new era opened, during which the Soviet Union and its 
satellites would delink from communism as well. 
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CHAPTER VII : ASIAN THIRD WORLDISM 
By the end of the forties, the Asian countries with the greatest populations, like China, 
India, Pakistan and Indonesia, had won their political freedom and were independent.  
National elites with outspoken views on future development had taken over the reins of 
power.  Indonesia was the first liberated colony and set a new course, inspired by 
pancha-sila, or the five principles of development.  Under the leadership of Soekarno,  
these formed a mixture of populism and of socio-cultural authenticity.  In India, Nehru's 
Congress Party initiated programs oriented toward economic self-reliance and democratic 
socialism.  In China, the communist party and its People's Army, after a period of 
seclusion and experience in the Yenan hide-out, fought a victorious war of liberation 
against both the Japanese occupation forces and the bourgeois nationalist party 
Kuomintang.  In Pakistan, the new rulers adopted an assertive Islamic policy, which 
ultimately caused the separation of its Bengali population, under the name of Bangladesh.  
The basic characteristic common to these new Asian nations was that their development 
ideas and plans owed nothing to the Western and Latin American debates reviewed above.  
The four regimes worked out their own blueprints and strategies in which not only 
economic growth objectives, but also their respective ideologies, cultural preferences and 
political matrices were wrought in an original synthesis. 
After the murder of Gandhi, Jawaharlal Nehru, a Brahmin with Western education, played  
the decisive role in India. It was he who converted the Congress Party from a rural-oriented 
Gandhian idealism to the idea of socialist planning.  It was, however, an Indian brand of 
democratic socialism. While it took inspiration from Russia in planning techniques, it was 
too much inclined toward ideas of human liberty to take over the Soviet model of society.  
Indian socialism allied the nationalist desire of self-reliance with an outspoken egalitarian 
creed propagated by its left wing.  It was an ideological attack against the culturally 
determined inequality of a caste society.  Indian socialism also wrought a clean break with 
the principles of laissez-faire economics and its price mechanism.  These were perceived 
as the discredited tools and ideas of the British colonisers. 
The rapid building up of heavy and capital-intensive industries, steered and stimulated by 
state planning, was taken for granted.  Indian planners and economists did not lose much 
time on professional pleas for balanced growth or on statistical inquiries concerning 
income elasticities.  Self-reliance was the propelling idea and as such the freedom from 
dependence did not need subtle legitimising.  In economic terms it meant independence 
from the First and the Second Worlds65.  Thus, import substitution was the logical path to 
follow. 
The Planning Commission was led by P. Mahalanobis, a first-rate economist with an 
international reputation, and was supported by an able staff. Mahalanobis elaborated a 
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famous 'two sector' model of growth in his technical approach, largely under the influence 
of Russian planners.  He was also influential in the option for early spurts toward the 
expansion of heavy industries.  The Mahalanobis-group undertook some detailed studies 
related to the external exchange or balance of payment constraint, imposed by speedy 
import substitution.  Their theoretical model states that in a developing economy, 
insufficient national savings are not the only determinant that may put a ceiling on 
investment growth.  Insufficient earnings of foreign exchange, resulting from inelasticity in 
export growth, form a second constraint, externally imposed by the limited foreign demand 
for Indian produce.  Thus, a deliberate and important spurt in the capital goods industry 
requires one of two solutions, or the combination of both: more imports of machinery 
and/or more imports of the non-ferro and other metals to construct a capital goods industry 
by local engineering. 
The growing import gap has to be filled up by external financial funds from multinationals, 
or by foreign aid.  However, this would contradict the outspoken desire for economic 
self-reliance.  The highly esteemed stance of ideological non-alignment of the Indian 
regime in world affairs functioned as a political ceiling.  Allowing that Nehru, and with 
him the whole Indian political establishment, chose a diplomacy of self-reliance, the 
Planning Commission had to muddle through the exchange constraint, and through its 
imposed bottle-necks in national industrialisation.  This so-called 'two-gap' constraint 
model was a theoretical forerunner.  In later debates on the economics of foreign financial 
aid, the Indian ancestor would beget many variants of this 'two-gap' construct.  At the time 
of the deliberate swing to the expansion of heavy industries, the Planning Commission was 
not overly deterred by two-gap pessimism.  India went its nationalist way66.  Evidently, 
ideology and politics play a more important role in the strategy of development than most 
economists realise.  This was still more the case in China. 
Chinese history is a long tale of empire building moved by a high culture, a central 
bureaucracy run by mandarins, and a peasant population which has steadily increased 
throughout the ages.  In the nineteenth century, weak emperors and a tired oligarchy 
rendered China an economic prey to Western penetration and spoliation.  After 
World War I, several groups of young intellectuals could not bear the shame and so 
formulated plans for reform.  Sun Yat-Sen's reform plan outlined a blueprint for 
development67.  Cultural clubs, social groups, warrior bands and political parties, each with 
different ideological inspiration and aims, joined the chorus.  In the evolving competition 
for a power base, the different groups rivalled in the search for support from the urban and, 
in a minor degree, from the rural masses. 
At the end of World War II, when the Japanese occupation forces had been driven out, the 
Communist Party and the Kuomintang began a civil war for the monopolisation of power.  
Mao Zedong and the People's Army carried the day.  The communist party replaced the 
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mandarin bureaucracy and acclaimed Mao as the red emperor of the new republic.  With 
this extraordinary figure as helmsman, China underwent one of the most fascinating and 
problematic development stories.  Mao's chief contribution to early development theory 
and practice is the inspiration and animation of an ongoing, peasant-based revolution.  In 
this process he explored and tested the dialectical advance and retreat of agrarian 
communism in its evolving phases68. 
Over the centuries, population pressure in China had functioned as the driving force in the 
progressive incorporation of virgin land, though with only minor effects on the 
intensification of cultivation techniques.  At the time when the communists took over, the 
inadequacy of this process was largely recognised.  From the outset, the new regime was 
conscious of the fact that in order to achieve a semblance of self-reliance, a radical spurt 
forward was required.  In the view of the new rulers rapid industrialisation would take the 
lead, accompanied by a substantial rise in farm yields. Given the size of the population, the 
infant urban industries would be unable to alleviate the plight of the peasant masses on the 
basis of rural exodus and labour absorption.  Thus, to solely emphasise rapid 
industrialisation, as advised by the Soviet godfathers, would not solve the agrarian 
problem.  A concomitant strategy that would induce substantial rises in the farm yields was 
also necessary.  The authoritarian tradition of Soviet communism tempted the new rulers to 
replace the age old central bureaucracy by marxist bureaucrats.  They would run a 
commando economy, supported by planned impulses from the top to bottom.  Soviet 
advisers strongly pushed in this direction.  They started to implement plans for the 
expansion of the heavy sectors of industry and for the collectivisation of agriculture.   
Half a century before, the Japanese experience had followed another route, adapted to a 
densely populated country.  The Japanese had chosen for speedy industrialisation, 
accompanied by various stimuli for agricultural improvement.  This successful story 
initiated the opening of rural markets, the organisation of local credit facilities and 
extension services, and last but not least, a reform of the feudal land tenure systems.  All 
this had functioned as a prerequisite for industrialisation. 
Mao, like any marxist, viewed industrialisation as the evident vehicle to achieve 
self-reliance and as an historical leverage toward proletarian consciousness.  In China, 
however, the locomotive of the industrial enclaves, even at full steam, would not be able to 
put in motion the massive train of peasants.  As a Chinese communist, Mao was convinced 
that a radical reform of the peasant economy was a must.  For the inspiration and the 
implementation of a global revolution, Mao profiled himself as the right man at the right 
place.  With messianic passion, and supported by masterly led campaigns rife with ideas, 
metaphors and slogans, he swept aside political rivals to slay the dragon of the incipient 
bureaucratic command establishment.  The bureaucrats went in opposition against his 
proposed mobilisation of the peasant masses, but supported the idea of central planning for 
industrialisation.   In his industrial strategy Mao opted for five priority sectors, adapted to 
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the needs of the country : cement, chemical fertiliser, heavy machinery and other capital 
goods, power plants, and iron and steel.  In the organisational set-up he went his own way. 
Maoïsm will be remembered for the novelty of its agrarian communism, which was based 
on the following elements : labour-intensive cultivation and irrigation methods, new 
modern inputs and the radical change of rural socio-economic institutions.  After a 
relatively short flirt with the Soviet model of planning and collectivisation, Mao dropped 
'the Soviet Union is our master' slogan.  Inspired by his own creed, he made a leap 
forward. With a deep distrust of specialists, who were over-eager to form labour 
aristocracies, he preferred militant workers and peasants who professed to be 'red and 
expert'.  His innate sense of egalitarianism led him to seek faster routes in the direction of 
real communism.  In these impulsive jumps, he operated against the argument that the 
material conditions and the mentality of China were not yet ripe for such moves.  Mao's 
promethean concept of development, in which the role of ideas and attitudes, or passions 
more than interests, formed the gist of human action, led him to proclaim that 'by effort of 
mind and will, people were able to move mountains'.  In his later years he rejected the 
ideas of centralised planning that would transform China into one large commanded 
workshop.  Thus, he carried out several experiments in decentralisation, some of which 
failed.  The hasty organisation of the rural people's communes (as a lever for a quick 
transition to real communism), and the propagation of small scale industries such as the 
famous backyard iron and steel factories at the village level, failed miserably.  Famine 
came over the country and millions of people suffered from starvation.  The impulsive 
program was cancelled by the right wing of the party leadership.  Mao was temporarily 
pushed into a minority position and remained quiet for a while. 
The rejoicing of the victorious conservative or pragmatist leadership was of short duration 
though.  With his famous promethean élan, Mao organised a comeback with the aid of the 
People's Army and of the revolutionary youth.  These two groups had felt betrayed by the 
pragmatism of the revisionist party line.  By a direct assault on party headquarters, local 
bosses, profiteers and other so-called 'enemies the people', Mao engineered a cultural 
revolution that caused an ideological watershed.  In the wake of exuberant mass 
demonstrations which did not shy away from demagoguery and violence, the conservative 
leaders were swept away. Those who had reviled Caesar, but were deemed indispensable, 
were able to save themselves by praising him in publicly organised confessions.  At the 
zenith of the cultural revolution Mao became not only the uncontested godfather of the 
nation, but also its idol.  In his direct appeal to the masses, Mao, like other charismatic 
leaders, had overstepped the intermediary bureaucratic machinery.  He engineered a radical 
movement of decentralisation and conscientisation.  Ultimately, this deteriorated into a 
personality cult.  For a while, the radicals were in power.  In the following period of late 
Maoïsm though, agrarian communism had passed the crest and a new spurt in 
industrialisation required more complex technologies.  The late sixties marked the end of 
the early postwar period, for China as well.  The victory of the Hanoy regime in Vietnam 
set in motion a détente with the West.  It was agreed that it would be a positive step to 
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open the door to Western technology.  As such, a new power base was in the making, with 
another development strategy. 
Deng Xiaoping's regime, which took the reins of power after intermittent power struggles 
between different ideological wings in the party leadership, vilified the radical initiatives 
of Maoïsm, such as the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution that followed.  
The revisionists pictured Maoïsm as a product of an 'adventurous' and 'utopian' ideology. 
This chorus received a resounding echo in the West.  With the hindsight of the repressive 
bloodbath perpetrated by the gerontocrat Deng Xiaoping at Tien Anmen Square in 1989, 
the image destruction of Maoïsm emerged under a new light both in specialist and public 
opinion.  
Maoïsm has been an extreme case of the politicisation of economic decision-making, of 
nation- building and of society construction.  The party which invested the state completely 
was the 'red' brigade of mobilisation.  Mao's herculean enterprise will be remembered for 
its ideological inspiration and for the permanent mobilisation of energies at the grassroots 
level.  His idealistic views of society and of human nature in general were occasionally at 
odds with the specific requirements of conventional wisdom and of more conservative state 
marxism.  His decentralised approach, animated by the slogan 'get going with local 
methods', clashed with the central commando line of the party.  However, the peasant 
masses and the progressive industrial proletariat responded to his appeals and gave him a 
solid power base to carry out his projects.  But Mao proved also to be a cold blooded 
revolutionary who did not shy away from intrigue and physical elimination of rivals and 
opponents.   
In the peripheral, backward economies of Asia, and in China still more than in India, the 
state has been the central agent in the total re-ordering of national self-reliance.  
Industrialisation and import substitution formed the basic strategy.  In China, the party 
commanded the state to take over the job.  In the field of industrialisation theory, Mao, 
with his dogma of all but absolute self-reliance, inversed the conventional perception of the 
linkage effects.  In the perception of the Austrian School, modernised by F. von Hayek, the 
evolution of the consumer goods sector gives the signals for sectoral growth in the capital 
goods sector.  Von Hayek acknowledges that, at times, the signals given by the market 
mechanisms have resulted in overreaction in the investment sector, resulting in the well-
known business cycles.  The models of balanced growth strive to correct this by adequate 
planning, but the finished goods sector is still conceived to be the pilot.  
Mao and his staff , conversely, began with the novel view that the enlarged capacity of the 
capital goods sector determines the potential rate of expansion of the consumer goods 
sector.  This 'forward' linking was enforced by Mao.  Mahalanobis, the Indian specialist in 
planning, would likewise formalise this forward chain of causation in his famous 
two-sector model of growth.  Further, they both recognised that capacities are not directly 
transferable from one sector to another ; there are delays and imbalances that must be taken 
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into account.  The originality of Mao lay not primarily in the economic rationale of this 
causation, but in its novel organisational implementation.  Indeed, the Soviet planner 
Feldman had formulated the theoretical foundations decades before.  Mao, though, paid 
more attention to the socio-political complexities of self-reliant industrialisation and of the 
particular accumulation cycle than others.  In a peripheral, backward economy, with more 
than half a billion peasants, this was the correct view.  He realised that the brunt of capital 
accumulation had to be borne by state appropriation of the surplus value, created by the 
industrial proletariat and by the rural population.  His egalitarian creed rebutted the 
possibility that during the transformation process, labour aristocracies and bureaucratic 
spoils might engender a class conflict between a privileged minority and a deprived 
underclass.  He was also aware that the sectoral imbalance of his industrialisation model 
required an institutional correction of the central planning idea.  Without this, the 
centralising approach would inevitably lead to a completely commanded economy. 
To meet this problem Mao initiated the institutional innovation of 'walking on two legs'.  In 
this system the capital goods sector was centrally planned, whereas the derived 
consumption goods industry was given a larger margin of manoeuvre and local initiative.  
Mao's originality lay in organisational innovation intended to overcome the problems of 
over-centralisation by the state planners.  The building up of quasi-autonomous agencies 
and localities, with the power to allocate resources and to distribute income in the 
industrial production of mass consumption goods, was his organisational novelty.  At times 
this created economic imbalances that irritated the central planning team.  However, the 
local correction of social conflicts by decentralisation functioned as a political buffer 
mechanism.  Social conflicts are inevitably engendered by all models of capital 
accumulation based on the limitation of consumption.  Mao Zedong softened the plight by 
socio-political innovations. 
On the basis of his experience as a partisan leader of the heroic Long March, this messianic 
leader and ideological prophet had formed a military conception of development.  Like an 
army, the mobilisation of material and human resources has to march great distances 
swiftly, without consideration of the toil involved, followed by a rest to regenerate forces 
for the following march.  Development is by nature unbalanced.  The mobilisation of 
human energy and will is the ideal and only response.  Mao aroused the mass of the 
peasantry to action.  The peasantry responded with herculean efforts.  By more intensive 
cultivation methods, that is, by deep ploughing and irrigation, and by more productive 
inputs, they realised remarkable increases in farm yields.  But near the end of his life Mao 
had lost contact with reality and left his country embroiled in a disastrous power struggle.  
His strategy that had combined industrialisation with agrarian communism had past its 
peak.  A new development phase opened for China.  As the required inputs of technology 
could not be delivered on the basis of self-reliance, the gradual opening to the West 
seemed the shortest way.  Deng Xiaoping inaugurated this new course. 
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CHAPTER VIII : EDUCATION AS A DIFFUSER OF 
MODERNISATION 
At the beginning of the 1960s, development economists discovered educated human capital 
as a determinant factor of production, and thus of economic growth.  The emphasis put on 
the surplus value created by technical know-how, and on the rise in organisational and 
professional capacities as the result of a modern education, produced a theoretical shift in 
development theory.  The new vision stressed investment in people, not only in the 
physical resource base.  It was called the human capital school.  A series of studies 
published by various economists, such as F. Harbison, C. Meyers, J. Tinbergen, H.Correa, 
T. Schultz, E. Denison, E. Blaug and others, enriched development theory with the idea of 
the planned expansion of education69. 
The central thesis of the human capital school was that an educated labour force was more 
apt to contribute to the enlargement of the material resource base on account of its 
organisational capacity.  Due to the lack of a sufficient number of modern educated locals 
in the LDCs, the marginal productivity of investment in education was extremely high in 
the first phases.  Gradual replacement of the expatriate specialists and professionals by 
trained local people, though, would render the goal of self-reliance more solid. 
The economic branch of the human capital school concentrated on the measurement of the 
investment funds required for a rapid building up of a modern school system, from the 
level of basic education to university schooling.  The then conventional input-output 
models for manpower blossomed.  The socio-politically inclined theorists of the human 
capital department, however, opened up new research lines.  In their view modern 
education was not only an economic asset.  The effects of education on nation-building in 
pluri-cultural societies creates greater social mobility for the educated, as against more 
traditional, elites.  Thus it leads to the diffusion of new sets of values. 
The staff of UNESCO, the specialised United Nation Organisation in Education and 
Culture, organised colloquia and workshops all over the world.  It played an important role 
both in spreading the new idea and in its technical implementation. This organisation 
developed programs for the schooling of youth and also strongly advocated adult 
education.  The campaigns for the functional literacy of the adult labour force had a direct 
and considerable effect on average productivity. 
In the early postwar period, modern education played a very important role in the 
processes of individual and group mobility.  It was often the decisive factor in the 
allocation of many elite roles and functions.  Public agencies and private institutions, such 
as economic firms, tended to place a relatively high premium on the possession of 
advanced educational qualifications.  In the new states, all well-paid and all prestigious 
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functions went to the happy few with a solid, modern education.  Thus, it conferred not 
only an economic premium on the diploma owners, but also social prestige.  Education 
evolved as the status conferring institution par excellence.   
During the course of the seventies the economic analysis of education faded into the 
background, and the extraordinary push of social demand in favour of school expansion 
took the lead.  A brief reference to the specific social dynamics of education may help to 
explain the generalised over-expansion of education that followed.  After the replacement 
of expatriates, and after the initial absolute shortage of educated manpower, a relative 
slow-down in the absorption of educated people by agencies and firms set in.   
Social demand, however, was a powerful lever for greater expansion of education.  The 
ensuing combination of a declining absorptive capacity with an exuberant growth of the 
educational system and of its output, tended to raise the minimal educational qualifications 
associated with a given occupational level.  The phenomenon is known as the educational 
'upgrading' of functions.  This situation tended to generate a rising social demand and 
pressure for the building of more secondary schools and universities.  As the occupational 
premium of the lower levels of education declined rapidly, public pressure for more access 
to the higher levels mounted.  The educational system was trapped by its own enthusiasm.  
The over-reaction to an initially correct estimation of the shortage of educated people 
created an over-supply. 
A fact often neglected by radical and marxist writers is the emergence, and in time, the 
ascendancy of a new social class in the developing countries that bears no relation to the 
possession of land or capital.  Rather, this privileged class is the result of an advanced 
modern education.  Thus, amongst the bourgeoisie of the first generation, a considerable 
number of the ascending elite groups can be considered to be capitalists on account of 
'educational' capital70. 
Not everyone had the same opportunity to enter the school system.  Initially, some groups 
withheld their children for religious reasons. Ethnic differences were also involved in the 
response to schooling ; and later, the urban-rural differential became a very important 
factor.  Research demonstrated that not only capitalist development and industrialisation 
were responsible for the widening of the elite-mass gap, but that the rapid and unequal 
expansion of education had formed a powerful motor of inequality as well.  Mao Zedong, 
who distrusted the mandarin mentality of the modern educated, rekindled the idea of the 
medieval, ascetic Cistercian monks.   He initiated a curriculum revolution in which he 
combined study with labour.  Like the monks, the young Chinese intellectuals had to work 
in rural and urban development : with their hands ! 
In many developing countries research revealed that the social demand for general 
education increased considerably faster than the demand for vocational training and 
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technical schooling.  The ensuing differential expansion of the school system was more 
aligned with the better opportunities in terms of social mobility and the higher status 
conferred to diploma holders of general education, than with the occupational needs of a 
developing country.  Simple curricula changes and other school incentives introduced to 
redress this lopsided social demand proved to be ineffective, as the roots of the different 
evaluation of the educational types originated in society. 
School reformers attempting to reorient the school systems and curricula dealt with the 
results of the problem rather than with its source.  Only the regimes characterised by 
intensive political mobilisation of the masses, supported by an egalitarian ideology like 
Maoïsm, took another course.  In Tanzania, the populist leader Julius Nyerere instituted 
initiatives similar to those of Mao, but his ruralisation of education failed.  School reforms, 
if well conceived and implemented, may improve the flow and allocation of students over 
the different sectors of general, technical and vocational education ; but they cannot 
influence the evolution of social demand.  This evolves in accord with the aspirations and 
interests of the elites.  Moreover, education is a most desired status symbol. 
After two decades of vigorous expansion, the general education systems had become 
diploma mills in overdrive.  This was also the case in the universities.  The oversupply 
generated considerable intellectual unemployment, as well as disguised unemployment in 
the inflated public bureaucracies.  With the exception of China, most developing countries 
copied the educational system and curricula of the West.  Thus, in one of the most 
important transmission belts of social and cultural values, the ideology of self-reliance and 
import substitution was forgotten.  Some countries paid lip-service to bridge the gap 
between the Western ideal type and their felt needs in terms of development.  In the 
African university of Kinshasa, where I lectured in the early post-independence period, the 
Africanisation of the curriculum and of teaching methods became the subject matter of an 
intense debate, followed by the polite refusal of the students when it came time to 
implement the reforms. While they hotly accused the West of policies that intensified the 
dependency of the periphery, in education the African students opted for copies of the 
West, more so than the Western professors. 
In my view, the spectacular expansion of formal education has been the most radical and 
efficient diffusion vehicle of modernisation and Westernisation of the transfer of 
knowledge process.  As the educational system expanded on a world scale, the family and 
also local experience as the privileged socialisation milieus for youngsters were eclipsed.  
For the rural as well as the urban educated elite, the school became the only and 
determinant socialisation agency.  The traditional knowledge of the parents was discredited 
in the Western educational system.  The over-evaluation of book-knowledge, combined 
with the relative neglect of other avenues of personal and social formation such as the 
absorption of wisdom, the traditional ways of working in agriculture and in other sectors of 
life, had a destructive effect.   
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The formally uneducated were identified as ignorant people of no worth at all.  With the 
expansion of education, a graduate of 'only' primary school was considered to be a person 
with a problematic future.  The accumulated wisdom and knowledge of millions of 
peasants and other villagers, of great use in their social and natural environments, were 
devalued.  The natives with experience were replaced by local and foreign agronomists and 
by extension workers with high degrees of schooling, but without any practical knowledge 
of the indigenous cultivation methods, of the traditional inputs and of soil reaction to 
innovations.  Critical assessments of Western schooling methods as an agent of creative 
destruction in the rural world in development have been few but radical.  After several 
years of study and experiment on the school system in rural Mexico, Ivan Illich published a 
book with the shocking message that 'the de-schooling of society' was the only solution.  
This was like throwing out the baby with the bathwater.  A more gradual and adequate 
reform is needed71. 
After three or four decades of intensive expansion and diploma inflation, the school 
systems and their graduates have lost some of their initial prestige.  The educational system 
needs reform: first of all in its curricula, directed toward the achievement of higher norms 
in terms of internal efficiency; and secondly in its external efficiency.  This latter element 
has to do with the basic needs of a society.  A better cross-fertilisation between education 
and the socio-cultural fabric of society, with its specific development needs, requires a 
combination of bold imagination with the political will to implement the blueprints of 
reform. 
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CHAPTER IX : EXPORT ORIENTED INDUSTRIALISATION IN THE 
NICs 
1. The new international division of labour 
Viewed from the vantage point of the history of economic thought, the Mercantilists were 
the first to theorise on the impact of foreign trade on development.  For them, the policies 
leading to a positive balance in foreign trade were strategic devices to generate an inflow 
of bullion.  This inflow of specie would not only 'quicken' trade and manufacturing, it 
would also produce a positive effect on employment.  In a series of remarkable economic 
essays, Hume, a well-known Scottish Enlightenment scholar and friend of Adam Smith, 
questioned these nationalist strategies72.  In a more cosmopolitan vein than the 
Mercantilists, he demonstrated the logical impossibility of every nation realising a surplus 
in its balance of foreign trade.  On a world scale, the export surpluses have to be 
compensated by import deficits and vice versa.  According to his famous specie flow 
mechanism, coupled to its effect on the movement of internal prices, the external 
imbalances would flatten out in due course. 
For our discourse, however, Hume’s lesser known thesis on the migration of economic 
opportunities is more relevant still.  In his view, the long term dynamics of development 
'make it appear unlikely that a leading trading nation will be able to preserve for ever its 
commanding position'.  Indeed, the international unfolding of the more advanced nations 
opens up opportunities for economic growth elsewhere.  Looking at the educational role of 
foreign trade, Hume emphasised its demonstration effect on the less advanced nations.  
Foreign trade acquaints them with 'the pleasures and luxuries' of imported goods.  
Imitation soon diffuses the imported luxuries and the art of manufacturing.  In due course, 
the domestic manufacturers begin to emulate the industries of the leading nations.  
Moreover, once a country has grown prosperous, 'its price level may compare 
unfavourably with the low price of labour in other nations which have not yet an extensive 
commerce'.  This disparity of labour costs and of the level of prices in general sets the 
stage for a diffusion of economic opportunities.  This may cause stagnation in the 
advanced nations and expansion amongst the latecomers.  According to Hume : 
‘manufacturers gradually shift their places, leaving these countries and provinces 
which they have already enriched and flying to others, whither they are allured by 
the cheapness of provisions and labour ; till they have enriched these also, and are 
again banished by the same causes’.  
Hume’s ideas on the migration of economic opportunities underwent a revival in the 
development discourse of the seventies.  An increasing number of multinational firms were 
unfolding the manufacturing industries toward a select group of developing nations ; more 
particularly, to those who welcomed these firms with market-friendly policies and 
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regulations.  While the schemes of dependency and neomarxism advocated delinking, a 
whole spate of neoliberal economists argued for the integration of the industrial base at the 
global level.  Export oriented industrialisation was hailed as the felicitous successor of 
import substitution.  The most outspoken neoliberal export orienters were Bela Balassa, 
Anne Krueger, Ian Little, D. Lal, H. Myint and, last but not least, some leading staff 
members of the World Bank.  By the second half of the seventies the ideological climate 
had changed.  In the economic profession as well, a paradigm shift occurred that contested 
the benefit of state intervention.  The glamour of Keynesianism had paled and was 
overshadowed by the rise of two new theoretical markers : monetarism and supply side 
economics.  In the new market-friendly atmosphere, the pessimism of the earlier 
generation with reference to the development capacity of international trade faded.  The 
pessimism was replaced with an almost unbounded enthusiasm for the internationalisation 
of the economy.  The new strategy consisted in the globalisation of industrial production, 
even if this entailed the de-domiciling of capacity and de-industrialisation in the core 
countries.  The more advanced countries were encouraged to move into 
knowledge-intensive service industries. 
The most important change in the investment pattern of the seventies was the transnational 
spread of manufacturing industries and of private capital impulsed by an outburst of direct 
investment.  This new international division of labour can be characterised as follows : 
a. Growing internationalisation of capital, as technological developments increasingly 
make possible an inter-linked but dispersed network of a firm's productive 
operations in different parts of the globe. 
b. A climate of liberalisation and deregulation, that is, a decolonisation of the markets.   
c. The introduction of innovative techniques and new modes of financial 
intermediation, concomitant with an intensive internationalisation of the financial 
markets.  The strategy of the external growth of firms on the basis of fusion and 
acquisition becomes fashionable. 
d. Creation in several Third World countries of 'free industrial zones' or 'free trade 
assembly zones', offering multinational capital not only cheap labour but also a 
variety of other fiscal and legal advantages.  Mexico’s maquiladoras located in the 
border zone with the United States are an example. 
e. Emergence of a number of newly industrialising countries.  The NICs rapidly 
managed to shift their exports from mineral and agricultural primary products to 
manufactured goods.  Stable political regimes, low wages and flexible labour 
markets induced the countries of the centre to locate a part of their activities in the 
NICs by a novel network of production and management. 
Changes of this dimension elicit new interpretative schemes and avenues of enquiry.  The 
mainstream version on the new international division of labour emphasised the spatial 
reorganisation and relocation of industrial production on the basis of market opportunities 
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and lower labour costs.  The older formula theorised by Ricardo favoured the specialisation 
of nation states in a particular product, like wine for Portugal and textiles for Britain.  In 
the classical case, a small number of industrial countries were profiled to produce finished 
capital and consumer goods for the world market, in exchange for the primary products of 
the developing nations.  In the new formula, a select number of countries in the periphery 
actively engage in the transformation of their industrial production structure.  This 
transformation consists in a shift of emphasis : from labour-intensive industries to 
manufactures with higher added-value.  The process of stepping-up the added-value sectors 
of the industrial structures in the NICs was activated by the multinational firms, who had 
initiated a transnational network in industrial assembly.  This resulted in the subdivision of 
industrial manufacture into a multiple and world-wide diffusion of production locations. 
With the fragmentation of industrial production over a multinational network, the 
interpretative scheme based on (national) comparative advantages, thematised by 
Hecksher-Ohlin Samuelson (HOS), needed to be revised.  In Wallerstein’s 'world-system' 
approach and in the study published by Fröbel, Heinrichs and Kreye, the logic of capital 
had pride of place73.  For these authors, the strategies of the multinational firms to multiply 
the industrial sites in the NICs were a consequence of the diminishing rate of return on 
capital in the core countries, in comparison with perspectives of a more profitable rate in 
the promising markets of the periphery.  This reductionist scheme, however, as well as the 
thesis of the lower labour costs, overlooks the multiplicity of factors leading to the spatial 
expansion of manufactures.  In order to correct the picture it should be mentioned that in 
the most promising NICs, like South Korea, Taiwan, Brazil, Mexico and Venezuela, the 
state administrations in conjunction with the managers of domestic industry were long 
active partners in the realisation of the new international division of labour.  In the text that 
follows we illustrate the role of the domestic partners in a novel synergy with the strategies 
of multinational firms. 
2. The bureaucratic authoritarian state 
In his typology of the bureaucratic authoritarian states (BA-state) in Latin America, 
Guillermo O'Donnell emphasises the dominance of the political element in their 
development strategy and sketches the following profile74: 
a. Dominance of the bureaucrats : high government positions are occupied by persons 
after a successful career in the armed forces, in the public bureaucracy or in large 
private firms. 
b. Political exclusion : the BA-state closes the channels of political access to the 
popular sector and controls or forbids trade unions. 
c. De-politicisation : development strategies and problems are reduced to 'technical' 
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ones that can be solved by rational indicative planning of state officials. 
d. Economic exclusion : the BA-state appropriates the surplus value of the working 
classes for accumulation ; a more favourable regime for the educated middle and 
upper classes. 
Against the world-system theory formulated by I. Wallerstein, which depicts all peripheral 
states as passive puppets of international capital, some dependency authors, like T. Evers, 
acknowledge the relative autonomy of the state in Latin America75.  The absence of a 
dominant and hegemonic local bourgeoisie results in the state acquiring a growing role, not 
only in providing infrastructure, but also in the industrial production of the high profit 
sectors.  In this context, the state competes with local as well as with international capital. 
The authoritarian capitalism of the NICs is different from its Western ancestor in several 
respects; that is, from the free market system impulsed solely by private entrepreneurs.  In 
the countries of authoritarian capitalism, the state attempts to play the hegemonic role of 
arbitration in a triple alliance between the local bourgeoisie, the managers of the state 
enterprises and the representatives of transnational capital. 
In his study on this 'triple alliance' in Brazil, P. Evans focused on the social bases of the 
state, rather than on public agencies and bureaucracies76.  Evans does not employ 
terminology like power bloc, hegemony or even relative autonomy, in the sense of 
O'Donnell and Evers.  Instead, he places a great emphasis on the contradictions between 
the strategies of the three partners.  In his view the triple alliance is a temporary and fragile 
alliance.  In spite of these contradictions, the three partners in the alliance were bound by 
the rules of the game of the post-1964 military regime.  Indeed, the stagnation of the 
OECD-countries gave an impetus to transnational industrialisation, and the authoritarian 
regime kept average wages and inflation rates low.  Capital accumulation went into 
overdrive and the Brazilian 'miracle' was hailed as a model for others. 
In my study Brazil a model ?, I analysed the potential instability of the triple alliance in 
some detail, and found that the weakest link was the national bourgeoisie77.  As long as the 
transnational firms incorporated new technology in the economy, and as long as the state 
bureaucracy served these firms by keeping wages low, the national bourgeoisie felt 
comfortable in the company of the two other partners of the alliance.  Some sectors of the 
local bourgeoisie, however, did not like the increasing state power of the authoritarian 
regime.  They preferred a less powerful government, like the weaker populist predecessor.   
At the beginning of the eighties, when the import of transnational capital dwindled as a 
result of the debt crisis, and the popular sectors of society rebelled more openly for greater 
participation and re-democratisation, the local bourgeoisie sided with the people.  The 
                                                          
75  T. Evers, El Estado en la Periferia Capitalista, Mexico, 1979. 
76 P. Evans, Dependent Development : The Alliance of Multinational, State and Local Capital in Brazil, 
Princeton, 1979 ;  P. Evans, Bringing the State Back In, Princeton, 1980. 
77  L. Baeck, Staat Brazilië Model ? (Is Brazil a model ?), Louvain, 1975. 
  
 
73
national bourgeoisie left the now less beneficial alliance.  In this process of abertura or 
re-democratisation, the Church and its affiliated grassroots development agencies played a 
more important role than the social democratic parties and trade unions inspired by the 
dependency theories.  In my view, the solidarity of the triple alliance in Brazil eroded as a 
result of two factors : the drying up of transnational capital (debt crisis) that hurt the 
national bourgeoisie, and the rebellion of the 'moral' base.  The Church campaigns of 
conscientisation of the common people had worked.  The moral base helped topple the 
military regime. 
3. East Asia 
If we compare the situation of Brazil, Mexico, Argentina and Chili with two major 
Southeast Asian countries, South Korea and Taiwan, the picture is rather different.  
Whereas the Latin American model rested on social control, low incomes for the masses 
and on distribution of the growth benefits in favour of the middle and upper classes, the 
Southeast Asian pattern was characterised by more egalitarian strategies.  In South Korea 
and Taiwan, there are state bureaucracies that appear to be more capable of steering 
foreign, as well as indigenous, investments78.  In their strategy, export oriented 
industrialisation is combined with a socially and sectorally more balanced development 
trajectory.  The benefits of growth are more equally spread over the different social groups 
and between rural and urban centres.  Despite the policy of low wages, these countries do 
not experience the same degree of social inequality and marginalisation that prevailed in 
Latin America. 
In both South Korea and Taiwan, civil society is considerably weaker than in the above 
mentioned Latin American countries, where for decades reformist populist regimes 
preceded the authoritarian states.  In my view, the geopolitical factor also plays an 
important role in the Southeast Asian cases.  South Korea and Taiwan live in the vicinity 
of a powerful communist state with an outspoken egalitarian ideology.  The state 
bureaucracy in both South Korea and Taiwan have been controlled by fiercely anti-
Communist authoritarian elites.  They view rapid growth of capacity as a development 
goal, but deem it necessary to proceed on a socially less exclusionary strategy.  In a 
situation characterised by permanent challenge from their communist neighbours (China 
and Vietnam), the allegiance of the masses is an important development goal. 
These two states of Southeast Asia managed to cope with the problems of rapid 
industrialisation in a more effective manner.  They practised manpower planning to spread 
new skills; they promoted more egalitarian policies; and they adopted flexible and highly 
selective government devices for the protection of the infant industries.  If we look at the 
historical evolution of the two countries, it becomes clear that their occupation by Japan 
has had a positive effect on the prerequisites for balanced growth.  The Japanese 
occupation forces had weakened the power of the great land-owning classes.  This opened 
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the way for agrarian reform and for entrepreneurial agriculture on a family base.  As a rule, 
economic publications tend to neglect the different socio-political aspects of export 
oriented development.  The cases of Latin America and Southeast Asia indicate, though,  
that export oriented industrialisation (EOI) is intertwined with a specific socio-political 
matrix of government.  We return to this later in the text. 
4. The post-ISI model 
The post-import substitution industrialisation model has the following economic 
characteristics : 
a. The state plays a key role in the development strategy, not to supplant but to 
complete the missing links. 
b. Direct foreign investment and absorption of new technology, by way of 
transnational terms, transforms and completes the industrial structure. 
c. The import substitution goal fades into the background and more emphasis is laid 
on expansion and diversification of industrial exports. 
d. Greater reliance is placed on the market mechanism, with emphasis on growth and 
efficiency rather than on equity. 
e. Fiscal incentives are applied to give impetus to capital accumulation; local capital 
markets are set up and a correct exchange rate policy prevents the negative effects 
of an overvalued currency.  Devaluation is seen as a first step toward export 
oriented growth. 
Apart from the above mentioned factors involved in the generalised turn toward export 
oriented industrialisation, let us again refer to the influence of the paradigm shift in the 
economics profession.  With the decline of Keynesianism, the schools of supply side 
economics, public choice and monetarism competed to fill the gap79.  Their ideology 
stands for a policy of  laissez-faire economics, the primacy of the market mechanism, 
privatisation, minimal state intervention and a market-friendly socio-political context.  In 
the developed countries of the North, the socio-political alliances which rode on the crest 
of neo-Keynesianism had steered their welfare states toward huge public deficits and to 
two-digit inflation.  The counter-movement of monetarism and of supply side economics 
was a healthy reorientation toward sustainability in the long-run. 
Influential staff members of the World Bank and more so of the International Monetary 
Fund, as well most neoclassical economists in the universities, defend EOI on 
predominantly ideological grounds, with a benign neglect of the social repercussions.  The 
econometrist W. Tyler analysed a sample of 55 middle-income LDCs in the period of 
1960-77, and found a positive and highly significant relationship between economic 
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growth and manufacturing output growth and exports80.  These cross-sectional calculations 
can only illustrate the association between economic growth and industrial export. They 
are unable to prove that EOI stimulates export though.  It may well be that it is the other 
way around.  Econometric studies are limited in value since they ignore the effects of EOI 
on employment, income distribution, and external debt and its vulnerability.  However, if 
we look back at the experience of the seventies and after, most observers will agree that the 
transnational model of EOI has proved its merits.  Some NICs, like South Korea, Taiwan, 
Thailand and Malaysia, managed to achieve high growth rates without too great a social 
inequality.  Several dependency theorists, and all marxist analysts, introduced a 
misconception due to their dogmatic concentration on the exploitative metropolis-satellite 
or centre-periphery relations.  The post-ISI successes of several authoritarian NICs 
illustrate the common-sense stance that sound policy strategies and incentives neutralise 
the backwash effects of the open growth model. 
In the neoclassical literature on EOI, all positive effects are derived from an 
outward-looking orientation to the international market mechanisms and incentives, as well 
as to the technological contribution of the transnational firms.  The novelty of the strategy, 
however, is the fact that it worked best when the NIC-state was directed by an enlightened 
elite, as was the case with the dragons of East Asia.  These were power elites willing and 
able to implement sound policies, which did not overly favour the upper classes but strived 
to achieve a more or less egalitarian pattern. 
In my view, the EOI strategy owes less to the neoclassical international division of labour 
theory than to the strategy of neomercantilism.  It is a synthesis of a policy of nation-
building by authoritarian elites on the base of economic growth capacity with private 
managers.  The best cases are those where the power elite realises that power has its limits 
and that the support of the social base is indispensable in the medium-term.  Some 
countries, like Brazil, experienced a brief miracle and blundered thereafter on account of 
excessive social repression or unsound governance.  It is readily understandable that the 
most baleful effects of EOI have been severely criticised by social democratic dependency 
theorists, by marxists and by the churches.  More interesting is the fact that M. Lipton 
formulated an incisive analysis of the urban bias of EOI, based on neoclassical principles 
and norms81.  For Lipton, the inequality of income distribution between town and 
countryside, or the bias in income distribution, is the consequence of market imperfections.  
This is a neoclassical argument in populist disguise.  Unequal access to land, capital and 
technical knowledge increases inequality and enables landlords to influence the local 
labour market by, for example, 'reducing the wage rate below what it would be in a fully 
competitive market. 
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The basic claim of Lipton is that if all production factors were priced at their social 
opportunity cost, a more egalitarian distribution of income would arise.  In other words, 
unequal income distribution is not only the result of an unequal distribution in individual 
qualities and endowments (e.g., land, capital education, know how). It is, moreover, the 
consequence of market imperfections.  Governments in many developing countries supply 
labour-saving inputs to landowners and rich peasants at prices below the world price on, 
for example, the basis of overvalued exchange rates.  If production increases employment 
on the farms, this will increase less than its production.  The landowners and all urban food 
purchasing groups profit more than ordinary rural people.  The state policies concerning 
exchange rates, tax rates, import protection and export promotion subsidies, depart from 
market considerations and are usually designed in favour of the urban masses.  These 
market imperfections are the reason why poor (rural) people stay poor.  Thus, Lipton 
defines urban bias as the systematic tendency 'to reject both the most efficient and the most 
equitable policy in favour of urban interest. 
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CHAPTER X : ECONOMIC GROWTH AND EQUITY 
1. Slow and imperfect trickle-down effect 
As early as the 1950s, S. Kuznets had published his first study on Economic Growth and 
Income Inequality where he outlined the following historical trend :  
Income inequality has widened in the early phases of economic growth when the 
transition from the pre-industrial to the industrial civilisation was most rapid ; 
afterwards this movement in inequality stabilises and in the later phases of 
industrialisation, the gap will narrow. 
He added that the inequality of income was highest in the urban sector, and that inequality 
across the whole country increased as the urban sector grew proportionally more than the 
rest of the economy.   
During the period 1950-70, most of the developing countries witnessed the reality of 
Kuznets' inequality statement in their growth experience.  Policy-makers and development 
theorists of the 1950s and 1960s, however, focused on 'capacity growth' and paid little or 
no attention to income distribution.  By the mid-1970s, the inequality and poverty debate 
had become an integral part of development theory and practice. 
Several authors divide the population into quintile groups.  The growth rate of income for 
each quintile group (g) is assumed to measure the increase of its social welfare over the 
specified period.  The rate of the increase in welfare of the society as a whole is the 
weighted sum of income growth for all groups : 
     G = w1g1 + w2g2 + w3g3 + w4g4 + w5g5 
On the basis of this weighted breakdown of income groups, development policy can be 
designed for the benefit of specific 'marginalised' groups ; for example, the poorest 20 or 
40 per cent of the population.  A series of empirical studies have illustrated the Kuznets 
effect :  I. Adelman and C. Morris ; F. Paukert ; H. Chenery and M. Syrquin ; and 
M. Ahluwalia82.  In their study of 43 countries, Adelman and Morris found the following : 
a. On average, the poorest 60 per cent of the population lives on 26 per cent of the 
total income ; in countries with a high degree of urbanisation, the income 
distribution is more unequal. 
b. The income share of the poorest 60 per cent is on average lower in countries with 
authoritarian regimes, who follow a policy of social repression. 
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c. There is no indication that high growth rates raise the share of the poorest groups. 
d. The average share of income received by the top 5 per cent of the population was 
on average 30 per cent. Government policy was an important determinant for a 
higher or lower share in the upper 5 per cent group. 
Income and employment are highly correlated.  The poorest groups are at the bottom 
because they either have no regular employment or no employment at all.  The 
International Labour Organisation (ILO) has studied this question in more detail.  Early 
neoclassical growth models, such as the Lewis model, assumed that only the capitalist 
class saves and invests.  The logic implicit in this position is that an unequal distribution is 
better for capital accumulation and growth, since a more equal distribution would increase 
the number of people that would not save. 
Policies directed to income redistribution are of two sorts : social welfare measures and 
growth strategies with an egalitarian effect.  In the field of social welfare measures, we cite 
the following : 
a. Price policy to reduce the cost of certain goods and services largely consumed or 
used by the poor. 
b. Employment creation  
c. Direct income transfers or subsidies. 
d. Supply of public goods. 
e. Measures that raise the productivity of the poor. 
The measures mentioned under (b) and (e) may be the most effective, as the others are 
purely consumption oriented at great cost to the government.  An adaptation of the growth 
strategy itself, with the effect that the benefits 'trickle-down' more directly to all groups, 
seems to be the soundest option.  But, in order to achieve the desired trickle-down effect, 
purely technical measures will not suffice.  The implementation of a growth strategy 
directed toward more equal distribution of benefits depends first, on a social base for 
support, and secondly, on the political will at the top to push it.  Without these two 
prerequisites the trickle-down blueprints will not materialise83.  Finally, foreign aid 
agencies can be helpful when they prescribe conditionality rules on the projects in favour 
of the poorest or marginalised groups. 
2. The basic needs approach 
Judged by the conventional yardstick of economic growth, development in the postwar 
period was a success : it resulted in an annual increase of more than 3 per cent in income 
per capita for the LDCs.  But according to World Bank estimates, 750 to 800 million 
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people still live beneath a nutritionally defined poverty level.  These statistics illustrate the 
thesis that overall growth and equal distribution do not always coincide. 
The best, and perhaps only, way to alleviate the plight of these marginalised people is to 
increase the productivity of the poor, by direct methods.  The trickle-down effect resulting 
from economic growth takes far too long.  The bottom 20 per cent may require special 
programs, oriented toward basic needs such as nutrition, health, sanitation, water and 
housing.  A second line of attack on poverty may consist in programs of integrated rural 
development and in the replacement of low-productivity employment by higher-
productivity employment.  This includes the 'working poor' in the informal urban sector 
and the disguised unemployed in the rural areas. 
The idea of 'basic needs' arose amongst Christian and other humanist groups that claim that 
every human being has a right to human dignity.  The International Labour Office was the 
first world agency to adopt the idea, and shortly later the World Bank followed suit84.  As 
such, basic needs programs are integrated in the Bank's development projects. 
The basic needs approach (BNA) is directed toward the mobilisation of particular 
resources or services for specific groups, for example, for malnourished children, 
unemployed illiterates or for people in the informal sector.  The programs are oriented 
toward needs, not only income.  They include non-material needs such as the 
implementation of self-reliance, more active participation of people, support for cultural 
identity, etc.  In contrast to the national growth model with its unspecified but built-in 
preference for development in favour of the elites, the basic-needs model resolutely 
focuses on certain target groups in the population by stressing the struggle against poverty 
and by giving priority to projects that promote employment.  Considering the bleak misery 
and massive unemployment that prevail in many parts of the world, this seems to me a 
salutary correction to the conventional perception of development policy. 
Specifically, the basic-needs model stresses the following aspects: 
a. Employment opportunities for the poorest groups must be expanded in order to 
increase their income. 
b. To improve the employment situation, more investment must be made in the 
sectors that have been neglected, i.e., those amongst the rural masses and in the 
informal urban sector. 
c. Fundamental services such as education, health care and public transport must be 
made more available to these neglected sectors and their populations. 
d. Institutions that stimulate the participation of the people as a whole must be 
strengthened or established. 
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e. On the institutional and material level, greater reliance should be placed on the 
means available in the village itself.  Where possible, self-reliance should be the 
goal. 
The models that give precedence to basic needs and that advocate growth with less 
one-sided distribution, were proclaimed on the international forum by the International 
Labour Organisation and the World Bank.  However, most policy making circles in the 
First World and, naturally, the privileged groups of the Third World countries, are less 
enthusiastic.  The basic-needs model presumes rather drastic social and political reforms 
that would challenge the privileges of the upper classes. 
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CHAPTER XI : THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER 
The ideas and programs in favour of 'growth with equity' and 'basic needs' were efforts to 
endogenise development.  They emphasised the internal aspects such as social and 
geographical distribution ; growth balance between urban centres and the country side ; 
and, last but not least, the increasing marginalisation of the poorest 20 per cent as a result 
of  EOI-strategies.  This was not to the taste of the state bureaucrats and political leaders of 
the authoritarian regimes.  They openly supported a more mercantilistic program, such as 
nation-building, industrial capacity growth, and more leverage for the periphery against the 
power of the centre countries.  Inspired by dependency theories, they emphasised the 
importance of the external aspects of development.  Consequently, they mobilised political 
support in the forum of the United Nations to transform the 'links' with the West, on the 
basis of internationally 'negotiated' terms. 
In two United Nations agencies, UNCTAD and UNIDO, the idea of replacing the market 
mechanism by politically negotiated bargaining terms (for commodity prices, for 
concessional aid and for the transfer of technology) had been germinating since the end of 
the sixties.  In the second half of the seventies, the Group of 77 deemed the moment ripe to 
launch an orchestrated bid for a 'New International Economic Order' (N.I.E.O.).  The 
success of OPEC had demonstrated that the West had lost control over the market of a vital 
primary product like oil.  Oligopoly capitalism had lost its first battle against a 
transnational state cartel.  The floating of the dollar and the nationalist reactions of 
monetarism illustrated the competition emerging between the most advanced nations to 
compensate for their decline in profitability, which resulted in a slow-down in growth.  The 
erosion of Western hegemony, combined with economic difficulties, produced a rift in the 
OECD-club of nations.  In 1971 the US rejected the IMF-discipline as the American lobby 
could no longer dominate it.  Europe and Japan had become more assertive, and the 
superpower had to share decision-making under the form of a trilateral summit : the United 
States, Japan and the European Community.  The problems of disunion in the centre 
encouraged the periphery to pursue assertive diplomatic action85. 
At the core of the debate for a new international economic order, is a proposal by the 
developing countries to influence world prices and trade tariffs in their favour by means of 
international, politically negotiated interventions.  Thus, market forces in the international 
economy should be replaced by politically negotiated price fixing by governments in 
international conferences.  The developing countries aimed at a collective stabilisation 
fund for their export revenues.  They demanded greater national control of the transfer of 
technology and more concessional financing at better terms. 
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Apart from demands concerning raw materials, others have been formulated : 
- A unilateral dismantling by the industrial countries of trade barriers against exports 
from the developing countries, ideally replaced by a general preferential system.  
Although most of the industrial countries have indeed paid some lip-service to the 
general principle of tariff preferences, tough resistance to practical implementation 
followed.  Resistance of the First World to a preferential arrangement built up a 
wall against it, since intra-OECD trade was stagnating, and the key countries of 
Europe and the United States were facing massive structural unemployment. 
- The establishment of a distribution matrix of benefits and losses due to the 
differential evolution between import and export prices of the developing countries, 
also referred to as the 'indexation problem'. 
- Third World participation in the reform and management of the international 
monetary system toward a system of greater concessional aid and a relaxation of 
the 'conditionality-rules' imposed by the IMF. 
- Interstate control by the Group of 77 of the transfer of technology to the developing 
countries.  Investment in synthetics would be prohibited when there were sufficient 
natural products available. 
- Settlement of the debt problem on the principle of burden sharing. 
- Action toward a more equal distribution of industrial capacity on the world level. 
- Reorganisation of agriculture in the developing countries by the launching of 
viable, small autochthonous initiatives. 
- Preferential treatment for the less developed countries in the Third World. 
Approximately 8 per cent of the world industrial production capacity was then located in 
developing countries.  The goal of the developing countries, as formulated in the Lima 
target, was to boost this share to 25 per cent by the year 2000. 
The N.I.E.O. was a collective reminder that the external, or inter-state matrix of relations 
such as terms of trade, management of international trade, financing of international 
imbalances and so forth, are very important growth determinants.  External relations do 
indeed play a major role in the national growth possibilities for many countries.  However, 
they are necessary but not sufficient stimulants.  In spite of its positive side, this 
N.I.E.O.-perception of development also clearly creates a number of problems: 
1. The state, not the market, is regarded as the price setter, since state-interventionist 
nationalism lies at the basis of it. 
2. Because of its one-sidedness, this model places pure economic growth at the centre 
of the development strategy, to the relative detriment of other facets such as 
education, agriculture, health, housing and environmental planning. 
  
 
83
3. Finally, this model has little to say about internal income distribution.  The social 
and regional dimensions of growth are completely ignored. 
The difficulty is that the Third World, especially since the 1970s, cannot be considered as a 
homogeneous group.  As is the case in the First World countries, the structural changes in 
the Third World economy (e.g., the formation of the OPEC-bloc, the assertive position of 
the NICs, the plight of the less developed countries, etc.) have produced a basic 
differentiation in the negotiation program: 
- The less developed members of G 77 demand greater concessional aid, urgent 
measures of debt relief and more trade concessions. 
- The most assertive NICs negotiate for structural change in the supranational official 
organisations like the IMF and World Bank. 
- The social democratic group regards both programs as perverse because they fear 
the  consequence : an increase not a reduction in dependency. They therefore 
advocate a dependency reversal program, based on greater self-reliance and more 
active South-South relations. 
The measures discussed in the forum of the N.I.E.O. were directed exclusively to the 
implementation of a more balanced distribution of the world income among the various 
states.  In my opinion, this is only a half step, and perhaps not the most direct step, in the 
direction of authentic development.  Looked at with hindsight, this inter-state transfer did 
indeed respond to the nationalistic desire for growth cherished by the already privileged 
elites of the Third World.  But it did not necessarily entail greater development for the 
most needy population groups in these countries.  More income will not automatically 
result in better distribution of wealth, either socially or geographically. To achieve this, a 
drastic social and political reorientation of the development strategies of these countries is 
required.  The strategy advocated by the N.I.E.O. needs to be corrected and completed by a 
policy orientation that would provide not only growth for their states but also development 
for their populations. 
I would hold that a new international economic order is most welcome and certainly 
necessary.  But let us add that the disorder in our world is not only economic.  It is also, 
and primarily, social and political.  The implementation of an international economic order 
must therefore be supplemented by positive social and political reforms.  The enormous 
inequalities in internal income distribution functions against the human, social and political 
dignity of the masses.  Thus, in addition to the new economic order, which is directed to 
regulate only income distribution between states, our world also needs a more equitable 
social and political order, an order that organises and stimulates human development for 
all.  The same holds for the economic agencies controlled by the West. 
The mobilisation of political clout by the Group of 77 for a N.I.E.O. was the last 
manifestation of Third Worldism.  Its failure hastened the subsequent loss of appeal of 
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Third World ideology.  The industrial core countries were held responsible for the 
economic plight of the Third World and the onus of the required change was placed upon 
them.  This may have worked at the time of decolonisation, but by the middle of the 1970s 
none of the OECD-countries were disposed to assume this historical responsibility.  A 
vocal minority of public opinion in the West gave support to a more realistic North-South 
dialogue, and the Brandt Report supported this as well.  But the ideological climate of the 
West was in full transition.  The socio-political constituencies in favour of active 
interventionism were supplanted by majorities that opted for a free play of the market 
forces. 
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CHAPTER XII : THE DEBT HANGOVER 
During the seventies, the American and European banks played a major role in the 
recycling of petrodollars from the OPEC-countries to the oil importing developing 
economies. During the eighties, however, the United States itself ran into considerable 
deficits in its external accounts and dropped out as a major capital exporter.  As a  
consequence, a great many American banks that had bypassed the norms of prudential 
lending totally interrupted their credit stream to the developing countries.  The debtor 
countries were forced to adopt policies of structural adjustment in order to deal with the 
generalised credit-stop.  The drying up of credit made it dearer and interest rates spiralled 
upwards.  Due to the higher interest rates and the more restrictive monetary policies 
inspired by monetarism, the debt-burden unexpectedly became much heavier. Within this 
context, structural stabilisation policies were necessary in order to avert a financial crisis.  
The International Monetary Fund initiated the famous 'conditionality-credits'.  These were 
financial facilities put at the disposal of governments that agreed to follow a disciplined 
policy line in the government budget, the monetary and the exchange rate policy, and that 
favoured market-oriented initiatives such as privatisation and deregulation. 
In Latin America, the shift in policies also had effects on the relative influence of the 
institutions that play a major role in the formation or the legitimation of ideas.  In the 
high-debt countries, the 'financial faction' of the state bureaucracies and the top 
management of the central banks took over the lead from the CEPAL-minded development 
administrations. CEPALISM had gained adherence and support in the offices of state 
planning, the public enterprises, and in the administrations concerned with industrialisation 
and with production in general.  But it had never gained the favour of the policy makers of 
the central banks and of the ministries of finance.  The managers of the monetary and 
financial institutions privileged the orthodox ideas and policies of the Centro de Estudios 
Monetarios Latino Americanos (CEMLA), which had its seat in Mexico city.  With the 
world-wide shift in macroeconomics toward monetarism, CEMLA gained precedence over 
CEPAL, and became the regional transmitter of the stabilisation policies inspired by the 
IMF. 
Within this context developmentism declined.  The structural adjustment paradigm became 
the new orthodoxy.  The rules of adjustment were enforced by the international financial 
community, that is, by the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and by private 
banks and business groups.  The adjustment policies consisted of a package of measures 
such as reducing the rate of expansion in money and credit supply, eliminating the fiscal 
deficit, devaluing domestic currency, deregulating prices and government activities, 
opening up the economy to free trade, and creating an external trade surplus to pay back 
the external debt.  Due to the urge to proceed on all fronts simultaneously, this adjustment 
process turned out to be more complex than expected, and rather painful in terms of its 
social costs.  In several adjusting economies unemployment reached a high level, wages 
lagged behind prices and income distribution became more unequal. 
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During the 1980s, the structural adjustment and stabilisation policies determined the  
condition of the developing countries more than any other single factor.  The debtor 
countries unexpectedly found themselves in the midst of a new dialectical process. It was 
characterised by a paradigmatic shift in macroeconomics and by a changing geopolitical 
context, in which the core countries (North America, Western Europe and the Japanese 
sphere of influence in the East) initiated another model of capital accumulation in the 
periphery, based on direct investment. The reform ideas of the early postwar period that 
had led to the creation of a welfare state in Western Europe and to developmentism for the 
periphery, had lost their appeal. The power elite of the West adjusted its ideas and policies 
to more realistic goals.  These changes occurred in a favourable atmosphere.  The 
Soviet Union was quietly phasing out communism as a realistic alternative to the market 
system of the West, and even Deng Xiaoping’s China opened its doors for Western 
investments.  Confidence in the positive effects of government steering had faded 
everywhere, and the belief that the laws of the market could achieve better results won 
credence. 
The change to other methods of capital formation, impulsed by external financial 
resources, was clear enough.  In the early postwar period, international financial funds had 
been the principle source of finance for the developing countries.  These public resources 
were provided by the official financial aid agencies of the centre countries and by 
multilateral agencies such as the World Bank and its affiliates.  The oil-shock had a double 
effect : private capital was easily available, and in terms of volume it became more 
important than the official aid provided by the governments of the developed countries.  
The sudden and unexpected surplus of funds originating in the oil exporting countries was 
recycled by the Western banks to the developing countries.  Due to the first oil-shock, 
private bank capital was easier to obtain than public financial aid.  The transition to 
external borrowing from Western banks was a rational procedure for most developing 
countries.  The international market supply of finance was apparently without limits, and 
interest costs were low.  The abundant supply of international capital created a euphoria 
and a spending spree of short duration.  The financial intermediation of the surplus funds 
from oil exporters to the oil importers in the developing countries gave a tremendous boost 
to international banking.  It also gave an impetus to the internationalisation of the financial 
markets. A major change, however, was that in the private financial markets the borrowing 
countries had to bear the brunt of the risks involved.  The banks provided international 
credit only on short- and medium-terms against floating or readjustable interest rates.  The 
new source (private capital market), the volume and the cost conditions (interest) were no 
problem as long as international credit was abundant at a low cost86. 
In most NICs, growth rates before 1980 were higher than after the debt crisis of the 1980s.  
This was relatively more the case in the Latin American NICs than in the developing 
countries.  Latin American countries also had very high inflation rates.  It was striking that 
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Venezuela, although an oil exporter, performed badly in the 1980s.  Malaysia, South Korea 
and Thailand maintained relatively high growth rates, coupled with mild inflation.  For the 
least developed Third World countries, the debt crisis was still a greater plight than for the 
NICs.  However, in all the countries concerned, the low income groups suffered relatively 
more in the adjustment process87. 
The debt crisis of the 1980s in the developing countries was a result of the paradigm shift 
in the core countries (the US, Japan and the European countries), which adapted the 
monetarist creed to combat their high inflation rates.  The second oil-shock of 1979 
produced a serious situation of stagflation or of recession with inflation.  In most leading 
industrial countries, the earlier tolerance for inflation in preference to unemployment gave 
way to a frontal attack against inflation and government subsidised activities.  Inspired by 
monetarism, the governments of the core countries resorted to a tight control of money 
supply.  The new economic strategy of a tight money supply provoked a steep rise in real 
interest rates.  In this new situation, the developing countries had to pay higher interest 
rates not only on the new sources of credit, but also on the past borrowed stock of capital.  
As a result, new debt was taken up at higher interest rates to service old debt.  Thus, by the 
early 1980s most developing countries were involved in an unforeseen and severe 
debt-trap.  A crisis was looming in which debt-repayment at a high cost dominated all 
other policy objectives.  The ideology of developmentism waned and 'adjustment' became 
the key target, enforced by the financial markets and the Bretton Woods institutions. 
Let us illustrate this by the conditionality-requirement embodied in the IMF-stabilisation 
system.  Some observers argued that external forces (the oil price lifts, the deflationary and 
protectionist policies of the key countries of the OECD zone, as well as the drying up of 
concessional aid flows) were the major source of the widespread financial imbalance. 
Accordingly, their plea was that the IMF-conditionality should be more lenient.  In Latin 
America, the structuralists conceded that the IMF-stabilisation policies might be able to put 
the external financial balances in order, but they protested against its social and economic 
consequences.  They feared the socially repressive effects and argued that they would stifle 
the normal process of growth.  Empirical evidence has indeed proven their case, which 
held that the lower income groups would have to shoulder the heaviest burden. 
Some highly indebted countries succeeded better than others in their structural adjustment 
and were able to achieve high growth rates.  The literature on structural adjustment and on 
economic policy reform has given a great deal of attention to the better performance of the 
East Asian dragons, especially of South Korea and Taiwan, as compared with the poor 
results of most Latin American economies.  It is interesting to note that several analysts 
underlined the degree of equality in income distribution as a positive factor, and inequality 
as a handicap.  A more equal income distribution positively influences social cohesion, 
which gives relatively more political clout to the concerned government to impose the 
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hardship of stabilisation policies.  In this respect, the more egalitarian countries of East 
Asia scored better than Latin America, with its unequal income distribution88.  This may 
also explain the fact that in some Latin American countries a number of grassroots 
movements arose, in protest against the growing injustice caused by inequality. 
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CHAPTER XIII : BRINGING ETHICS BACK IN 
1. Renewed interest in the Mediterranean tradition 
Viewed from the long span of intellectual history, economic science is of a relatively 
recent birth.  When asked for the date of birth of their science, most economists hesitate. 
Some would mention the Mercantilists.  Others would refer to Adam Smith as the founding 
father of the 'classical' tradition.  Many would suggest the neoclassical triad of 
Jevons-Walras-Menger.  In my view, the concept of an autonomous branch of science 
called economics was only possible in the period following the Enlightenment, when a 
group of social scientists severed the subject matter from moral philosophy.  In the 
civilisations of the Mediterranean, economic thought had been embedded in practical 
philosophy (ethics and politics) or in the normative systems of the revealed religions, for 
more than two thousand years 89.  The pre-modern traditions of economic thought were 
developed by the major thinkers of the Mediterranean civilisations: the philosophers of 
Classical Greece and of Hellenism, the Roman rhetors, the early Church Fathers, the 
Islamic and Latin Scholastics, the Italian humanists, and the post-Renaissance Scholastics 
(also referred to as the School of Salamanca) and their Portuguese colleagues.  All these 
schools perceived the economy as embedded in a complex web of social and political 
relations, regulated by religious and ethical norms.  In their worldview, a holistic approach 
prevailed in which economics formed only a subordinate segment of ethics and politics.  
Ethical and religious norms prescribed the social obligations of the individual both toward 
himself and the community.  These Mediterranean thinkers were in fact the historic, but 
now largely ignored, pioneers of development thinking. 
In Aristotle’s conceptual world, development meant the realisation of the inherent natural 
potentials (e.g., of an individual, a society, an idea) toward a state of maturity 90.  To 
describe this process in greater detail he used various terms, such as becoming, unfolding, 
flourishing and flowering into a pre-given, natural form of completeness (Physics, Book 
II).  In Aristotle’s scheme, the unfolding of the inherent virtualities was not conceived to 
be a process that continues without end.  In stark contrast to the infinite possibilities for 
progress and development proclaimed by modernity, the ancient Greeks could not 
conceive, and still less confer, a positive value to an open-ended unfolding of virtualities 
(dunamis) into actualities (energeia).  Their world was that of the limited good.  Indeed, 
the Socratic philosophers in particular frowned upon individuals and societies that might 
become the victims of insatiable desire.  It was the Christians who initiated the notion of 
the infinite good, but they situated its realisation in the afterlife, that is, in heaven.  The 
                                                          
89 L. Baeck, The Mediterranean Tradition in Economic Thought, London, 1994. 
90 The Aristotelian concept of development received special attention in the philosophical analyses of 
Martin Heidegger.  For a commentary on the change in meaning of this concept  in the Roman world, 
and later in the medieval treatises of the Latin Scholastics, see J. Beaufret, 'Energeia et Actus', in 
Dialogue avec Heidegger : Philosophie Grecque, Paris, 1973.  Cornelius Castoriados extended this 
seminal discourse to the literature of the postwar period in his study 'Reflections on Rationality and 
Development', in Thesis Eleven, n° 10, 1985. 
  
 
90
humanists of the Renaissance were the precursors of the utilitarian philosophers, who 
transferred the possibility of an infinite good from heaven to earth.  The human and 
material wants were proclaimed to be infinite.  Modern man gradually came to be 
understood as a being with unlimited wants, or as a bundle of appetites.  Since the means 
are limited, a science of economics was needed, that is, an allocative mechanism of means 
which best maximises the satisfaction of the infinite wants. 
Aristotle’s analyses on the commercialisation, monetarisation and the ensuing 
'financiarisation' (chrèmatistikè) of the economy were the theoretical strides of a genius.  
His discourse on chrematistics was an historical benchmark for centuries.  In Aristotle’s 
view, chrematistics or the pursuit of wealth for wealth's sake, results in an unnatural course 
of development.  This occurs when the acquisition of money takes pride of place in the 
economy, and in the society in which it is embedded.  When the chrematistic spirit 
prevails, moral decadence inevitably sets in. The medieval Scholastics also produced a 
high tide in development ethics.  The doctrines of the Islamic and Latin Scholastics on the 
just price opened novel vistas on the moral constraints of the price mechanism, and they 
also offered interesting analyses on the terms of trade in general.  In an outburst of 
creativity, the School of Salamanca formulated the quantity theory of money and the 
doctrine of the international purchasing power parity.  This theoretical breakthrough 
illustrates that these Schoolmen also had a clear insight into the (international) market 
mechanism. 
When the intellectual influence of the Mediterranean civilisations had lost its spell, and the 
geopolitical and economic predominance migrated to the North, that is, to the upcoming 
nations of the Atlantic (Western Europe and North America), the paradigm shift which had 
been incubating since the seventeenth century caused a radical break in favour of 
utilitarianism and economic hedonism.  The Western social scientists of the Enlightenment 
and the nineteenth century Neoclassicists, who may be considered to be the fathers of 
modern economics, were the first social philosophers in history to openly proclaim that 
self-interest was not only permitted, but that it was a much better guide for the public good 
than altruism.  This paradigm-revolution is already discernible in Adam Smith’s oeuvre, 
who began his career as a professor in moral philosophy.  In his Theory of Moral 
Sentiments (1759) he was still a Mediterranean moral philosopher with a more than usual 
interest in economics. Like his predecessors, he upheld the ethical dimension of the subject 
matter.  It was in The Wealth of Nations (1776) that he initiated his celebrated 
'disembedded' version of the commercial society and of its theoretical legitimation, 
namely, economics91. 
In the wake of this revolution in thought, modern economics emerged as a single-focused, 
autonomous and formal framework of thought.  Its axiological base had completely 
emancipated itself from moral philosophy.  The homo economicus was born.  A great 
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number of today’s economists would argue that economics became the queen of the social 
sciences simply by completely disentangling itself from ethics and politics.  However, this 
highly praised value-neutrality, as well as the disembeddness of economics  from the 
socio-political and cultural web, are handicaps for economists who cherish social and 
political relevancy in their work.  In development economics especially, the value-neutral 
abstractions have led to a theoretical dead-end.  Indeed, development economics has not to 
do with marginal shifts, but with structural and motivational changes in non-Western 
cultures. 
Anthropologists and economists with field experience challenge the universalist claims and 
argue that economic thought, like the intellectual discourses of all the social sciences, are 
socio-cultural constructs.  The central process of all economies, making a livelihood, is 
culturally patterned and modelled in diverse ways92.  And famous non-Western members 
of the profession, like the Japanese economist Takamitsu Sawa and others, proclaim that 
modern economics is an ideological product of the Western industrial world in a particular 
phase of its historical development93.  Compared to the pre-modern diversity, the novelty 
of Western economics is the particularistic exception, not the universal norm.  The ideal 
type of the homo economicus is that of a rational, decision-making, economically 
optimising and hedonistic individual.  It would be hard to maintain that this individual, or 
should we say robot, is a representative figure of Western culture, and still less so of other 
cultures.  In situations of economic development, with the inevitable mix of local and 
global forces and diversities, the vantage point of glocalism, characteristic of the 
comparative approach, is to be preferred. 
The spread of economic growth to the most remote corners of the globe caused a 
generalised economisation of society and of its values.  The rising import of material 
aspirations in society resulted in the ascendancy of economics over the other social 
sciences.  Due to this hegemonic position, the economist acquired the eminent status of 
distinguished guru in a growing number of institutions.  And yet, when the prestige of the 
economic profession was at its zenith, the triumphal mood was accompanied by misgivings 
and questioning.  This spawned a wave of articles and books on methodology.  The 
economic slowdown of the Western core countries in the second half of the seventies had 
come as a shock to a great number of economists.  In the new thematisations that followed, 
the mainstreamers opined that the oil-shock was the major villain in the piece. The most 
critical in the profession delved more deeply and pointed to the shortcomings of economic 
science itself.  The questioning of the basic principles produced a number of 
epistemological and methodological spin-offs, eliciting a new approach in the branch of 
welfare economics94.  The most insistent critics emphasised the irrelevance of a good deal 
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of modern economic theory as a guideline for policy.  An often heard complaint was that 
the prestige accorded to mathematical models and to econometric forecasting had led to an 
impasse.  In the ensuing debate over macroeconomics, the supply siders and monetarists 
won. Keynesianism lost not only theoretical disciples, but also the socio-political 
constituencies which had upheld the welfare state at home and developmentism in the 
periphery. 
With the triumph of neoliberal thought and practice, development theorising entered a 
crisis mood.  In a provocative essay, the famous development economist A. Hirschman 
stated that ‘much of the zest and hope that characterised work in this area of economics in 
the 1950's and 1960's is no longer present’.  A few years later, the economist H. Bruton 
developed this idea in more detail95.  Bruton, who was one of the well-known exponents of 
the 'mainstream development theory', is now engaged in serious self-critique.  He asserts 
that with only limited exceptions, in both the literature and in practice, ‘development has 
come to mean a replication of the West.  The equalisation of development with 
Westernisation impeded the construction of an authentic development theory’.  And the 
neoliberal D. Lal went so far as to argue that the demise of development economics is 
likely to be conducive to the health of both the economics and the economies of 
developing countries96. 
Well-known theorists in economic development admitted the failure of both theory and 
practice.  They realised that its shortcomings were the consequence of an inadequate 
paradigm.  In a majority of cases, developmentism had been able to generate economic 
growth, but it had concomitantly displaced a traditional system by a modern (Western) 
system, usually at great social, economic and cultural costs.  Sociologists and 
anthropologists were in the same critical mood and underlined the devastating effects on 
cultural identity and integrity. The trend of the times also marched against the themes of 
neomarxism.  Their dogmatic and abstract theses fell with the bricks of the Berlin Wall97.   
The times were ripe for a paradigmatic move, back to the roots of a more ancient tradition: 
the Mediterranean tradition and its ethical base. 
2. Development ethics : A new theme 
The value-neutral models of modern economics are, up to a point, able to describe and 
explain what was, is and can be.  What ought to be, however, belongs to the domain of 
ethics.  By its very nature, development economics implies that basic choices have to be 
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made between several goals and policies, each of which leads to different outcomes. The 
different paths that lie open before the decision makers and their constituencies, imply and 
impose a great number of value-laden choices.  Authentic development cannot materialise 
without a clear view as to the most adequate goals and the strategies to achieve them.  
Economics can clarify the instrumental means to meet these ends, but the projection of an 
authentic model of development requires, first and foremost, the working out of a well-co-
ordinated set of goals.  In order to arrive at a harmonious whole, the ends should be 
hierarchically ranked according to normative criteria arising outside of economics.  
According to Aristotle, the historical pioneer on development thematisation, ethical norms 
provide the overarching principles over and above economics.  As noted above, in 
practically all the succeeding civilisations of the Mediterranean, Aristotle’s ideas on 
development ethics were absorbed by the most prominent scholars and cherished as a 
canon. 
Aristotle’s discourses on the politics and ethics of development are spread over two essays. 
In Politics (Book I, chapters 8-11), the matter is considered from the viewpoint of the 
dichotomy natural/unnatural, while in Ethica Nicomachea (Book V, chapter 5), it is 
analysed on the basis of the criteria just/unjust.  Of the many socio-political options 
available in relation to the ends and means of development, Aristotle claims that political 
philosophy offers the ultimate guiding principles.  They are the 'visible' hands that ought to 
orient decision makers toward a natural course, that is, toward a course of development 
that responds to the basic needs of the community.  The ideal development course, which 
Aristotle refers to as the 'flourishing of nature', is a course that also meets the criterion of 
justice.  The socio-political community-ends of the polis that concomitantly comply with 
the criterion of justice, are those which guarantee a course of development toward the 
highest good.  In order to achieve a just course, ethics enlightens us as to the best ends.  In 
a well-ordered praxis (europrattein telos), that is, in a praxis oriented to the highest good in 
life (eudaimonia), the means are subordinated to the highest ordered ends.  Within 
Aristotle’s paradigm, the art which we call economics is merely a discourse on 
instrumental means ; its principles are subordinated to the discourse on ends, namely, 
ethics.  Since man is a social and political being, only an eudaimonic synthesis of 
socio-political and ethical norms and ends can engender harmonious development. 
One of the first postwar thematisers on development who considered ethics to be a guiding 
principle in theory as well as in practice, was the French Dominican father Louis Lebret.  
In the fifties, he founded his famous institute Economie et Humanisme, with its central seat 
in Paris.  A number of African offspring’s were affiliated with the Paris centre.  The core 
of the message was the concept of integral development, that is, development oriented 
toward humane ends, as well as toward adequate and just means to achieve them.  From 
the vantage point of integral development, humane ends are by definition a harmonious 
ordering of basic needs and priorities in various domains : economic, social, political, 
cultural and spiritual.  One of Lebret’s disciples, Denis Goulet, spread the message to a 
number of Christian audiences and movements engaged in social development in the 
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United States98.  Paul Steidlmeier, another typical exponent of the Christian humanist 
tradition in development, lists the ideal ordering of priorities as follows:  
When it gets down to the concrete options, I advocate a certain qualitative orientation 
in development policy based on the following priorities : the liberty of the oppressed 
over the freedom of the more powerful, the social opportunity of the marginalised over 
their exclusion by certain elites, the needs of the poor over the mere wants of the 
wealthy, the duty to contribute to the common good according to ability rather than be 
apathetic or merely seek narrow self-interest, and the reinforcement of patterns of 
social justice through social incentives and sanctions rather than surrendering the 
determination of due process to mere group egoism or vindictiveness.99  
One of today’s most prominent Aristotelians is, without doubt, Amartya Sen.  In a number 
of influential publications he first voiced his misgivings about modern welfare economics.  
According to Sen, with its methodological individualism, that is, in its disregard for 
collective goals, and on account of its static nature, modern welfare economics (e.g., the 
principle of Pareto optimum) is a ponderous theoretical apparatus with only a slender 
guideline-capacity for policy making.  After this theoretical rite of initiation in the sect of 
the new welfare economics, he turned his attention to development ethics100.  Sen focuses 
his analytical scheme on the relationship between social goals and individual choices, set 
within a democratic society with a sense for social justice.  In his approach, the 
interdependence of the individual choices figures as a basic concept.  From the vantage 
point of social reality, the concept of interdependence is indeed a more relevant axiom than 
the supposed individualism of the homo ecnomicus. 
According to Sen, economics and the economy are not autonomous, single-focused 
domains.  They are embedded in societies characterised by value-laden choices.  Economic 
activities such as production, commercial exchange and consumption of goods and services 
are rooted in a web of social and institutional settings. This web is much broader than the 
market.  Thus, economic analysis ought to take these links and their interdependencies into 
account.  Indeed, in order to be morally relevant, economics should measure, evaluate and 
order these activities from the standpoint of a broader criterion than that of individual 
utility.  Accordingly, Sen proposes a ranking criterion that transcends the economy, a 
meta-ranking rooted in ethics.  He does agree that the conventional branch of development 
economics has been successful in the identification and analytical exploration of factors 
that may lead to economic growth, namely, capital accumulation, mobilisation of the 
abundant (under-employed) labour supply, backward and forward linkages, etc.  The error 
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in the approach consists in the identification of development with economic growth.  
Economic growth is only a means, and not always the best or most efficient means, for the 
achievement of broader development goals.  In true Aristotelian fashion, Sen holds that in 
order that development be eudaimonic, it should be organised in such a way that it enables 
people to live as good and flourishing a life as possible.  In accordance with this guiding 
principle, he conceives of development as a process which (ideally) expands the 
possibilities of people : live long, be well nourished, take part in humane pursuits.  This 
capabilities approach concentrates on goal-rights.  In some of his later publications, he also 
refers to these goals-rights as entitlements.  Sen’s ethical approach reaches beyond the 
mere welfarism of conventional developmentism.  His normative economics offers a 
theoretical and methodological deepening of the basic needs approach.  As such, it offers 
promising new vistas on more humane development. 
More recently, the Italian political philosopher E. Berti published a collection of essays, 
covering ongoing research, on today’s theorising in Aristotelian practical philosophy by 
colleagues from Germany, France, Italy and the United States101.  Its scope is not an 
antiquarian nostalgia for pre-modernity, as this would entail a loss of some of the 
fundamental acquisitions of modernity.  On the contrary, it also reacts against the 
complacent irrationality that is often linked with the most radical representatives of 
postmodernism.  Rather, the survey contests the abstract mathematical basis of modern 
social and economic science, and opts for a rehabilitation of the historical concrete notion 
of ethos.  The new thematisation of today's practical philosophy entails an intellectual 
cross-fertilisation that reintroduces ethics in the social sciences, and thus in economics, 
where it belongs. 
Development ethics has also focused a great deal of attention on the social roots of the 
moral base.  Some of the ethicists who inspire or who are engaged in grassroots 
movements offer theoretical underpinnings to, and legitimise the positive role of, non-elite 
participation in the shaping of the course of development102. Indeed, from a democratic 
standpoint, the ordinary citizen has a basic right to participate in decisions affecting the 
ends and means of development. 
3. The moral base at work in Latin America 
The moral base of development was not only an offspring of practical philosophy, but 
historically it was also embedded in the religious injunctions, prescriptions and 
commandments. In all times and in all cultures, religions have been participants in the 
constitutive dimension of the humane life.  This may explain why most of the thematisers 
on modernity (Nietzsche, Weber and Heidegger) analysed the impact of religion on 
society, that is, on its development and on its systems of meaning.  Being children of that 
special brand of post-Enlightenment German philosophy, they all adhered to the 
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secularisation-thesis.  Today, however, in different parts of the world and for various 
reasons secularisation is being challenged.  Religion is firmly back as a structuring element 
of the symbolic and cultural imagery, and as a socio-political force as well.  This is the 
case especially in the developing countries and in the lands that until recently belonged to 
the Soviet bloc103.  Of late, the rhetoric and the actions of religiously inspired groups have 
become more insistent and radical.   
Within the Christian culture we can mention the different encyclicals of the Popes, the 
pastoral letters and the publications of the World Council of Churches104.  The original 
institutional opening was initiated by the Second Vatican Council, where-after the then 
regime-bound Church started to take a more independent position with regard to the state 
machinery and to the established power groups. After an intensive ideological struggle 
between conservative Christians and those more future-oriented, the Church opted for the 
emancipation of the deprived groups in society.  This is reflected in the following 
examples.  In the encyclical Populorum Progressio, Pope Paul VI declares that real 
development cannot be reduced to the notion of a mere growth in material wealth.  
Authentic or integral development should also promote humane values, with due respect to 
social justice105.  In the more recent encyclical Sollicitudo Rei Socialis of John Paul II, 
great attention is given to the structural power of the First World, as well as to the means to 
create more employment and to meet the basic needs of the poor in the Third World with 
more dedication and efficiency.  The religious doctrines on development circulate 
worldwide and have an impact on the development policies outside the circle of believers.  
The special attention given to the poor by institutions like the World Bank and the United 
Nations is but one illustration. 
At approximately the same time as the institutional reorientation, bottom up initiatives also 
became manifest. In Latin America, for instance, the moral base has been operative in the 
course of the last two decades. It manifested itself by means of numerous 
Church-organised base communities, referred to as the basista movement (comunidade 
eclesial de base) or as the CEBs.106  For years, socially aware pastors and laymen have 
played the role of agents of change for the popular masses.  While the CEBs originated in 
Brazil, they have since spread to other countries in Latin America, Africa and Asia.  Here 
we focus on the original movement in Brazil.   
There the CEBs focus their attention on the following objectives : 
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a. They emphasise the respect for the values and aspirations of the popular classes. In 
this 'grassroots work' they stress the pedagogy of participation and of conscientisation 
(conscientizaçaô), which is intended to overcome the paternalism that characterised 
most previous work with the popular classes. They implement their programs by 
means of a more socially-oriented pastoral policy against oppression and injustice. 
Since the 1970's, the Church has been a defender of human rights in the authoritarian 
regimes of Latin America. 
b. The so-called 'liberation theology' functions as a new religious ideology of 
emancipation against internal as well as external manipulation.  It strives to 'delink' 
from the intellectual paternalism that is exerted by some practitioners of West 
European and North American theology. Liberation theologians hold that the 
secularising theology of Western Europe and of the United States is inadequate, when 
one considers the historical and cultural aspirations of the Latin American societies. 
They perceive Western theologians as too rationalistic and as too removed from the 
people. They thus reject imported models of theology. 
c. In their work with the popular masses the basista groups take the same anti-elitist 
position. Basismo refers to the belief of the pastoral and social workers in the capacity 
of the base to resolve its own problems without the assistance of the intellectuals and 
professionals of the political parties, trade-unions, co-operatives, or any other outside 
support. As such, they work with small, limited units which are independent from 
large organisations. They direct their action at 'conscientisation' with local, limited 
objectives. The  'conventional wisdom' of expert 'outsiders' such as economists, 
sociologists and also educationalists is taken with a great dose of scepticism. Their 
basic orientation is toward 'self-reliance'. 
It is clear that this way of working with the popular masses of society has a positive 
educational effect. The question is whether this kind of in-depth operation can be 
sufficiently effective without assistance from external expert co-operation. The main 
movers of complex societies are and remain big organisational units such as parties, labour 
unions and other structured socio-political organisations.  While the base communities can 
work as a ferment among the deeper layers of society, if they want to move beyond mere 
'conscientisation', and if they wish to become operational at a macro-societal level, then a 
mass organisation with the inevitable bureaucratic techniques will prove to be 
indispensable.  In sum, this novel approach has been criticised as 'naive political 
messianism' as, according to the critics, this can operate only on a local, small-scale basis 
and as such can have no impact on the national movements and centres of power107.  More 
metaphorically speaking, it can be formulated as follows : 'small is beautiful, big is 
powerful, but only the combination of the two is successful'. 
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Now that the authoritarian regime has been replaced in Brazil by a system of electorally 
steered politics, this problem is still more relevant than before. Most of the Church's 
intellectuals have grasped the need of a better link between development work at the local 
level and actions that influence social, political and economic macro-policies. The distance 
which separates the popular sectors from the national political machinery cannot be 
overcome through the dynamic of the popular movements alone. The living and working 
conditions of the great majority can be transformed only if the popular classes are capable 
of influencing the centres of decision and power.  A policy aimed at establishing a link 
between the macro and micro approaches seems to be a useful guideline to achieve a 
balance between political efficacy at the national level and local basista action. Without 
this link, a good deal of the energy of the moral base may be spoiled. 
4. Africa's messianic movements 
Central Africa may be called a hotbed for messianic movements and sects with an 
outspoken prophetic flavour.  In the past, the messianic movements of protest against the 
social and economic destructuring of the African societies under the pressure of 
colonisation, were studied in great detail by anthropologists.  With the renewed interest in 
the relationship between development and religion, sociologists and political scientists 
have also focused on the religious dynamics in postcolonial Africa108.  These studies 
underline the extraordinary vitality of the charismatic movements and sects.  Some 
perceive these movements as symbolic sublimations to compensate for the social and 
economic hardships ; others contend that they are prone to metaphorise the new power 
relations and patterns of domination in the postcolonial nation states.  Still others state that 
even in the authoritarian nation states of Africa, the administrative structure is unravelling 
and thus creating a void.  The vacuum causes a displacement of societal energy toward 
ethnic loyalties and to the symbolic and cultural domain of religion. 
In Africa, the Christian religions (Catholicism and Protestantism) are historically 
associated with the colonial form of modernisation.  After independence the pastoral 
functions of these Western religions were taken over by Africans, but their message 
continued to be perceived as a theodicy of cultural domination.  In the aftermath of 
independence, the African societies have recovered some part of the territory they had lost 
under the influence of colonisation and postcolonial Westernisation : in the material or 
economic field by means of a revitalisation of the subsistence sector (and of its 
half-brother, the informal sector); and in the symbolic and cultural fields through a 
resurgence of paganism109.  Thus, various forces of re-Africanisation are at work at the 
expense of the postcolonial nation state and of the modern (Western) sector of the 
                                                          
108 J. Peel,  Aladura : A Religious Movement among the Yoruba, London, 1969 ; J. Fabian, Jamao : 
Charismatic Movement in Katanga, Evanston, 1971 ;  W. Van Ginsbergen, Religions Change in 
Zambia, London, 1981 ; J.F. Bayart, Religion et modernité politique en Afrique Noire, Paris, 1993 ; J.P. 
Dozon, La cause des prophètes, Paris, 1995. 
109 A. Mbembe, Afriques Indociles : Christianisme, Pouvoir et Etat en Société Postcoloniale, Paris, 1988. 
  
 
99
economy as well. 
The African nation states were unable to supersede the emotional ties of the ethnic and 
tribal loyalties.  The mismanagement by the political elite, the prebendal malversions, the 
exploitation of the people, militarisation and finally, the loss of contact with the moral 
base, resulted in the erosion of the postcolonial state’s legitimacy110.  The mismanagement 
by the political elite and the bourgeoisie, in combination with their catastrophic failures in 
growth strategy, produced the poorest economic results in the world.  The African 
continent’s adjustment policy produced a supplementary shock.  The dismal situation 
engendered a collective mindset of frustration, which induced the societal forces of 
pre-colonial times to take their revenge.  In the African states, the civil society and its 
intermediary organisations, which function as a countervailing power, are either non-
existent or completely manipulated by the postcolonial power elite.  In such a situation, a 
considerable vacuum is created in which other emotional ties and loyalties can take the 
lead.  This explains, in part, the resurgence of ethnicity and the revival of the symbolic and 
cultural order of religious culture. 
In this process, the well-organised Christian religions face two pre-modern competitors : 
an expansive Islam and all forms of a revitalised messianism.  These forms of cultural 
indigenisation in the restructuring of African society are supported by the indigenisation of 
the material sphere or by the resurgence of the subsistence economy.  This is not only the 
case in the rural areas ; large segments of the urban centres are ruralised as well.  In sum, 
in various parts of the world, recent history reveals that religion is once again an influential 
force in the domain of social imagery.  The symbolic superstructure functions as a cultural 
prism and code to name and assess the dynamics of the real world. 
Since the 1980s a Pentecostal wave, coming from the Southern part of the United States, 
has been flooding over the urban centres of Sub-Saharan Africa.  Their well-oiled 
organisations and highly motivated, mostly lay, pastors have set up social networks or 
community centres who attract young members of the mainline (this is the Protestant and 
Catholic) churches.  A great number are voluntary associations who profess to be 
non-denominational.  One can become a member by making ‘a decision for Jesus’, but 
their pastors adhere to fundamentalist Christianity.  In their view religion creates bonds of 
kinship and the members are told to be brothers and sisters.  Their messages and gatherings 
respond to the need of new community bonds, now that the traditional ones gradually 
unravel and are growing thinner.  According to P. Gifford, the Pentecostal churches are 
new and important voluntary associations of true brothers and sisters with a novel 
organisational style.  Their impact on the Christian landscape is just as substantial as that 
of the NGOs on the socio-political terrain111.  However, the Catholic and Protestant 
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churches have kept a formidable presence and influence in the fields of education, health 
and increasingly in development at large112.  The Catholic organisations employ a fast 
growing number of lay helpers who are integrated in the mushrooming NGOs.  This 
NGO-isation of the various development activities of the churches brings them also at the 
grass-root level.  As such they are part of the emerging civil society.  In the domain of 
socio-politics and development the churches have become an influential factor.  
Participation in religious organisations is one of the most prevalent forms of associational 
life in Africa today.   
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CHAPTER XIV : THE CULTURAL REVIVAL OF ISLAM 
1. Back to the roots 
History informs us that the Islamic culture was at its zenith from the seventh to the 
fifteenth century.  It created a cultural 'golden age' and brought development to the lands of 
the Middle East and Southern Europe.  In my view, Ibn Khaldun is one of the great 
pioneers in development theory113.   But by the beginning of the eighteenth century, the 
cultures and societies of the Mediterranean civilisations had receded into relative decline. 
The new nations of the North - France, England, Germany, Holland, Belgium, and later the 
United States - carried the day and became dominant. With the 'atlanticisation' of Western 
culture, a new development model came into the world, based on the secularisation of 
ideologies and values, industrialisation and modernisation. From the vantage point of the 
new Western centre, the whole Mediterranean region, and with it the Islamic countries, 
were downgraded as the material and cultural backwaters of the West. 
In the nineteenth century, the first seeds were sown that would prepare the Westernisation 
of the urban bourgeoisie of this region. This challenge wrought frustration and resentment 
amongst the conservative and devout Muslims. It also elicited a desire to rethink the 
Islamic culture within the new historical context, amongst reformers such as Afghani and 
others.  The cultural wound was not healed.  However, the mass of believers did not depart 
easily from their ingrained impulse to think and to try to live in terms of the Islamic world 
view. The dominant twentieth-century phenomenon in the area was the rise of political 
nationalism and the formation of (conflicting) nation states. The intensification of the 
Westernisation process during the postwar period brought some of the Islamic 
communities to the brink of crisis114. In this crisis they felt a need, at times desperately, for 
reassurance about the basic values of tradition115. 
In the Islamic countries the oil-shock induced a cultural and religious reassertion that had 
been incubating in the deep waters of Islam for decades. The moral base of Islam took the 
lead in this revival.  Although the oil-shock may have been the catalyst, it cannot explain 
the resilience of the movement.  Rather, with the increasing inability of the imported 
models of development (laissez-faire as well as planned socialism) to organise economic 
growth with equity, particularly in societies exposed to cultural aggression by the Western 
culture-industry (the media), it is natural that native traditions reassert themselves. Culture 
represents the beliefs and the values of a society, which in fact were the areas where 
imported development caused the greatest erosion. The revival of the Islamic tradition, 
then, is part of a cultural backlash, the reaction of the moral base activated by the stunted 
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development process.  The cultural revival of Islam is also visible in Islamic economics.  
For more than a decade now, a group of Islamic economists have been endeavouring to 
come to terms with economics and with the ethical tradition116. 
2. Iran’s culture bomb 
There is no doubt that Iran's revolution was an assault against the Western development 
model launched by the Pahlevi dynasty117. For a great majority of the external observers, 
the revolution, as well as the succeeding triumph of the shi'a clergy, was a novel and 
unexpected unravelling of events. But specialists of the region should have known better. 
In N. Keddie's book of 1972, the following prophetic lines were published :    
Despite all the inroad of the modern age, the Iranian national consciousness still 
remains wedded to Shi'a Islam, and when the integrity of the nation is held to be 
threatened by internal autocracy and foreign hegemony, protests in religious terms 
will continue to be voiced, and the appeals of men such as ayatollah Khomeini to be 
widely heeded118.  
The opposition to the Pahlevi regime was not only religious. It was a broader amalgam 
consisting of the conservative ulema, the bazaari, the deprived urban masses, the 
nationalist intellectuals and the Muslims of the left.  In the line of cultural opposition, the 
books of Ali Ahmad and associates on gharbzadegi (westoxication, or more literally 
'weststruckness') have become classics of modern Persian prose. According to Ahmad, 
'westoxication' is a worldwide disease affecting most of the developing countries, and not 
limited to Iran alone. Of all cultural institutions, education had, in Ahmad's view, become 
the most westernised. In a rambling prose he railed against the invidious 'diploma disease' 
or the emphasis on certificates rather than the real concern for true educational wisdom. 
One of his favourite theses was that machinism (technology) dominates westernised  
Iranian society.  A better strategy would be the taming of the machines by Islamic culture.  
The literature on gharbzadegi can be considered a cultural version, produced in Iran, of the 
(socio-economic) dependencia theory. 
Another inspiring figure was Ali Shariati. He was a specialist in Third World sociology 
and a devout Muslim. Shariati's analysis of the situation presupposes that the reader is 
familiar with the plight of Iran : its domination by an autocratic Pahlevi-capitalism that was 
destroying the Shi'a traditions and exploiting the popular masses. The opening lines of his 
book Reflections of a Concerned Muslim give a flavour of the analysis that follows :  ‘My 
friend, I live in a society where I face a system which controls half of the universe, maybe 
                                                          
116 Z. Ahmed, 'Socio-economic values of Islam and their significance and relevance to the present day 
world', in Islamic Studies, 1971 ; see also S.N. Nagri, 'Ethical foundations of Islamic economics', in 
Islamic Studies, 1978. 
117 The bibliography on Iran's revolution is so abundant that the reader has only the difficulty of making the 
choice. For a good introduction see N. Keddie, Religion and Politics in Iran, London, 1983 ;  C. Bernard 
& Z. Khalilzad, The Government of God, New York, 1984 ; D. Hiro, Iran under the Ayatollahs, London, 
1985 ;. 
118 N. Keddie, Scholars, Saints and Sufis, Berkeley, 1972. 
  
 
103
all of it... the system has converted us into empty pots which accommodate whatever inside 
them !’  At the end of the book Shariati offers solutions to the predicament of his beloved 
country.  He asserts that for the Iranian society, the path to salvation can only be the result 
of a revolutionary, revitalised shi'ism oriented toward social justice in the material 
organisation of life. In his view the moral base (the shari'a) of society is superior to a 
development path according to Western or marxist principles.  The focal point of Shariati's 
plan for the revitalisation of Islamic society was the reactivation of its moral base : the 
religious inspiration of social justice in development. 
The original moral impulse of the popular uprising in Iran had soon lost its novelty. And at 
times, the Islamic republic has become enmeshed in fanatical sectional fights as well as in 
gruesome wars.  After the Iranian Revolution, all the lands of Islam were aroused. The 
widening gap between rich and poor, intense population growth, the spread of mass 
education, the lack of adequate opportunities for the young, and the rural exodus and the 
squalor of the crowded urban centres, created frustration and resentment amongst the 
forgotten groups. For them, authentic development was a dream that had not materialised. 
3. Paradigm change in Islamic social sciences 
Some middle-eastern social scientists perceive the paradigm change as a process of 
indigenisation, since the avowed objective is the construction of a conceptual framework 
that reflects their own world view, with reference to lived cultural, social and economic 
experiences and aspirations.  Indigenisation comes up against the slavish adherence to 
Western concepts and models by the postwar generation of social scientists.  A great 
number the latter group were associated with national government services or foreign 
funded institutions.  The authoritarian rulers of the Middle East, however, were only 
interested in securing scientific approval for their own policies.  Their bureaucrats frowned 
upon independent and critical research work.  And the foreign funded research institutes 
had led to the absorption of the local elite within either the Western or Soviet orbits, and to 
its theoretical subservience.  In reaction, critical intellectuals railed against what can be 
called the bedouïnisation of middle-eastern sociology and economics119. 
In the period following the Second World War, this region, like the rest of the developing 
countries, embarked upon ambitious programs of industrialisation and urban growth, 
marked by a careless neglect of the rural sector and its population.  For the rulers of the 
new states characterised by ethnic diversity and problematic borders drawn by the 
colonising powers, nation-building based on authoritarian rule had priority.  In the 
countries blessed with huge petroleum reserves, the oil rent produced enormous wealth for 
only the happy few, resulting in great social and economic inequalities. 
                                                          
119 The Egyptian Sayyed Qutb, a militant of the Muslim Brotherhood, was one of the first to publish a 
diatribe against this intellectual degradation in his plea for re-Islamisation. The English translation, 
Social Justice in Islam, was published in 1970. 
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a. Arab Third Worldism 
In the social sciences two currents of indigenisation can be distinguished, one secularist 
and the other Islamic.  A more or less secularist and socialist branch evolved in the wake of 
the Third-Worldist ideology.  This current was an offspring of the theoretical models on 
dependency, which formed the rallying cry of the Latin American centre-periphery school.  
Some were influenced by the neomarxist theory on imperialism and on unequal exchange.  
In the field of development, a few indigenisers drew inspiration from Ibn Khaldun, who 
was hailed as the founding father of the Arab social sciences. 
In a series of seminars, the forms and aims of decolonisation in the middle-eastern social 
sciences were discussed.  The failure of Nasserism, the deceptive course of the 
Baath-regimes in Iraq and in Syria, and the bleak prospects in the Maghreb countries, 
severely tested the theoretical tenets of Arab nationalism and socialism. This resulted in a 
state of crisis in the secular branch.120 
b. The Islamic branch 
In the 1970s an upsurge of loyalty to holy things became manifest.  Due to the failures of 
nation-building, the ideals of the religious community gained precedence over those of the 
state.  In the urban centres groups of young professionals and militants, by-passing the 
more passive and submissive members of the ulama (the lower ranks of the clergy), 
rediscovered Islam as the basic reference of collective identity.  In reaction to the 
intellectuals in favour of the modernisation of Islam, they call for a re-Islamisation of 
society, that is, of its morals and economics.  In effect, the Islamic resurgence symbolises 
the failure of modernisation in its most important manifestations : nationalism, secularism 
in education and culture, individualistic capitalism, socialism and marxism. 
The trend toward the re-Islamisation of the middle-eastern social sciences represents the 
search for a better ordering of the world along the lines of social justice.  In harmony with 
Islam's historical legacy, sociology and economics are perceived as the sciences of the 
umma, or of the community of believers ordered by the shari'a.  This re-Islamisation has 
produced a series of publications in Urdu, Turkish, Persian and Arabic, the most important 
of which have been translated121. 
                                                          
120 S. Sabbagh & I. Ghazalla, 'Arab Sociology Today : A view from within', in Annual Review of Sociology, 
1986. 
121 Mohamad Mannan, Islamic Economics : Theory and Practice, Lahore, 1970 ; Alhaji Ajijola, The Islamic 
Concept of Social Justice, Lahore, 1977 ; Mohamad Siddiqi, Muslim Economic Thinking, Jeddah, 
1981 ; Syed Naqvi, Ethics and Economics : An Islamic Synthesis, Leicester, 1984 ; Shahrukh Khan, 
'Political Economy of an Islamic System', in Hamdard Islamicus, Karachi, n° 4, 1985 ;  Homa 
Katouzian, 'Shi'ism and Islamic Economics : Sadr & Bani Sadr', in R. Keddie (ed.), Religion and 
Politics in Iran, New Haven, 1985.  For a critical evaluation, see Timur Kuran, 'On the Notion of 
Economic Justice in Islamic Thought', in International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, 1989. 
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In the fundamentalist tradition it is repeatedly claimed that the emphasis on social justice is 
the basic characteristic of Islamic economics.  Contemporary authors in this field give a 
great deal of importance to the religious prohibition of interest, to the theory of 'just' prices 
and wages, and last but not least to the Islamic forms of redistribution of wealth, such as 
zakat (tithing).  A society can only achieve social justice through unremitting moral 
pressure for equality and fairness, but solely on the further condition that economic gains 
are to be 'earned' and their losses 'deserved'.  As in all religions the ideal norms are far 
more lofty than reality, but in the Islamic lands the special attention given to the 
marginalised, the mustadafin, is a fact.   
The challenge for Islamic social science is to exemplify the relevance of the religious norm 
or shari'a to present-day problems and to formulate workable models.  The literature offers 
numerous alternatives by which social and economic relations may be brought into 
conformity with the principles of equality and fairness.  Although the individual authors 
subscribe to the same basic philosophy, they formulate a variety of practical priorities and 
opinions.  The Islamic cultural jihad presents a serious challenge to the Western 
development theories.  Given the need for more social justice in world development, the 
revival of the Mediterranean tradition in sociology and in economics opens a promising 
perspective. 
For the deprived masses, as well as for the intellectuals disenchanted with the secularising 
influences of modernisation along Western lines, Islam provides a frame of reference for 
their collective identity and cultural consciousness, rooted in their own history and 
tradition.  It should be emphasised, however, that Islamic reassertion is not a reaction 
against modernisation  per se, but only to the baleful aspects of Westernisation122.  A 
return to Islam means a return to authenticity (asala).  We may expect that the internal 
economic ordering of the Middle East, as well as its geopolitical matrix, will undergo 
important changes as a result of the reassertion of both the historical tradition and cultural 
symbols. 
                                                          
122 A. Ahmed and H. Donnan, Islam, Globalisation and Postmodernity, London, 1994. 
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CHAPTER XV : THE IMPACT OF CULTURAL TRADITION ON 
RUSSIA’S POST-COMMUNIST DEVELOPMENT 
1. The quest for Russian identity 
The ambivalent relations between Russia and the West have been a leitmotiv of the Russian 
philosophical tradition and of nineteenth century literature123.  Both resisted the ambition 
of Western culture to assert its own specific culture as a universal model.  The Russian 
intelligentsia perceive Western developmentism as a cultural particularism that ignores its 
limits.  Today’s renaissance of Slavophile-oriented thought aspires to replace the failed 
Communist grand narrative of modernisation. The Slavophiles profess that their culture 
and development guarantee the realisation of the ideal unity between body and soul. This is 
a project of well-being also cherished by the West, but one in which it has so far failed. 
Since the time of the tsar Peter the Great (1689-1725), Russia has been torn by ambivalent 
attitudes toward modernisation and Europeanisation.  A small minority of westernisers 
(zapadniki) stood for a copy of the West.  However, Russian intellectuals have always 
perceived their culture and religion as the 'better child' of Byzantium.  At the end of the 
Middle Ages, Latin Europe chose the path of rationalisation, modernisation and economic 
development, whereas Russia, like the other cultures rooted in the Christian orthodox 
religion, maintained the social bonds and moral values of the Mediterranean tradition.  In 
this choice they were following almost the same path as the neighbourly civilisation of 
Islam. 
The slavophiles idealised the Russian village and equated capitalist industrialisation with 
Westernisation, and thus with the increasing penetration of Russia by European ideas and 
values.  From the outset this fundamentalist ideology had a messianic and nationalistic 
flavour.  In the 1860s, the great writer and socially minded aristocrat Leo Tolstoy wrote his 
novel War and Peace to celebrate the victory of the fatherland against Napoleon, his army 
and their revolutionary ideas.  The slavophiles were staunch defenders of the Christian 
orthodox tradition of the pre-Enlightenment world.  They raised a wall against the 
rationalisation and secularisation of society.  In short, they were 'romantic socialists' living 
in the firm belief that their community-oriented development was superior to Western 
individualism and capitalism. 
The populists or narodniki with an economic bent were well aware that industrialisation 
was necessary for Russian development, at least to keep foreign military powers at bay.  
The leaders of this movement separated themselves from the cultural slavophiles, and 
transformed their movement into an anti-urban populist party in defence of the peasantry.  
The leitmotiv of the debate was if, and under what conditions, the pre-capitalist society 
could perform the direct transformation to social communalism.  This more positive 
attitude toward economic development gained a greater number of adherents after the 
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defeat of the Russian fleet by Japan (1905).  Even after this though, the claim was made 
that Russian industry had to be less destructive of the peasantry and of local artisans.  In 
the early twentieth century the socio-economically minded narodniki evolved into a 
populist movement, which was severely attacked by the upcoming radical marxists124.  
And after the great proletarian revolution they lost their grip on events.  They lived on as 
an undercurrent, re-emerging only in the wake of Gorbachev's loss of control. 
In the mainstream textbooks on economic development, as well as in the studies on the 
history of economic thought, the analyses produced by the slavophile movement have been 
neglected.  It should be stressed that its major proponents professed an economic 
humanism, the main objective of which consisted in keeping the baleful influences of 
Westernisation and capitalism at bay.  Its most important economic thinkers and 
pamphleteers of the tsarist period, like Chernyshevsky, Flerovsky, Vorontsov and 
Danielson, as well as the influential agrarian economist Chayanov of the Communist 
period, were more or less ignored by the development literature of the Western scientific 
establishment. 
In the search for inspiration and ancestral models of thought on the functioning and 
transformation of subsistence economies, the stimulating research findings of the Russian 
scholar A. Chayanov, published originally in 1925, were rediscovered and re-interpreted 
within the African and Asian context.  In the Theory of the Peasant Economy, Chayanov 
stated that the Russian peasant in the still large sector of the subsistence economy, worked 
according to a rationale unlike that of the homo economicus of Western neoclassical 
theory.  His findings, supported by abundant statistical material, revealed that the peasant 
family would work for as long and as hard as necessary to obtain the subsistence level 
prevalent in their time.  Once this level was reached, their labour input would start to drop 
sharply.  In their primitive conditions the drudgery of work was too great a hardship to go 
beyond the natural wants.  As noted earlier, in Aristotle's worldview, chrèmatistikè or the 
desire to accumulate was morally frowned upon.  From the vantage point of the Russian 
peasant, the end-product of accumulation was not worth the hardship it required.  The 
motivation was simply lacking. 
In such a situation, both the amount of land which a peasant family holds and the intensity 
with which they work it is determined by the volume of the labour resources at their 
disposal, not by marginal productivity and utility considerations.  The novelty of this 
theory lies in the statistical illustration of Chayanov, which demonstrates that the size and 
the intensity of use of peasant land holdings was determined by the size and constitution 
(children, dependants) of the peasant family.  The demographic cycle of the peasant family 
(young children, followed by a period of young adult children, and ending with 
married-out adults) regulated the size of its available labour hands, and consequently of its 
                                                                                                                                                                               
123 For more historical details, see the special number of Soviet Thought, 1992. 
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total disposable work volume.   
Accordingly, the variation in the size of the plot that was worked and the volume of 
product (income) it yielded in a situation of abundant labour hands, was only a temporary 
phase of accumulation beyond the natural level.  This peters out when the family size is 
reduced through the marriage of the adult children.  In Chayanov's view, the temporary 
economic differentiation among the subsistence peasants does not induce class formation 
of a better-off peasant class (kulaks) on a permanent basis.  This was a line of thought of 
capitalist as well as of communist theory.  The communists, however, committed to the 
collectivisation of agriculture in order to avoid the class formation of the despised kulaks, 
carried the day.  
Chayanov's penetrating analysis of the socio-cultural dialectics between economic motives 
and economic calculus, as well as his study of the kulak, were rejected by the scientistic 
approach of the communist planners.  But Chayanov's writings have influenced African 
populist regimes, such as Nyerere's ujamaa and other cooperative organisations in the 
developing world125.  In our time, Solzhenitsyn is without doubt the most prestigious 
representative of the slavophile populists.  Even in the heydays of communist rule, he 
championed slavophile ideals.  Today, in the ideological turbulence of post-Communism, 
the slavophile revival is daily becoming more manifest in the Russian heartland. 
2. The failed reform of post-Stalinism 
Since the implosion of the Soviet system and the political revolutions of 1989 in Central 
and Eastern Europe, the social sciences, especially economics and sociology, have been 
grappling with a new phenomenon, that of post-Communism.  In order to understand the 
situation, a reference to the historical development phase of the society in which 
post-Communism emerged is helpful. Russia was, in fact, the first developing country of 
our age and the theoretical debates between the nineteenth century populists and the 
westernisers produced a broad range of literature on development of exceptional quality. 
Orthodox marxist theory was silent on development strategies for backward countries as 
socialism was expected to emerge from mature capitalism.  In the view of Marx, the 
system change toward socialism could only succeed after the productive forces of 
capitalism had been exhausted.  From the standpoint of development theory though, the 
'non-capitalist development' model of the Soviet Union was not as much understood as the 
establishment of orthodox socialism, but rather as a transformation ideology for 
latecomers.  In the planned transformation of an agrarian society into an urban and 
industrial complex, the Stalinist take-off will be remembered as a pharaonic achievement.  
Only an authoritarian and central planning system could muster the muscle to push through 
                                                                                                                                                                               
124 A. Gerschenkron, 'The Problem of Economic Development in Russian Intellectual History of the 
Nineteenth Century', in E. Simons (ed.), Continuity and Change in Russian and Soviet Thought, 
Cambridge, 1955 ;  A. Wallicki, The Slavophile Controversy, Oxford, 1975. 
125 G. Schmitt, 'The Rediscovery of Alexander Chayanov', in History of Political Economy, n° 4, 1992. 
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the collectivisation of agriculture, and the primitive socialist accumulation of capital 
required for a process of industrialisation on the back of the peasantry. 
After Stalin’s death, Krushchev opened a development debate in order to steer the 
military-industrial complex into a more socially balanced system.  The major problems 
under debate were the lagging agricultural production resulting in regular food shortages, 
the underdeveloped consumer industries, and the lack of flexibility inherent in the 
centralising planning model.  Even this disciple of Stalin realised that the phase of 
primitive accumulation was over.  The growth of total factor productivity of capital and 
labour required organisational changes in the planning system in order to solve the 
imbalances built into the dirigiste framework.  In a dramatic party congress, the disciple 
began to revile Caesar in order to draw a new party line.  The entourage of Krushchev, 
though, proved to be a lively but impulsive lot.  They blundered and lost all credibility. 
In the political debacle that followed, E. Liberman opened a new register in the 
development debate.  Against the administrative decentralisation of the planning 
bureaucracy Liberman opted for the micro-economic solution.  In his view, the units of 
production or the firms should form the crucial nexus in a system of decentralised 
decision-making. The market mechanism of supply and demand, sanctioned by profit 
signals, were to be the guidelines of Liberman’s market socialism. 
This radical program did not materialise, but it became apparent that the rigidity of the 
system could only survive thanks to some oiling by the (tolerated) shadow economy, that 
is, by the free market at the margin.  Gorbachev’s initiatives were made public with great 
fanfare, but they were very poorly implemented.  They came too late and produced the 
well-known watershed.  When the implosion materialised, the emperor was naked. 
3. Cultural springtime aroused by glasnost 
Gorbachev's initiative of glasnost, still more than that of perestroika, unloosed the 
undercurrent of Slav humanism that had continued to live a sequestered existence even 
during the darkest hours of communist repression.  Today, its revival is manifest.  From 
1986-1990, its underground literature poured out social, political and economic blueprints 
advocating novelty and change.  Solzhenitsyn is their glorious banner from the 
underground period.  In order to grasp its impact, we should realise that in Central and 
Eastern Europe the interactions between the culturally creative elements and society as a 
whole are different from and more trend-setting than in the West.  In Russia, the great 
nineteenth century forerunners, such as Tolstoy, Turgenev, Dostoyevsky and Chekov, 
created a tradition in which the novelist voices the deep human emotions that are stirred by 
ongoing developments.  They embodied the cultural matrix of the social discourse.  
Literature and the arts in general functioned as ideological hothouses par excellence, with 
forms of expression appealing to many.  The novelist was at once priest and philosopher, 
as well as sociologist, political ideologue and economist in literary garment. 
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In the opening of the horizon for freedom of opinion elicited by glasnost, the literary 
periodicals provided the platform on which the longing for a new humanism was voiced, in 
kaleidoscopic fashion126.  In these avidly read periodicals, the intellectuals described and 
projected the conflicts and contradictory projects which stirred the various layers and 
groups in society : the struggles between modernisation and retraditionalisation and 
between the centre and the periphery; the longing for autonomy, cultural identity and 
respect for the mother tongue against Russian linguistic imperialism; and the resurgence of 
mysticism and religion against stultifying secularisation.  Under the authoritarian and 
ideologically invested regimes where the official language and blueprints were champions 
of worn rhetoric, art creatively translated the desire of the people for a more human and 
better world.  Art became the instrument par excellence for incubating some sense of life 
in a situation of lost harmony.  The existential themes of life, the conflict between the 
official system and the quality of life, the longing for human flourishing, the utopias and 
the nostalgia of human beings, were all exemplified and developed in art. In the 
background stood the messianism typical of the Slav culture.  In the wake of glasnost, 
some of the most prestigious writers engaged in active politics, such as V. Astatjev, 
T. Ajtmatov, V. Rasputin, A. Rybakov, W. Belov and J. Jevchoutchenko, amongst 
others127.  Another socio-cultural ferment was added when religion received greater 
freedom of expression.  Many churches, mosques, prayer houses, monasteries and 
seminaries have been reopened, attracting a multitude of people. 
Due to the partial disintegration of the official institutions or of social protection, the 
churches stepped into the vacuum with new social services of their own.  In the elections 
for the various state councils many clergymen entered the legislative bodies as the people's 
deputies.  Besides the resurgence of the pastoral mission for churches, we notice the 
emergence of a more socially engaged religion with a manifest ethical tone.  Since most 
Caucasian and Asiatic republics belong to the Islamic confession, their geopolitical 
orientation is not directed toward Europe.  One of the future trouble spots may arise from 
the latent conflicts between the different denominations within the republics, that is, 
amongst the Orthodox, Catholic, Muslim and Jew. 
The increasing welfare gap between the socialist and the centrally planned economy of the 
Soviet Union and of its replica’s in Eastern Europe brought the reformists to the fore. They 
initiated a partial rehabilitation of market calculus, competition, entrepreneurship and of 
profit making, but to no avail. 
4. Transformation versus development 
When the new regimes assumed power after the fall of the Communists,  this novel 
emphasis on economic versus political rationality was radicalised by the neoliberal lobbies.  
                                                          
126 A few of the trend-setting periodicals at that moment, conservative as well as 'new look', were New 
World, People's Friendship, The Flag, Youth, Ogoniok and Literatournaia Gazette. 
127 The Kirghizian writer Tchenguiz Ajtmatov and the Russian slavophile Valentin Rasputin were members 
of Gorbachev's Executive Council for a while (March 1990 - September 1991). 
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In some countries, the strategy of shock-therapy spearheaded by prompt privatisation and 
marketisation carried the day.  In some cases the former apparatchiki became converts to 
the new creed and joined forces with the new elite.  But in the euphoria of the beginning, 
the complex prerequisites of democratic bargaining and the high social costs of transition 
to the market were greatly underestimated.  The collapse of the communist regimes was a 
well of rejoicing for the freedom fighters, but for a great number of people it caused 
material hardship and moral deception.  The complexities of the transformation occurring 
in the post-communist regimes confirms our main thesis : development does not simply 
replace tradition; rather, its novel program is added to or superimposed upon the preceding 
tradition.  As such, a society may retain even some of the legacies of the previous 
communist regime.  The loss of moral meaning experienced by a growing number of 
people is transforming the naive euphoria into a so-called post-totalitarian neurosis.   The 
development path of post-Communism is a novel and as yet untried one. 
But in the relatively short period of systemic transformation from planned to market 
economy and from authoritarian rule to some sort of democratic consensus, the simplistic 
rhetoric of the experts that this reorientation and restructuring is merely a job for social and 
economic technicians has proven to be a technocratic myth.  The development of a market 
economy is not only a technical question.  History informs us that capitalism was able to 
emerge only after a fundamental change in values and norms.  Moreover, even after the 
change in values it was kept within bounds by socio-political checks and balances.  The 
creation of the Welfare State as a response to the harsh realities of early capitalism offers 
an illustration. 
The history of economic development is a tale of market expansion and of the growing 
'financiarisation' of the economy, with various political and cultural counter-movements in 
defence of society.  As long as the civil society is too weak and thus unable to succeed in 
this protection, the post-communist societies in transition of the former Soviet Union and 
of Central and Eastern Europe will resort to ethno-cultural assertivity as a refuge. 
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CHAPTER XVI : EAST ASIA’S DEVELOPMENT MIRACLES ? 
1. Japan : A pioneer in Asiatic Modernity 
Economics is a stern discipline which shies away from imaginative metaphors.  Outsiders 
to the profession have called it a 'dismal' science.  But when an exceptional success is in 
the making, or is already realised, economists yield to non-scientific, that is, to religious 
and animal vocabulary.  Spectacular successes are labelled miracles and its actors are 
profiled to be dragons and tigers.  The dynamics of industrial upgrading is compared to the 
flight of wild geese.  The meteoric rise of Japan came as a shock to many in the West.  And 
the miracles of a whole series of Eastern dragons and tigers have not only challenged the 
tenets of conventional development theory, but more importantly, they have altered the 
way the West perceives its own place in the world.  Since the lands of Islam do not 
perform as well in the field of economic development, their religious revival represents to 
most observers a noisy but unproductive reaction of nostalgic fundamentalists.  But East 
Asia’s exceptional performance brings home the argument that non-Western cultures are 
able to realise economic successes.  This new awareness acts as a catalyst, opening new 
horizons for development theorising. 
Since the Enlightenment, and influenced in this by the colonisation drive of the nineteenth 
century, the scientific establishment of the West has habitually analysed and interpreted all 
religions and cultures of the world from a Western perspective.  This perspective was 
claimed to be objective, unbiased and universal.  All non-Western languages, arts, political 
and social organisations and economic systems, were analysed and interpreted by models 
and concepts elaborated in the West.  Japan was one of the last Eastern countries to be 
forcefully opened to Western influences but also the most influential to proclaim its 
cultural identity and its historical uniqueness.  The development literature on Japan is all 
the more interesting in that it analyses the transformation of an industrial latecomer to the 
position of 'number one' in some industrial sectors.  This initiated the 'learn-from-Japan' 
boom of the 1980s 128.  The deterioration of America’s competitive edge vis-à-vis some 
important sectors of Japanese industry gave rise to a wave of militant nationalism and 
cultural chauvinism in the 'land of the rising sun'.  Its most radical exponents indulged in a 
denigration of Western culture and rejoiced in the so-called decline of the West129.  A 
number of authoritative voices in the development debate of Japan impute that the merits 
of the model are more attributable to cultural and institutional factors (like government 
policies, management styles, business strategies and the family base of social order), than 
to the play of the free market.  In the field of industrial organisation, Japan, conventionally 
labelled as a brilliant 'imitator', surprised the world with a flexible and successful 
                                                          
128 R. Mouer and Y. Sugimoto, Images of Japanese Society, London, 1990 ; A. Boscaro, F. Gatti and 
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upgrading of its industrial activity and with a managerial shift from Fordism to Toyotism.  
With the sectoral transformation of its industry toward higher levels of added-value, Japan 
stepped up its competitive breakthrough in world markets.  With the introduction of a more 
flexible and differentiated system of production, 'just-on-time' its managers transformed 
the logic of mass production.   
2. The Flying Geese Paradigm 
At the end of the 1950s when growth had taken off at an unprecedented speed, the 
sustainability of its exuberance became the central topic of Japanese economic debate.  
Miyohei Shinohara, one of the most influential interpreters of Japan’s development, 
explained the miracle on the basis of a few cardinal themes, all of which have subsequently 
been echoed by other scholars.  The five most important factors are the stimulating effects 
of the geopolitical context in its postwar recovery; Japan’s favourable terms of trade; the 
country’s industrial dualism (the synergetic coexistence of a modern sector paying 
relatively high wages and a great number small workshops paying low wages) ; and last 
but not least an exuberant propensity to absorb foreign technology.  All this in combination 
with a 'catching-up' syndrome that nurtured the willingness to transform and upgrade the 
industrial structure to higher levels of added-value in a flexible way130. 
The interpreters with an institutionalist-oriented inclination argue that the qualitative 
changes in the industrial economy have been assisted and accelerated by conscious and 
adequate policy decisions.  Saburo Okita, an able economist who also employed his talents 
in a successful administrative career, was the intellectual leader of this line of thought.  
While Minister of Foreign Affairs, he opened a new register that was to become a theme 
echoed later, namely, that Japan could serve as a model for the developing nations of 
East Asia131.  Whether it was the active support of government and administrative guidance 
(more specifically of MITI : the Ministry of International Trade and Industry) that had 
played the decisive role, or the innovative drive of Japan’s entrepreneurs, remains a matter 
of controversial debate.  But very few commentators contest that Japan’s industrial 
officials frequently intervened in the free market mechanism with appropriate guidelines 
and policies.  With their aggressive export strategy oriented toward a deliberate conquest 
of foreign markets, they often ran counter to the conventional notions of comparative 
advantage. 
In my view, one of the most original thematisations on industrial strategies for latecomers 
like Japan and the East Asian region was formulated in the early 1930s by 
Kaname Akamatsu.  He profiled his theory with a telling animal metaphor, namely the 
'flying geese pattern of development’ (gankô keitai hattenron).  In fact, Akamatsu’s model 
was a new version of David Hume’s thesis on the migration of economic opportunity, but 
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viewed from the standpoint of very active 20th century latecomers to industrialisation 132.  
During World War II though, his theorem was used to legitimise the Japanese Greater 
Asian Co-prosperity Sphere.  This form of intellectual propaganda tarnished the model as a 
catalist of outward expansionism. The theory explains how latecomers, after a first phase 
of importing the up to then unknown manufactures by a strategy of import substitution, 
launch suitable labour-intensive industries to produce these products themselves for the 
home market.  As a rule the first phase in which local products have to compete with 
imports, will by no means be easy for the latecomer, especially when the amount of 
imported foreign goods grows greater.  And Akamatsu highlights the social implications in 
some detail.  The import of factory made goods competes with the local handicraft 
activities, thus driving craftsmen out of work.  This creative destruction has been observed 
in most developing countries.  But gradually a local industry comes to bloom.  The second 
phase of import substitution may be due to one or more of the following beneficial 
conditions : low wages, cheap raw materials and/or an expanding local market.  In order to 
create strong local industries, its entrepreneurs should engage in competition with the 
imports of the advanced countries.  Nationalism and protective measures make the local 
producers soft and inefficient.  In Akamatsu’s view, international trade is a most important 
vehicle in the transfer of new goods and technology across countries.  
After a short phase of import substitution during which production expands rapidly and 
qualitative upgrading takes place, the local product is transformed into an export item, 
while imports and domestic manufacture shift toward new, more sophisticated and higher 
value-added industrial goods.   At the start, the products are simple technology goods 
manufactured by low-wage producers, but gradually the quality is upgraded.  The 
procedure is applied repeatedly, with continuously new and upgraded industrial products.  
Akamatsu’s original work was based on the development sequence of Japan’s textile 
industry.  At the start these products were imported.  In a following phase a local textile 
industry was set up.  This resulted in import substitution.  In a third phase Japan’s textile 
industry was thriving on production for exports.  Later the upgrading scenario was repeated 
with other industrial products.  When this sequential career of Japan’s industrial products 
(imports, domestic production, exports) is presented in a graphic form, it produces a 
pattern analogous to a flying formation of wild geese (figure 1). 
                                                          
132  The original text and the subsequent publications of Akamatsu on the subject are written in Japanese, 
with the notable exception of two articles in English : ‘A Theory of unbalanced growth in the World 
Economy” in Weltwirtschafliches Archiv, n° 2, 1961 and 'A Historical Pattern of Economic Growth in 
Developing Countries', in The Developing Economies, n° 1, 1962.  For an insightful historical 
contextualisation of Akamatsu’s paradigm, we refer the reader to P. Korhonen, 'The Theory of the 
Flying Geese Pattern of Development and its Interpretations', in Journal of Peace Research, n° 1, 1994. 
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The basic idea of the paradigm is that latecomers in industrialisation, in a context of 
open-economy, climb step by step in a process of upgrading, since they are able to 
capitalise on the learning opportunities made available by their international relations with 
more advanced nations.  Akamatsu’s analysis provides a generalised scenario of Japan’s 
catching up mechanism.  In the postwar development strategy of Japan the most promising 
industries were profiled as 'sunrise' industries which merited official support.  Older 
industries which were losing their comparative advantage in the local and/or the 
international market were downgraded as 'sunset' industries. They lost state support and 
were gradually relocated in the less developed countries of East Asia.  Two of Akamatsu’s 
disciples, Kioshi Kojima and Terutomo Ozawa, adapted his paradigm to the TNC-context 
with direct investment (see its graphic form in figure 2), in which Japan’s restructuring of 
manufacturing and exports is accelerated by the outward drive of its transnational 
corporations worldwide, and in the East Asian developing region in particular.133 
Up to the beginning of the 1990s Japan’s success owed much to its ability to restructure 
continuously its manufacturing sector toward more productive and international 
competitive industries.  The light and heavy industry starters built up before the war (such 
as textiles, machinery and chemicals) served as a launching pad for the postwar industrial 
upgrading toward higher value-added manufacturing in a manner consistent with the 
country’s changing level of technological sophistication.  Looked at from the standpoint of 
comparative advantage, Japan’s industrial development was relatively unbalanced.  
Government policy and the entrepreneurial response by the leading companies 
concentrated on industries and products whose income-elasticity and world demand was 
                                                          
133  K. Kojima, Direct Foreign Investment : A Japanese Model of Multinational Business Operations, 
London, 1978 ; K. Kojima and T. Ozawa, 'Toward a Theory of Industrial Restructuring and Dynamic 
Comparative Advantage', in  Hitobashi Journal of Economics, n° 2, 1985 ;  T. Ozawa, 'The flying geese 
paradigm and tandem growth : TNC’s involvement and agglomeration economies in Asia’s industrial 
dynamism', Paper presented at the AIB meeting, Seoul, 1995. 
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high.  When these industries were loosing their advantage of low wage-costs, the industrial 
establishment was swift to rationalise domestic production through technological 
upgrading and for the less competitive ones to start relocation in Southeast Asia. 
According to the upgrading sequences worked out by Kojima and Ozawa, Japan’s foreign 
direct investment abroad (especially in the East Asian developing countries) stepped up its 
own restructuring process of moving up in the added-value hierarchy.  In a deliberate effort 
of scaling down domestic industries losing their competitiveness, Japanese manufacturers 
of labour-intensive goods relocated production to the neighbouring developing countries.  
This transfer abroad of “sunsetting industries” permitted a re-deployment of labour toward 
innovation-intensive activities with a higher added-value and with a sharper competitive 
capacity in the world markets.  In the 1980s automobiles and electronics accounted for 
about two-thirds of the country’s manufactured exports.  But, halfway the 1980s Japan 
moved toward the R & D-intensive activities.  This and the building up of an efficient 
financial sector appeared to be more difficult than foreseen.  In their most recent work 
Kojima and Ozawa have extended the flying-geese-paradigm to a group of neighbouring 
Asian developing countries, with Japan as the lead-goose and the dragons and especially 
the young tigers (Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia) as follower-geese.  This is in part a 
justification of the positive development effect of direct investment by Japanese 
transnational corporations in the region.  In the most recent industrial strategy in which the 
development of industries is assisted by transnational corporations (TNC-assisted 
industrialisation) both the production curve and the export curve for producer goods will 
occur almost simultaneously in the earlier stages of industrialisation.  The TNC-assisted 
mechanism of industrial re-deployment makes possible that the time-lag of the sequence 
from consumer goods to more sophisticated products and their exports is shortened 
(figure 2). 
Japanese direct investment in the developing dragons of East Asia has been described by 
Kojima and Ozawa as a move toward ‘tandem economic development’ in which Japan as 
the lead goose organises a regional pattern of interactive industrial restructuring.  The 
regional design of Japanese investment in East Asia involved a regional division of labour 
based on an industrial and locational hierarchy according to the flying geese model.  The 
regional restructuring implies that domestic investment withdraws gradually from sectors 
suffering from loss of competitiveness and whose production is relocated to economies 
where production is more advantageous in order to supply both foreign and home markets.  
But, even in Japan, once upgrading had reached economic maturity, the speed of 
restructuring slowed down, because moving up in the hierarchy of technology increasingly 
depended on creative innovation.  This slowing down may be the entrance of Japan in a 
new stage of development, namely the phase of post-industrial maturity with lower growth 
rates and higher unemployment. 
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3. The cultural line of thought 
In the cultural line of thought we have chosen two authors from very different 
backgrounds, namely, Michio Morishima who has a well-founded reputation as a professor 
of Cambridge University, and Yasusuke Murakami, an economist with a nationalist profile 
and a respected essayist.  Morishima’s book on Japan’s economic success was a complete 
departure from his earlier mathematical methodology134.  But his message is very clear : 
the success of Japan is due to a synergetic match of Western technology with the Japanese 
value system. Abandoning the claim of mainstream economics that there is only one 
'universal' model of analysis, he opted for the postmodern stance of cultural relativity.  In 
his book he postulates that economics, being a behavioural science, is a cultural construct.  
In accordance with his thesis on the historical and cultural variety of economic systems, 
Morishima explains the peculiar path of Japan by religious determinants, and more 
particularly, by the combination of Confucianism with Scientism. 
Yasusuke Murakami, also a former mathematical economist, became a convert to a new 
brand of non-marxist political economy.  This is an approach that takes into account both 
the homo economicus and the social values and institutions.  Murakami’s analysis 
emphasises the declining efficacy of Western values to meet today’s economic challenges, 
and the better performance of Japanese values in the context of late capitalism.  This better 
performance is the result of the cohesive force of the Japanese family which was 
transposed to institutions like the large firms and even to the state.  According to this 
Japanese analyst, the decline of the West is due to its excessive individualism.  
Murakami’s approach follows the Weberian view that the value orientations of the 
economic agents are more important factors in accounting for development than the 
material prerequisites, such as capital accumulation, as the marxists had proclaimed.  But 
                                                          
134 M. Morishima, Why has Japan succeeded?, Cambridge, 1982. 
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Murakami puts the Weberian matrix of value orientated action on its head.  Whereas in 
Weber’s Protestant Ethic rationalism and individualism acted as a motor to break the 
traditional loyalties of custom, in Murakami’s approach social cohesion and group 
solidarity, together with the societal discipline of Confucianism, formed the gist and the 
cement of Japan’s outstanding performance. 
Of course the Japanese miracle also has its shadow side.  The world shaped by modern 
science, technology, business, industry and urban agglomerations is, for the older 
generation at least, a strange world.  It is very different from the one in which they have 
grown up.  It is a world which tends to erode the sacred pieties, morals and rituals inherited 
from the past.  The younger generations, on the contrary, are more willing to march with 
the worldwide trend of Westernisation.  The culture shock induced by modernity and the 
disenchantment that resulted, however, generated an authentic counterwave in Japan that 
proclaims the uniqueness of Japan (nihonjinron).  The concept of nihonjinron is all 
pervasive.  It is present in the arts, literature, the human sciences (sociology, political 
science, psychology and economics) and in the communication channels that reach the 
masses, like the press, movies, television and commercial publicity.  It is a reaction against 
the historical and ideological bias inherent in Western modernisation theory.  Nihonjinron 
makes the nation and its people aware of Japan’s distinctiveness in worldview, in its 
socio-political organisation, cohesiveness and, last but not least, in its work ethic.  The 
wave of the 'Japaneseness of Japan' is also an expression of cultural nationalism, or worse, 
of chauvinism.  In its most radical form it denies the foreigner the ability to understand the 
Japanese culture.  This is a rather extravagant thesis.  In a less radical version, nihonjinron 
hammers out the argument that in the ongoing process of globalisation, the least permeable 
area seems to be that of understanding culture.  According to the culturally inspired 
authors, the Western modernisation theories went astray both by ignoring culture and by 
the evacuation of the ethical dimension. 
One of the most respected political scientists of the postwar period, Masao Maruyama, 
opined that beneath the high-growth development (of Japan and other developing nations), 
there lay an historical and human experience that merits more careful analysis.  It is a 
human experience that does not coincide with the theory of modernisation and 
rationalisation such as formulated primarily by Western social scientists135.  With him, his 
most influential colleagues, Shigei Toyama and Takeshi Tshida, postulate that 
'postmodern' development theorising should does well by emphasising the particular, the 
cultural, the ethical and the human purpose of development into the picture.  According to 
this line of thought, the basic question is : 'development for what ?'. 
                                                          
135 The reader interested in the modernisation debate in Japan may consult the interesting bundle of essays 
edited by M. Masao and H. Harootounian in The South Atlantic Quarterly, n° 3, 1988 ; M. Maruyama, 
Essais sur l’histoire de la pensée politique au Japon, Paris, 1996. 
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4. The development debate on the dragons and tigers 
The economic growth performance of a first tier of East Asian countries called dragons 
(South Korea, Taiwan with the city states Hong Kong and Singapore) followed by a 
second tier of Southeast Asian disciples called tigers (Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia) 
together with the spectacular emergence of China, have produced a watershed of 
essay-writing on the successive waves of miracles.  Indeed, in the course of the last two 
decades this region realised records in economic growth that were never heard of before.  
This new wave of thematisation produced different schools of thought on the subject with 
the neoliberal canon in the lead.  The thematisation spiralled into a full-fledged scholastic 
debate when the World Bank joined the chorus with a vision of its own.  In two influential 
studies, namely the Development Challenge (1991) and the East Asian Miracle (1993) this 
prestigious institution formulated what was later referred to as the World Bank’s canon136.   
Its central principles are : 
(a) On the domestic side : an increase in the role of the free markets and private 
enterprise with a considerable diminution in state intervention.  Hence, the 
World Bank encourages initiatives such as privatisation, deregulation, financial 
liberalisation, reduced taxation and other incentives on the supply side of the 
economy.  The core of the canon is a “market-friendly” approach to development. 
(b) On the global scale, the World Bank’s canon stresses the benefits of a close 
integration in the world markets.  In practice this requires policies leading to import 
liberalisation, export promotion, keeping domestic prices in line on the basis of 
adequate exchange rates or ‘keeping prices right’. 
The authors of Development Challenge recognise that the international economic context 
may influence the growth performance, but their main argument is that domestic policy 
matters far more.  In reaction against the neoliberal orthodoxy that preaches a radical free 
play of market forces with an almost complete retreat of the state, the authors of 
Development Challenge suggest that government intervention may be helpful on the 
condition that it is “market-friendly”.  This means that government authorities remember 
the following working conditions :  
(a) Intervene reluctantly ; that is let markets function unless it is demonstrably better to 
step in.  
(b) Apply checks and balances in accord with the discipline required by the norms of 
international and domestic markets. 
(c) Intervene openly and transparently ; this is, keep the needed intervention subject to 
incentive norms rather than to official discretion. 
                                                          
136  World Bank, “The Challenge of Development” in World Development Report, New York, 1991 and 
World Bank, The East Asian Miracle, New York, 1993. 
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The report acknowledges that there had been considerable government intervention in the 
postwar miracle of Japan, as well as in the successes of South Korea and Taiwan.  But it 
stresses the point that its market-friendly approach has been conducive to the creation of a 
suitable climate for private enterprise and to a high and appropriate level of human capital 
formation by education.  The thesis of the DC-report was clearly that the more open an 
economy, the more efficient the degree of competition and the higher its investment in 
education ,the greater would be its capacity for overall economic growth.  Some influential 
but heterodox thematisers who had an intimate knowledge of the region’s development 
path, openly voiced their critical comments and elicited the World Bank’s research 
department to abandon its scholastic stand and to probe deeper into the empirical evidence 
of the miracles. 
In the 1993 report on the East Asian Miracle, a great deal of discretionary government 
intervention is acknowledged ; we quote the report on page 6 : 
“Policy intervention took many forms : targeted and subsidised credit to selected 
industries, low deposit rates and ceilings on borrowing rates to increase profits and 
retained earnings, protection of domestic import industries, the establishment and 
financial support of government banks, public investment in applied research, firm- 
and industry-specific export targets, development of export marketing institutions, 
and wide sharing of information between public and private sectors.  Some 
industries were promoted while others were not”. 
Moreover, the miracle study underlines that the high performing Asian Economies 
(HPAEs) are unique in combining a rapid growth rate with more than usual equality in 
income distribution.  The first group, this is the dragons South Korea and Taiwan, were the 
most equal.  But the central theoretical argument is that economic growth is determined 
essentially by the total factor productivity (TFP) of capital and labour.  The high 
performing group of the region differs from other developing economies in the 
optimisation of the production factors which economists have traditionally associated with 
economic growth : 
(a) High rates of investment, exceeding 20 % of GDP, supported by rapid growth in 
domestic saving. 
(b) High and rising endowments human capital due to universal and primary and 
secondary education. 
However, the peaks of the TFP-variable is thought to be the result of efficient economic 
policy : the degree of openness of the economy, the extent of competition in the product 
and factor markets and the rate of accumulation on account of deliberate investment in 
physical and human capital.  The underlying chain of causation is that competition and 
education promote technical progress, with resulting TFP-growth and hence economic 
expansion.  The “free mobility of people, capital and technology and the free entry and exit 
of firms” are regarded to be particularly conducive to the spread of knowledge and 
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technical change.  The high performing Asian economies fall into two distinct groups : 
(a) The productivity-driven economies - Japan, South Korea, Hong Kong, Thailand 
and Taiwan - who registered relatively higher TFP-growth rates and higher 
contributions of TFP to output growth. 
(b) Investment-driven economies - Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore - who 
conformed to the typical developing country pattern of relatively low TFP-growth 
rates and small relative contributions of TFP to output growth. 
The 1993-report is rich in empirical data who support the macro-economic basics of 
neoclassical growth theory : the role  of high saving and investment rates, the impact of 
expenditure on education (human capital) and the dynamics resulting from 
export-orientedness.  The chapters on state intervention and on industrial policy offers 
already a more relaxed view in comparison with the 1991-report, but is still ideologically 
biased in favour of market-friendliness.  However, the real story of policy guidance by the 
Asian dragons fails to support the Bank’s canon on the play of the free market.  In Japan, 
South Korea and Taiwan, the phasing out of obsolescent industries and the support of 
sunrise activities has often required considerable government intervention in order to assist 
the restructuration leading to upgrading at home and at relocation abroad.  A close look at 
the East Asian experience also informs us that the states of these countries have played an 
important role in industrial policy and that the policy.  The policy makers have clearly 
demonstrated a preference for ‘strategic’ rather than ‘close’ integration in the world 
market.  The controversies are still waging between the adepts of neoliberalism who 
explain the high growth rates by the free play of the markets (this is by getting domestic 
and international prices right) and those who impute the successes to the deliberate strategy 
developmental states.  In the following lines we offer a schematic survey of some 
heterodox viewpoints. 137 
Alice Amsden’s book on South Korea is an original and stimulating study, representative 
of the new wave of political economy and institutionalism 138.  In her view one of the basic 
characteristics of ‘late’ industrialisers is that they advance ‘through learning’.  In the 
absence of a domestric tradition or capacity in the research of new technologies they 
borrow, absorb and adapt to their own growth requirements the industrial policies, the 
innovations and the management techniques of performing forerunners.  The core of 
Korea’s success was not so much education or export orientation but shopfloor 
productivity.  The interconnected factors behind East Asia’s micro efficiency extend over a 
                                                          
137  T. Banuri, Economic Liberalisation : No Panacea, Oxford, 1991 ; A. Amsden, 'Diffusion of 
Development : The Late-Industrializing Model and Greater East Asia', in The American Review, n° 2, 
1991 ; R. Wade, 'East Asia’s Economic Success : Conflicting Perspectives, Partial Insights, Shaky 
Evidence', in World Politics, n° 2, 1992 ;  F. Godement, La Renaissance de l’Asie, Paris, 1993 ; The 
periodical World Development published special number on the subject : n° 4, 1994 ; A. Singh, 'How 
Did East Asia Grow So Fast ? Slow Progress Towards an Analytical Consensus', Discussion Papers, 
UNCTAD, n° 97, 1995 ; J. Paulet & I. Mor, L’Asie et la croissance, Paris, 1996. 
138  A. Amsden, Asia’s Next Giant : South Korea and Late Industrialisation, New York, 1989. 
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vast array of domains and institutions, from the shopfloor level to the state.  In East Asia, 
beginning with Japan, there has been a tendency for state subsidies to be dispensed 
according to the principle of reciprocity in exchange for high performance standards with 
respect to output, exports and last but not in the least by industrial upgrading through 
R & D-absorption. East Asian late industrialisation is not only characterised by a high 
degree of labour discipline but also by the Weberian ascetism and discipline of the 
capitalists and managers. 
Subsidies were used as stimuli to realise higher productivity levels in the sunrise industries 
with a promising export performance.  Japan had learned from the West ; South-Korea 
learned from Japan.  They both constructed a similar set of institutions to respond to the 
handicaps and the advantages of lateness.  In particular, they developed an entrepreneurial 
state sustained by managerial bureaucracies and diversified business groups.  According to 
the author, the low-wage advantage is not enough to spur development.  All in all, 
Amsden’s approach is more an institutionalist exercise that comes closer to the real story in 
comparison with the Bank’s report.  The East Asian pattern as she sees it may be 
summarised as follows : ‘industrialisation through learning ; learning through reciprocity 
between government and diversified business groups ; reciprocity involving 
price-distorting subsidies in exchange for performance ; synergy between domestic 
upgrading and in combination with the growth in world market demand.  The above 
mentioned study by Singh analyses the export orientation. 
With a clear emphasis on the socio-political aspects of late industrialisation, Stephan 
Haggard thematises on the different performance of East Asia in comparison with Latin 
America139.  The author organises his analysis on four kinds of factors that bear on the 
policy choices : the international context, domestic coalitions between political parties and 
interest groups, political institutions and the influence of ideas.  However, the author does 
not miss the point that the geopolitical context of East Asia, with an erstwhile aggressive 
communist China next to it, has made that the region received relatively more attention and 
foreign aid (transfer of technology included) than Latin America. 
As far as the strength of the social groups is concerned - agricultural interests, labour and 
business - the Latin American NICs had to face relatively more articulate and organised 
groups in comparison with East Asia.  There the intermediaries of civil society were more 
subdued and/or more in harmony with the official development policies.  In the domain of 
ideas on development, the Latin American elites were influenced by structuralist thought 
- the ECLA doctrine and the dependencia school - while those of East Asia followed a 
more pragmatic course.  In the analyses of the here quoted thematisers on the subject, but 
also of those referred to in their bibliography, a central theme is repeated over and over 
again as a refrain ; namely that the state has to direct society toward the goals of 
development but in order to be efficient the state should also be disciplined this 
                                                          
139  S. Haggard, Path ways from the Periphery : The Politics of Growth in the Newly Industrialising 
Countries, Ithaca, 1990. 
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growth-oriented society. 
To conclude the institutionalist perceptions of the East Asian successes, we refer to the 
interesting study by the political scientist Ziya Onis on ‘the developmental state’140  Japan 
served as a prototype and the dragons and the tigers were inspired by this model.  
Summarily a development state may be profiled as follows : ‘economic development 
defined in terms of growth has pride of place, while productivity and competitiveness, 
constitute the foremost and single-minded priorities of state action.  Conflict of societal 
goals is avoided by the absence of an undue commitment to equality and social welfare in 
the early stages of growth.  High performance is a standard of behaviour and external 
examples provide the state elites with models for emulation.  There is an underlying 
commitment to private property and market.  The market mechanism is assisted by 
instruments and institutions steered by a small-scale, economic bureaucracy which is 
recruited from the best managerial talent in the system.  In development states the single 
most ambition is winning the context of growth.  In this climate of emulation the 
professionals who can assure a high score enjoy prestige and power.  Their autonomy of 
action is thus embedded.  In such a system politicians reign but the professional 
bureaucrats rule141.  Close institutionalised links are organised between the elite 
bureaucracy and private business for consultation and cooperation.  The officials keep 
stringent performance requirements in return for the provided subsidies.  This guidance 
provides results in a different but more efficient production and investment profile than 
would result under the free market system.  These stimuli also accelerate the restructuring 
toward upgrading.  Crucial to the good functioning is a significant degree of 
institutionalised interaction and dialogue between the state elites and autonomous centres 
of power within civil society.  The development state keeps a tap not only on popular 
demands but also on the eccentricities of capital. 
Of course, this ideal type of the development state has not been realised in all its aspects, 
even with the best performers of East Asia.  Even the highly disciplined tigers are not free 
from flaws.  These flaws became in due time more visible with the tigers of Southeast 
Asia : Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia.  More than their predecessors, the second tier 
group was involved in a regional interlinked pattern of TNC-assisted restructuring and 
industrial upgrading along the ‘flying geese pattern’142.  Since the 1980s an acceleration in 
foreign direct investment occurred, this in combination with the emergence of a local 
financial bourgeoisie.  However, a growing number of the financial intermediaries got 
gradually more engaged in speculative activities.  The growing financiarisation of their 
                                                          
140  Z. Onis,  “The Logic of the Development State” in Comparative Politics, October, 1991. 
141  The impact of the relative autonomy of the entrepreneurial part of the bureaucracy for the sustainability 
(the so-called ‘embedded’ autonomy) of high growth is a favourite theme with the institutionalists ; see 
also the interesting study by P. Evans, Embedded Autonomy : States and Industrial Transformation, 
Princeton, 1995. 
142  See for more analytical underpinning empirical evidence of this statement, the following recent reports : 
UNITED NATIONS, World Investment Report, 1995 and UNITED NATIONS, Trade and Development 
Report, 1996.  Both reports illustrate the mechanics of the ‘flying geese’ model in East and South-East 
Asia. 
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economies required sound functioning bank systems and capital markets to keep the 
eventual run-away speculative bulbs in bounds.  Restructuring and upgrading in this 
domain lagged and unsound financial pyramid resulted.  The miracle-economies whose 
developmental state machinery was designed for ‘industrial’ growth flawed in the 
superstructure of its ‘financial’ management.  Like Japan had experienced a financial crisis 
in the beginning of the 1990s, the industrial miracles of the region went through a financial 
shock wave in the second half of 1997.  Thus, also wild geese, are subject to the historical 
law of the rise and fall in growth rates, especially when discipline gives way to (wild) 
financial speculation. 
5. Old and new theoretical questions 
In the debates on the experience of industrial policy and of selective intervention in Japan 
and in the tiger economies of Southeast Asia some reputed scholars of growth theory came 
to the conclusion that the “visible hand” of government had a major and positive role in all 
of these cases.  A judicious package of interventions succeeded in most cases in markedly 
changing the structure and performance of each of these economies in their development 
drive.  Questions of increasing returns to scale, externalities, imperfect information and co-
ordination costs were pointed out as major sources of market failure demanding and 
justifying specific forms of government intervention.143  
This insight led prestigious economists like Krugman and Romer to initiate a revival of old 
issues in development theory.  During a seminar organised by the World Bank they called 
for a “counter-counter-revolution” legitimising some of the writings of the pioneers like 
Rosenstein-Rodan, Nurkse, Prebisch, Myrdal and Hirschman144.  After some blunders of 
the neoliberal counter-revolution against cases of successful voluntaristic industrial policy, 
economists and policy-makers had reached to a better understanding of development 
problems in the new context of the 1990s.  More so than the pioneers of the early postwar 
period the new growth theorists are conscious of the hazards of a badly designed public 
policy package and of the high cost that countries have to pay for excessive intervention 
and protectionism.  On the other side they also agree with their predecessors that market 
forces alone are insufficient to attain the desired industrial restructuring that leads to new 
technology and higher-value activities.  New forms of intervention are needed in order to 
attain such a transition in a reasonable span of time.  Inspired by the pioneers and in 
reaction against the neoliberal version some of the leading modern growth theorists suggest 
that public policies, when appropriately implemented, have been and still are fruitful.  In 
this counter-revolution against the mainstream orthodoxy a group of revivalists underlined 
the importance of institutional variables and the need for co-ordination efforts vis-à-vis 
decentralised market forces.  This in order to steer the economy toward a socially 
satisfactory allocation of resources. 
                                                          
143  J. Stiglitz, "The New Development Economics", in World Development, n° 2, 1986. 
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In Latin America similar voices were heard.  They opined that it would be a misleading 
simplification to argue that the import-subsitution strategy has nothing left behind except 
outmoded industrial plants and rent-seeking entrepreneurs, incapable of functioning in a 
competitive international environment145.  There the heterodox approach was a modernised 
version of the “structuralist school” formerly institutionalised by CEPAL.  The heterodox 
approach has been associated with the ideas on non-recessive adjustment to the debt crisis 
of the 1980s.  According to these tenets, indebted economies should not undergo inept 
adjustment processes that imply setbacks to economic development and incur politically 
unfeasible social costs.  In Brazil the critical press epitomised the IMF-therapy with the 
telling metaphor of“armadilha da recessão” which means the trap for a mouse.  However, 
also in Latin America the political constituencies in favour of heterodoxy grew thinner.  
And in the 1990s the orthodoxy inspired by neoliberalism, backed by the Bretton Woods 
institutions gradually became hegemonic. 
                                                                                                                                                                               
144  P. Krugman,, “Toward a Counter-counter-revolution in Development Theory” and P. Romer, 
“Strategies for Economic Development : Using Ideas and Producing Ideas” in Proceedings of the World 
Bank Annual Conference on Development Economics, Washington, 1993. 
145  J. Fanelli, R. Frenkel & R. Rosenwurch, Growth and Structural Reform in Latin America Where Do We 
Stand ? CEDES, Buenos Aires, 1993 ; G. Schwartz, “Stabilisation Policies Under Political Transition : 
Reform versus Adjustment in Brazil”, in The Developing Economics, March, 1990. 
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CHAPTER XVII : GOOD GOVERNANCE FOR SUB-SAHARAN 
AFRICA 
1. The Patronage Logic of the African State 
In Africa more than elsewhere in the developing world the geopolitical changes of the 
1990s came as a shock with far-reaching political and economic consequences.  The 
internal and external pressure for democratisation and the call for economic reform 
engendered a novel stream of thematisation.  The new canon was that political pluralism 
would stem the tide of decline, engender institutional and societal reform and pave the way 
to sustained economic growth.  In the African context, however, the commitment of the 
opposition parties, to transform the patrimonial logic of the predatory state toward capacity 
growth, seemed to be more ambivalent than most external godfathers wished.  In the 1990s 
the Western governments, multilateral aid organisations, private creditors and other donors 
intensified the external pressure for democratisation.  In some cases where the commitment 
to political liberalisation with reform was rather weak, like in Habyarimana’s Rwanda and 
Mobutu’s Zaïre, the state machinery was paralysed and left a void to be filled up by the 
informal sector.  Civil society was unable to gather the required muscle for reform and the 
impotent camarillas drone on with sterile palavers146.  In these two countries only a 
military conqueror was able to defeat the corrupt regime and to re-install a new one-party 
system.   
Most African states had become independent between 1955-1965.  This was the time when 
the Cold War was at its “hottest”.  Some of the up to then rather insignificant countries 
became strategic domino’s in the ideological and geopolitical rivalry between the 
superpowers.  This context induced the superpowers to reach out and go shopping for the 
favour of the African elites with financial aid as compensatory manna.  Foreign aid was 
forthcoming not so much on the basis of development criteria than with reference to the 
strategic and economic links and interests of donors.  In this context foreign policy was the 
prevailing determinant of aid.  The conditionality of the aid business at that time was 
dependent on alliance stability and material interest for the donor.  In a certain number of 
African countries this caused a substantial ‘geopolitical rent’ that formed a considerable 
part of the state budget.  This dependency of the African elites and their rulers on the 
relationship with external donors, proved to be a key element in the changes of their 
political economy brought about by the end of the Cold War.  All of a sudden aid became 
conditional on internal reform.  In the new geopolitical context the Western donors insisted 
on good governance accompanied by democratisation.  In the new geopolitical context of 
the 1990s the Western godfathers and donors could afford to insist on the moral standards 
of good governance. 
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In the course of the last decade the state-system of postcolonial Africa has been a subject 
of intense study by political scientists, anthropologists and historians147.  More than in the 
past, this academic literature takes into account the long-run historical processes and the 
socio-cultural context in which these postcolonial states and their political economy are 
embedded.  Colonial rule, being by its very nature authoritarian, could not provide the 
ideal tutorship for democratic decision making.  And after a short span of years the 
multi-party systems installed on the eve of independence broke down.  The vacuum was 
filled up by one-party or no-party rule, with military or civilian ‘big men’ in power.  The 
cross-fertilisation between modern authoritarianism and African tradition gave birth to a 
postcolonial patronage network on the basis of which internal tribute-money could be 
raised by politics.  Depending on the angle from which such a system is looked at, this 
network may be labelled a predatory, patrimonial, clientilistic or prebendal state.  In 
postcolonial Africa, politics became essentially a struggle over scarce resources.  The 
French political scientist J. Bayart calls this practice une politique du ventre, or a politics 
of the belly.  According to the patrimonial logic, power status and the major economic 
goods can be procured in the shortest and surest way by the political channel.  The ‘big 
men’ who control and exploit the political machinery and the army, and through this also 
the offices of the state, are by this way in control of the material resources and of surplus 
production.  They direct and regulate the clientilist redistribution in order to consolidate the 
subservience of their followers.  In a recent study Stephen Ellis defines the patronage logic 
as follows :  
‘It is a pyramid in which power and prestige flow from the top downwards while 
wealth is simultaneously sucked from the bottom upwards ; wealth or opportunities 
for advancement are redistributed within clientilistic systems by the provision of 
gifts, commercial opportunities, and so on, to the supporters of political patrons’148. 
In the first decades after independence, the political systems installed by the colonisers 
were gradually Africanised.  The African values and norms took their revenge on 
Westernisation and remodeled the fabric of their society and the offices of the state.  
According to the logic of its African embeddedness, the state increasingly became a 
magnet for all facets of political and economic life ; consuming the attention of traders, 
industrial managers, financial intermediaries, farmers, teachers, traditional rulers and all 
other individuals or groups with social leverage.  In such a generalised system of clientilist 
redistribution, the first victims are the logic of accumulation and the commitment to 
economic development.  The required investments for the production of goods and services 
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and its upgrading in the hierarchy of added-value was increasingly sucked by the prebendal 
client mechanism.  With rather few exceptions, the state enterprises were run inefficiently 
as a result of mismanagement or by the tapping of the resources by a predatory state or by 
a combination of both.  In due time economic decline was lurking behind the corner.  In 
the 1980s the international markets for Africa’s primary products became erratic and less 
promising.  African countries suffered a decline in production, sometimes in absolute 
terms, sometimes in relation with population growth.  Most states took refuge in the 
shelters offered by international institutions that were willing to provide credit and foreign 
aid.  But the time of free-wheeling geopolitical rent was running out.  The programs of 
structural adjustment imposed by the Bretton Woods institutions not only aimed at a 
retrenchment of the state, they also brought new actors on the stage, namely the NGOs and 
civil society. 
Most African states were authoritarian but at the same time too weak to respond to the 
prerequisites of economic growth.  Despite formidable coercive powers the African rulers 
were unable to enforce capital accumulation because they were unable to resist the 
demands of political clientilism.  The bias of their political elites toward urban 
development has diverted resources away from the agricultural sector, which still is the 
major source of added-value in most African countries.  The amounts spent on prestige 
industrial or agro-industrial projects (white elephants) ended most of the time in 
catastrophy by the widespread abuse of power and funds.  The first half of the 1980s was 
witness of different patterns of informal disengagement from the state and the circuits of 
the formal economy.  The growth and spread of the informal economy filled up the void as 
the formal links weakened.  This process of indigenisation functioned as a refuge 
mechanism against the breakdown of modernisation.  It enabled the marginalised groups of 
the population to survive.   
For the sectors of public utilities like education and health-care the informal channels of 
fund-raising sponsored part of their functioning as the provision of funds by the state grew 
thinner or collapsed altogether.  The survival strategy deployed by the sector was an 
indigenous survival strategy in a context of decline.  As such it proves the vitality of the 
base communities to handle their problems by their own means.   In some publications the 
informal sector was attributed with democratic and egalitarian properties functioning on 
the logic of solidarity.  In others, on the contrary, they were downgraded as a mafia of 
smugglers and black marketeers149.  In the second part of the 1980s when the repressive 
capacity of the authoritarian state weakened, new actors like the leaders of the emergent 
civil society entered the scene.  Civil society is defined as the realm of organised social life 
independent of the state and concerned with public communitarian or collective (in 
contrast to private) goals and needs.  The most profiled groups of civil society are trade 
unions, organised business, socio-cultural associations, churches, NGOs and all other 
                                                          
149  The informal sector is a widespread phenomenon in the development world.  For a fair sample of the 
voluminous literature on the subject, see : H. De Soto, el otro sendero : la revolución informal, Bogota, 
1987 ; B. Lautier, L’économie informelle dans le Tiers Monde, Paris, 1994. 
  
 
129
groups who are able to muster countervailing force to the power of the state.  While state 
power acts along a top-down line, these new actors on the scene stood for a bottom-up 
strategy in their drive for political and economic liberalisation.  In this domain they have 
acted as catalysts at the grass-root level150.  In the widespread disillusionment with failure 
of the postcolonial state the Western constituencies and also professionals of development 
called for a more prominent and forceful development role on behalf of civil society and its 
NGOs.  In the new political climate of the 1990s this call was heard and the donors 
embarked upon the gradual NGO-isation of aid. 
2. The World Bank’s Hour 
There is no other place on earth where the World Bank ambitions to have such a decisive 
influence than in Sub-Saharan Africa.  Since the 1980s while they faced mounting 
economic problems their governments were obliged to accept the structural adjustment 
programs in exchange for official aid.  The first generation of these programs was in tune 
with the pure neoliberal view of development and recommended open, export-oriented 
growth on the basis of largely unregulated markets151.  Besides a drastic retrenchment of 
the state in the management of the economy and sound macro-economic policies, the 
Berg-report, as it is often called, recommended ‘to get the prices right’ in the 
micro-economic sphere.  In particular this first report advised the removal of the policy 
bias against agriculture by means of reform in price, exchange rate and state marketing 
policies.  In its strict technical market-view it passed by the most pressing and obvious 
problem, namely that it was the political mess and not only technical deficiencies that 
bedevilled these economies.  The structural adjustment programs went ahead and involved 
profound changes in the allocation of financial aid for the production and distribution of 
resources.  All this with few winners and a lot of losers, namely : government officials and 
public sector workers, party bosses, manufacturers, farmers and most of all the poor 
groups.  The programs did not live up to the expectations and caused a soul-searching 
between the most influential tenors of the bank’s economists.  The disenchantment led to a 
second generation of programs which relied less on the economics of autonomous‘trickle 
down’and came out for directive action.  In fact they recommended “political correct” 
specific stimuli of assistance in favour of the poor152.   
At the very moment when the Berlin wall was tired down the World Bank came out with a 
‘third generation’ policy view for Africa.  Here the emphasis was on the socio-political 
prerequisites for sustained development, to wit : political liberalisation, empowerment of 
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the people, greater accountability of government by means of good governance153.  With 
the emphasis on administrative probity and efficiency ; on effective legal, judicial and 
regulatory mechanisms, especially property rights and contracts ; with the recommendation 
for informational openness and transparency including a free press, the Bank entered 
political waters.  This betokens a new turn in perspective and a considerable broadening of 
development ideology.  Here the emphasis is not on less but on better or on more efficient 
government.  With its insistence on reinvigoration of local government and the fostering of 
community participation, or in other words on the importance given to civil society and its 
NGOs, the reports opened a novel agenda with populist overtones.  One of the new and 
prior goals of development, as the Bank proclaimed in this blueprint, is ‘to empower 
ordinary people to take charge of their lives, to make communities more responsible for 
their development and to make governments listen to their people’.  The fostering of a 
more pluralistic institutional structure - including NGOs - is seen to be a means toward the 
above mentioned ends.  With the recommendation of accountability, legitimacy, 
transparency, participation and empowerment of the people, the staff of the World Bank 
opens the horizon.  It crosses the borders from the strict economic domain and engages in 
thematisations which belong to political science and sociology.  The fact that a powerful 
international institution like the World Bank embraced the ideals of democratisation and 
decentralisation, and emphasised the importance of civil society were clear signals to the 
oppressive and corrupt regimes that the times had changed.   
The focus on civil society, grass roots movements and NGOs betokened that the Bank’s 
staff had absorbed the academic and even the more popular thematisations on these 
subjects.  In taking this stance the Bank not only reflects the ‘new wave’ in development 
studies ; it also helps to produce, spread and globalise it.  However, the Bank’s concept of 
good governance was also critically scrutinised by political scientists and sociologists154.  
The critical substance can be synthesised as follows : 
a. For Williams and Young the Bank’s idea of good governance, particularly the idea 
of empowerment and participation, are even in the democratic societies of the West 
recent constructs and ideals.  They did not have cultural roots in Africa and even 
today these lofty ideals do not arouse the African masses. 
b. The Bank’s approach is in fact a revival of the modernisation (Westernisation) 
theory of the early postwar period.  Modern sensibilities rule out some of the old 
colonial methods, but with the technical emphasis on disciplining, monitoring and 
watching the Bank reaches much deeper into African society and ambitions to 
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mould them more than has ever been contemplated in modern times.  Some of these 
programs vehicle a form of "moral" authoritarianism.  
c. Some of the critics strongly doubt the thesis that the introduction of a Western type 
of liberal democracy may reinvigorate economic growth.  There are no historical 
precedents of such a development course. 
d. Still others criticise the over-enthusiasm of the Bank on the development capacity 
of civil society and its NGOs.  We quote Fowler, a specialist in this matter and 
former NGO-professional : ‘Experience to date suggests that there are few grounds 
for believing that NGOs in Africa will fare any better in promoting democratisation 
than their counterparts in Latin America.  African NGOs are recognised to be 
organisationally weak and seldom truly indigenous or rooted within the mass of the 
population’155.  Moreover, Williams and Young state that this lack of indigenous 
roots of the NGOs is not incidental for, we quote ‘they share with Western 
constituencies not only a lack of interest but also contempt for cultural traditions 
that do not square with Western notions of ‘rights’ and ‘justice’. 
The African context offered an ideal platform for intellectual leadership to the Bank156.  In 
the domain of economics and also in technical matters the professional staff of the 
institution is of excellent quality.  They produce an impressive amount of papers and 
studies.  A great number of these staff papers are of outstanding quality and most are 
published and reach the specialists on development around the globe.  Moreover, the Bank 
is a pre-eminent employer of consultants in the development field.  And as George and 
Sabelli pointedly state : ‘This state of affairs coincides with the now greater dependency of 
academics, university departments and development institutes on income from consultancy 
work’.  The same can be said of the NGOs who are increasingly integrated in local 
development projects sponsored by the Bank.  In a great number of specialised and general 
topics (from water supply to good governance) the World Bank sets the agenda.  It is also 
able to mobilise the material and intellectual resources to implement its projects.  Since the 
end of the 1980s the World Bank has increasingly taken up a role of intellectual leadership 
in the field of development.   
The future will show whether the increasing dependency of the university staff engaged in 
research subsidised by the World Bank will influence the thematisation on development in 
a positive or a negative way.  But as it happens so often in history, the financial crises of 
the most dynamic emerging countries, namely the Asian tigers, changed text and context.  
In the wake of the questionable management of these crises by the IMF as well as by the 
World Bank, the intellectual canon as well as the strategy of both institutions known under 
the flag of Washington Consensus came under academic and political fire. 
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CHAPTER XVIII : THE SURGE OF LIBERALISM AND 
GLOBALISATION 
In the 1990s a series of ruptures in the ideological and geopolitical context produced a 
watershed of changes : the implosion of communism in the Comecon countries, the 
opening of China to market forces and a relentless surge of globalisation in the rest of the 
world.  This systemic turn of the tide was driven by the global triumph of the neoliberal 
ideology over its former rivals.  In the political spectrum of Europe and Latin America a 
notorious rightward shift took place.  There the social democratic parties assimilated a 
good deal of the ideas and practices of the neoliberal creed.  In Europe their platform was 
called the Third Way.  And in Latin America it was labelled a move to “realistic” utopia.  
In the academic sphere a similar rightward trend occurred.  The appeal of heterodoxy 
declined and the legitimation of orthodoxy moved centre stage.  In this process “text and 
context” were dialectically entwined.  The process of globalisation went hand in hand with 
a marked convergence toward the uniformisation of economic thought.  In the French 
literature the evolving canon of development was named “la pensée unique” and in the 
Anglo-American publications this mainstream orthodoxy for the developing economies 
sailed under the flag of “Washington Consensus”157. 
According to proponents it would be a misconception to see the neoliberal trend of the 
1990s as simply a corrective political response to the mercantilism, welfarism and 
corporatism of previous decades.  In their view neoliberalism is not only geared toward a 
retrenchment of the state.  The new style of liberal political reason encourages government 
to actively create the legal conditions within which entrepreneurial and competitive 
conduct is able to flourish.  Neoliberal government is pre-eminently economic government 
in the dual sense of less government and a political practice geared to securing the 
conditions for optimum economic performance.  In the economic domain these principles 
served as a forceful legitimisation for the liberalisation of international trade, for 
deregulation of financial markets and for privatisation of state enterprises.  In this frame of 
thought macroeconomic policy has to be sound and stable.  Moreover, it was expected to 
play second fiddle to the pre-eminent microeconomics of the market forces.  The staff of 
the World Bank, of the IMF and of WTO used their intellectual and institutional clout to 
break open the impediments and barriers created by national industrial policies of nation 
states.  The major aim was the creation of a global market.  The new geographical context 
was expressed in a novel vocabulary.  The orthodox market policies of the core countries 
in the West would play as a locomotive for the catch-up strategy of the emerging market 
economies of the periphery and for the transition economies of the communist converts. 
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In the wake of this systemic change a new cycle of development came to bloom, namely 
the financiarisation of the economy.  As a result of liberalisation and deregulation of the 
markets in the United States herein followed by Europe and Japan, the financial 
superstructure of this triad flourished into a significant multiple in comparison with their 
national products.  According to the statistics of the Bank for International Settlements 
their financial flows climbed at the end of the 1990s to a total of 25 times the volumes 
traded in the combined sectors of the real economy.  In the wake of the extraordinary 
expansion of the credit and capital markets in the triad a massive flow of international 
direct investment, of bank credit and of portfolio capital flooded toward a relatively small 
number of the most promising emerging market countries and to the transition economies.  
Like in the triad the financial system of the emerging market economies underwent a 
systemic change by the fast expansion of the local banking circuits and fast growing 
stockmarkets.  The financiarisation of their economy, assisted by international direct 
investment, by volatile short-term credit inflows and by foreign portfolio capital, initiated a 
problematic interaction between their credit, stock and currency markets158. Since the 
exchange rate of the emerging markets economies were pegged to the dollar the monetary 
authorities lost their grip on the evolution of their international terms of trade.  The 
development and stability of the real economy depended in a higher and growing degree on 
the way in which the local financial superstructure absorbed, intermediated an channelled 
the flood of foreign credit and capital toward productive investment.   
The emergence and expansion of a huge pool of internationally mobile and risk-sensitive 
financial capital had far-reaching effects on the functioning of the emerging markets.  The 
financial superstructure dominated the real sector of the economy.  And the gyration of the 
prices of equities and of capitalisation volumes in the stockmarkets caused unforeseen 
shocks in the capital balance of their firms.  Their international capital account, depending 
on the supply of foreign capital and on the risk sentiment associated with it, became the 
key problem, while in the former situation the current account, determined by the 
performance of the real economy had been the key variable.  As a consequence the new 
style crises would not so much originate in the real sector of the economy but would 
become exchange rate and financial crises159. 
The initial effects of the financial injections from abroad were positive.  But as time went 
on the massive inflow of foreign credit and capital resulted in an unsustainable boom and 
finally in economic dislocation (an expansionary import drive, overvaluation of the real 
exchange rate, explosion of real estate prices, etc.) followed by speculative “bubbles” in 
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the recipient countries.  Their local financial markets were unprepared to manage the 
massive inflows from abroad, especially those of a volatile nature like short term bank 
credits and portfolio capital.  And some of the best performing economies in the world like 
the tigers of Asia, followed by lesser stars like Russia and Brazil succumbed to a disturbing 
financial crisis.  This new era of financial crises demonstrates how the underdeveloped 
financial sectors of the emerging market countries, exposed as they were to exuberant 
deregulation and inadequate risk assessment by international creditors and investors, can 
cripple the development of the economy.   
In the aftermath of these crises a new cycle of thematisation set in.  A great number of the 
thematisers now focuses the attention on the inherent instability of the rapidly but 
disorderly liberalisation practices and on the much needed reform of the international 
financial architecture160.  The financial crises of the second half of the 1990s resulted in a 
more realistic and even a critical view of the neoliberal canon.  The market mechanism is a 
key instrument for an efficient allocation of resources since it gives a free play to the 
entrepreneurial spirit.  However, the financial crisis demonstrated that when markets are 
entirely liberalised, perverse “animal spirits” get loose.  In order to achieve a more stable 
development, prudential practices and institutions are essential.  Regulating institutions 
matter even as much as markets161. 
In keeping with our thesis of the systemic changes in the international political economy 
we suggest to take the liberalisation of international markets as the independent variable 
rather than globalisation.  The former draws the attention to the policy dimension of the 
determining force while globalisation could pass as a spontaneous worldwide extention of 
the economy.  Globalisation is largely occurring as a result of conscious decisions to 
liberalise cross-border transactions in capital, credit, goods, services, people, information 
and business practices.  Moreover, the free market school of thought proclaims to be the 
embodiment of the single best approach for all countries in a global financial system, 
where everyone is subject to the same rules.  In the old time development models of the 
immediate aftermath of World War II the international constraints were seen as structural 
impediments for a balanced growth of the national economies.  In today’s orthodoxy 
domestic policy error rather than unfavourable external conditions heads the list of 
explanation of poor performance. 
In order to come to the crux of the matter the surge of free and worldwide movements of 
credit and capital could not have happened on the sole basis of ideas and neoclassical 
tenets.  Powerful interests were also at work to spread production structures and capital 
markets worldwide.  The production in local markets by foreign affiliates of multinational 
firms has largely superseded the total volume of international trade and the profits that 
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result from foreign direct investment form a substantial and growing part of total profits in 
the balance sheets of multinational industrial firms and banks162.  In our financiarised 
economies the power of decision has shifted from the managers toward the shareholders.  
Since the second half of the 1980s this model of shareholders control has spread first from 
the United States to Europe and in a second move to the emerging market countries and to 
the transition economics.  The expanding stockmarkets in the core economies of the centre 
as well as in the periphery functioned as hothouses for this systemic change.   
In the decade of the 1990s capital liberalisation has replaced trade liberalisation at the top 
of the policy agenda.  In this shift of emphasis the growing international indebtedness of 
the United States loomed large.  In the second half of the 1990s the foreign debt of the 
United States grew to a volume amounting to ten times the foreign debt of Brazil.  In the 
ongoing controversy over international capital flows the well-known American political 
economist Robert Wade bluntly stated that on account of its low rate of national saving the 
richest country in the world, namely the United States needs to tap the rest of the world’s 
savings163.  In this paradoxical situation the centre of the world’s capital markets, namely 
Wall Street, is able to transform the foreign-deficit of the US into a highly profitable 
business.  The emerging market countries were manifestly unable to achieve this “tour de 
force”.  In several think tanks of the periphery this pattern of free capital movements was 
denounced as a process of asymmetrical globalisation.  In the boom-and-bust cycle in asset 
markets, the weakness of the financial system and the blunders of the global regulatory 
institutions produced a shockwave of self-reflection and criticism.  In the post-crisis 
thematisation the intermediary transmitters of financial globalism, especially the 
international bankers and the guru’s of stockmarkets found themselves in the tick of 
controversy.  Georges Soros, a notorious guru of Wall Street wrote a book in which he 
openly confessed that the system of global capitalism itself is the main cause of financial 
fragility164. 
In the critical assessment of the failures in the surveillance by the international 
Bretton Woods institutions and more so in denouncing the blunders of the IMF in the 
handling of the financial crisis, a great number of scholars and policy makers joined the 
chorus clamouring for reform.  Influential opinion makers from the centre as well as from 
the periphery denounced the rescue plans of the IMF as inept and its far-reaching tutelage 
of the countries in crisis as a form of neocolonialism.  Looked at from the South of the 
world the intellectual and cultural arrogance of the IMF received more than one blast.  
From the South Letter we take the following quotation : “An equally difficult barrier (in 
the negotiations) lies in its in-bred, inward looking and elitist institutional culture, 
homogenised by educational experience and background of its professional staff.  They are 
much more comfortable in the theoretical world of assumed rationality and economic logic 
than in the practical messy world of politics and the reconciliation of a multiplicity of 
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diverse interests… Regardless of their diverse nationalities, they think alike, almost as if 
they have been cloned”165.  This may seem a harshly worded statement.  But our own saga 
on development theorising points to the same problem, namely that the West has not yet 
learned to understand and respect the cultural “others”.  In many of the postwar 
development models “text and context” were worlds apart.  The guidance offered by 
development economists and international institutions was in its major part inspired by 
so-called universal principles of “theory-and-practice”.  In the multicultural world of ours 
this misconceived canon of universality proclaimed by Western scholars and policy makers 
is to my mind one of the major reasons for the limited development success of the last half 
century.   
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CHAPTER XIX : A FLASHBACK ON DEVELOPMENT THEORY 
Since 1945 an impressive amount of development studies has been published.  The period 
from 1945 to the beginning of the seventies produced a high tide.  Development theorising 
imposed and manifested itself as a specific and specialised branch of economics, sociology 
and political science166.  In the period of the pioneers a great variety of contrasting theories 
and models were formulated.  Reformists, marxists, structuralists and theoreticians of the 
dependency school debated with gusto and ideological verve on the best path toward 
welfare and development.  The theoreticians of dependency and unequal exchange and still 
more so the marxists proclaimed that a strategy of delinking from capitalism was the best 
way.  The reformist growth economists on the contrary opined that a process of physical 
and human capital formation, assisted by a judicious steering by the state would do well 
enough.   In their schemes the infant industry argument and protective measures were 
instrumental for an initial strategy of import-substitution industrialisation. 
In the second half of the seventies, after a series of setbacks in the capitalist as well as in 
the socialist Third World, the heterodoxies that were chapter and verse in the aftermath of 
World War II went in retreat.  The emphasis upon the inadequacies of markets in general 
and international trade in particular lost appeal against the neoclassical counter-revolution.  
The new development thinking emphasised export orientation as an antidote to the inward 
looking strategy and relied on the market mechanism "to set the prices right".  The new 
approach rejected state intervention since in this view government was the problem rather 
than the solution. Reform and structural adjustment meant privatisation and fiscal 
retrenchment.  In the ensuing country convergence to these neoliberal standard norms "la 
pensée unique" became hegemonic.  Under this pressure of international convergence, 
development theories lost their autonomous status.  Moreover, they are now more formal 
and less sweeping than in the time of the pioneers.  In keeping with the general trend in 
economics the new style development models sacrificed the strategic vision of the past.  A 
great number of these topical and technical exercises produce an impressive set of 
sophisticated empirical findings at the microlevel.  In most of them the vision is 
completely lost.  Since the 1980s development theory underwent a process of gradual 
absorption by general theory.  And in an incisive review article Albert Fishlow conceded 
with some nostalgia that economic development theory is now in search of itself167. 
In the wake of the financial crises of the emergent market countries the neoliberal canon 
came also under fire.  In their review of development theory two well-known scholars in 
the field of development, namely Irma Adelman and Cynthia Taft Morris, bluntly stated 
that "the purely neoclassical Washington-consensus theories apply fully mainly to the 
                                                          
166  C. Wilber, "The Methodological Foundations of Development Economics", in World Development, 
n° 2, 1986 ; Ch. Oman & G. Wignaraja, L'évolution de la pensée économique sur le développement 
depuis 1945, OCDE, Paris, 1991. 
167 A. Fishlow, "Review of Handbook of Development Studies", in Journal of Economic Literature, 
December, 1991. 
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handful of developing countries currently engaged in the final process of transition to 
OECD status"168.  This line was written before the financial crises of the Asian tigers who 
were acknowledged to be eager disciples of the export orientation strategy and of financial 
globalism.  The post-crisis questioning of "la pensée unique" may open a new horizon for 
the rejuvenation of development theory.  To stir things up Irma Adelman and her colleague 
put the finger on the sore spot of development theorising ; we quote "development theories 
both old style and new, have suffered from misplaced universality and from tunnel 
vision… they must therefore be changed to take full cognisance of historical and 
situational relativism and of the multifaceted nature of the development process".  We 
enthusiastically share this paradigmatic standpoint.  In the postmodern cultural nationalism 
of our time the broadening of the horizon by an inclusion of the neglected context, to wit 
the historical, cultural and ethical dimensions, offers a promising future for the 
development of development theory.   
Development history informs us that theories, policies and institutions are context specific 
and do not transfer well to other environments and circumstances.  From the history of 
ideas we have learned likewise that canons like all products of the human mind are up to a 
certain degree dependent on context and time.  Thus they are coded by the values, the 
norms, the paradigmatic modes of thought and the historical consciousness prevalent in the 
society from which they spring.  Canons like all human artefacts live a cycle of birth, 
growth and flourishing followed by decline and re-interpretation.  A crisis mood elicits 
self-reflection conducive to a widening of the intellectual horizon.  In the aftermath of the 
forceful swing of the orthodox canon that failed, new themes and more promising 
theoretical perspectivations may flourish.  For development theory the times are ripe for a 
new beginning. 
                                                          
168 I. Adelman & C. Taft Morris, "Development History and its Implications for Development Theory, in 
World Development, n° 6, 1997. 
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